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Foreword 
Krzysztof Klincewicz’s book is of outstanding interest for business practi-
tioners in the high-tech sector, as well as scholars and policy makers. In re-
cent years, there has been growing pressure on firms to give higher priority 
to R&D and at the same time to improve their R&D effectiveness. These 
pressures are associated with the accelerating rate of product innovations, 
shorter product life-cycles, the growing diversification of the technological 
portfolio underlying the products and the growing range of applications, 
functions that a product or a service must provide. For example, a mobile 
phone, which used to provide only real time voice communication in its 
early days has additional functionality nowadays to provide including mu-
sic downloading, Internet access, digital TV and global positioning. We are 
witnessing transformations of simple products to become complex prod-
ucts. Boundaries between hitherto distinct sectoral segments are becoming 
blurred as the result of technological change. For management, all this im-
plies that the traditional focus on the management of projects must be ex-
tended to include greater emphasis on the strategically more important is-
sue of the management of technology. It is universally known today that 
information and communication technology (ICT) has now become the 
dominant technology in the world economy. This field is characterized by 
its turbulent nature of changes taking place in the market as well as tech-
nologies. No firm can realistically hope to exist on its own in isolation. It 
has to form linkages with its competitors as well as other firms, institutions 
in the same or different field. At the same time, it has to manage these link-
ages efficiently and also creatively. This is where Dr Klincewicz has made 
a significant contribution. 
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Firstly, the author has been able to analyze accurately the processes of 
radical change in the high tech industry, characterized by strategic partner-
ships. He develops an analytical framework to analyze the structure of the 
high-tech industry, based on the concept of high-tech value chain, which is 
different from platform leadership. The analytical framework and the ty-
pology offers new ways of interpreting a company’s own position in the 
industry and how one can make strategic moves vis-à-vis other players in 
the value chain, to maximize one’s competitiveness. He classifies three 
types of players in the value chain: value chain leader, complementors and 
contractors, and then discusses the roles and strategies of each of them. The 
book offers a comprehensive review of existing literature, concerning stra-
tegic alliances, management of technology and high-tech markets. Al-
though the book greatly benefits from existing literature, the author avoided 
excessive quotations or full discussions of concepts already published 
elsewhere, instead, the book focuses on comparisons between existing and 
proposed models and their empirical evaluation using novel research tech-
niques. 
Secondly, the theoretical framework is complemented by in-depth case 
studies. Since the companies analyzed are leading firms in the field, includ-
ing Microsoft, NTT DoCoMo, Cisco, Indian software companies and Tai-
wanese electronics manufacturers, the comparison of their performances 
and strategies provides an excellent opportunity to assess some of the char-
acteristics of technology management styles in different countries. The au-
thor extends his analysis to the community-driven development scenario of 
open source software and the role of government. 
Thirdly, as the author shows, strategic partnership can be managed with 
foresight, systematically and he proposes multiple useful techniques such 
as partnership network mapping, managing close and distant value seg-
ments, transformation from partner intimacy towards independent innova-
tion. 
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Fourthly, the author uses novel techniques in his analysis to analyze the 
dynamically changing high-tech industry using qualitative and quantitative 
techniques such as partnership network mapping and data mining. This too 
is of great interest to those working in the field of science and technology 
policy, as well as those in industry, consulting and business schools. 
Dr Klincewicz spent 2 years in my laboratory at Tokyo Institute of Tech-
nology. In April 2005, a new Graduate School of Innovation Management 
was established. It is timely that Dr Klincewicz has carried out this re-
search. In my lab, I and my students have been studying sectoral systems of 
innovation, competence building in firms, high-tech diffusion and technol-
ogy strategies of high-tech firms using a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative data and techniques such as bibliometric analysis and data 
mining. I think Krzysztof Klincewicz’s previous experiences working in 
the software industry as well as academia, as well as his linguistics skills 
(being able to learn Japanese in a short while) has helped him to carry out 
this research. He considerably deepens our understanding of the importance 
of management of the high-tech value chain for this major industry of the 
twenty first century. For all these reasons, I recommend this book most 
strongly. 
 
 
Kumiko Miyazaki 
Professor 
Graduate School of Innovation Management, Tokyo Institute of Technology 
December 2005 
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Preface 
The book presents results of a research project, concerning the strategies of 
high-tech companies, funded by the government of Japan and conducted at 
Tokyo Institute of Technology. I had an opportunity to confront the estab-
lished theoretical frameworks, experiences from my previous work for 
software companies in several European countries, as well as recent trends 
and developments in the global technology sector. In spite of the abun-
dance of (overwhelmingly quantitative) studies concerning computer, tele-
communications and media sectors, there are only few publications at-
tempting to offer integrated frameworks and models for the converging 
domains. To make things worse, there are not many empirically grounded 
publications about strategies of high-tech companies, what remains in a 
striking contrast to numerous to-become bestsellers for managers, often 
containing unconvincing, normative statements. 
Managers working in the high-tech industry discover early in their ca-
reers the limited relevance of general theories and models related to man-
agement and marketing. They cannot explain many important phenomena 
and tendencies, not capturing some critical dimensions of the market activ-
ity. The present book will hopefully help better understand the underlying 
logic of the high-tech industry, with the specificity of corporate strategies 
and interorganizational relations. In the following chapters, you will have 
an opportunity to read about the high-tech value chain, resulting from the 
nature of new technologies, but constituting the industry structure and im-
pacting strategies of all high-tech companies. In the last 15 years, strategic 
alliances became the main driving force for the industry development – 
nowadays, it is easy to think of “standalone” strategies and complete 
independence, due to the proliferation of technology standards, long- or 
short-term linkages, and the complementary nature of advanced products. 
The present underlying logic of the high-tech industry, described by the 
high-tech value chain model, turns alliances into a strategic necessity. The 
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tech value chain model, turns alliances into a strategic necessity. The fol-
lowing chapters will introduce the relevant concepts and identify three ge-
neric partnership strategies in technology markets: value chain leader, 
complementor and contractor. They will also discuss the relevance of pro-
posed frameworks for alternative industry settings, including the open 
source software community, apparently revolutionary different from the 
ways commercial companies tend to cooperate. 
The book is rooted in multiple theoretical perspectives, coming from the 
domains of strategic management (including Porter's and Treacy and 
Wiersema's work on corporate strategies, resource-based perspective and 
the model of co-opetition), technology management (with the concepts of 
industry convergence, supplier-driven innovation, technology lifecycle and 
complementors) and organizational theory (particularly the heritage of so-
cial embeddedness and organizational politics frameworks). First two chap-
ters of the book will introduce some of these concepts, attempting to inte-
grate them and point to their relevance for technology companies. 
The research project involved a mixture of qualitative and quantitative 
methods, used to analyze the relatively unexplored phenomena. I particu-
larly benefited from in-depth qualitative case studies of the Japanese mo-
bile telecom operator NTT DoCoMo, software giant Microsoft and their 
partners, as well as Taiwanese electronics and Indian IT services compa-
nies. Different technologies and diverse cultural settings helped propose 
and test theoretical concepts, which would not be relevant only to Silicon 
Valley start-ups, taking into account the recent industry developments and 
the increasing importance of Asian companies. The case studies were based 
on multiple data sources, including industry press and analysts, interviews, 
other forms of corporate communication and government materials – the 
strenuous task of coding and analyzing was greatly facilitated by a qualita-
tive data analysis software nVivo. To cast some light on the scale of the ef-
fort: I derived my understanding of NTT DoCoMo's business from an 
analysis of over 1,300 documentary sources, while Microsoft case study 
was based on over 1,600 documents – the analysis, theory modeling and 
testing would not be possible without computer support, which additionally 
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helped me follow the methodological recommendations of the grounded 
theory approach while analyzing the data. The adopted approach differs 
significantly from past, predominantly quantitative studies – early in the 
course of the project, I discovered the limited usefulness of the dominant 
alliance research paradigm, recommending to count alliance agreements 
from specialist databases and use econometric modeling and statistical in-
ference to test hypotheses. As the book will explain, alliances are not dis-
crete events, but processes – for strategy makers, more important is their 
dynamics than initial agreements. Moreover, many strategically important 
types of cooperation are not formalized and could only be discovered 
through detailed case study analysis. Nevertheless, triangulation of multiple 
data sources and perspective helps better understand complex phenomena 
and verify conclusions, so the qualitative case studies were supplemented 
by quantitative research techniques, including financial analysis, partner-
ship network mapping (using dedicated Ucinet and NetDraw software 
packages) and bibliometric analyses (facilitated by scientific data mining 
solution VantagePoint). 
Managers of high-tech companies will hopefully find here useful recom-
mendations helping them define corporate strategies. The integrated part-
nership model, described in the following chapters, suggests when, how 
and with whom to ally in order to stimulate innovation and diffusion of 
technological products. The three strategic alternatives include options for 
market penetration without substantial financial investment, opening doors 
to young start-up companies and helping them gradually grow their busi-
nesses. Plural governance model and portfolio of incentives and deterrents 
help in turn established firms align the strategies of their partners and boost 
their innovativeness. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Evolving corporate strategies 
1.1.1 Challenges for established models 
The main task of any business organization is to create value in the econ-
omy – but classical strategic management frameworks may not adequately 
capture the complexity of the turbulent technological environment, with 
frequent breakthrough innovations and radical structural changes. The pre-
sent book suggests extensions of popular models such as value chain (Por-
ter 1985) and industry competitive forces analysis (Porter 1998: 3), adopt-
ing them to the 21st century high-tech industry. Corporate value chains of 
advanced technology companies are nowadays increasingly disintegrated, 
each chain segment may even form the core of business of a separate com-
pany, while linkages between the segments are not always defined by ex-
plicit, formalized supply contracts. Value creation processes are no longer 
based on vertical links among divisions of one company, and the entire in-
dustry structure turns into a multiplicity of interrelated partnership net-
works, blurring the roles of suppliers, customers and competitors. 
High-tech firms look at their environment through different lenses, not 
adequately represented by these frameworks. Similarly, academic critics 
representing resource-based perspective in strategic management, point to 
various limitations of the models, as failing to capture the complexity of re-
lations in modern industries. While Porter's framework focuses on stable 
industries with incidental entrants, most markets experience turbulent 
changes, disrupting the growth of incumbents' businesses (Slater and Olson 
2002), blurring boundaries between new entrants and innovative substi-
tutes. Commercial success of technologically advanced products depends 
usually on companies offering complementary products and services, add-
ing value to the core product while not being its suppliers (Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger 1997). The roles of suppliers, customers and competitors 
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are often blurred, with companies launching ad hoc or strategic cooperation 
with competitors (Nalebuff and Brandenburger 1997), liaising with cus-
tomers (or even investing in them to induce loyalty), and pursuing alli-
ances. Moreover, value chain as a sequential mode of value creation and 
delivery is not the only alternative in structuring business operations. Other 
options include “value shops”: service organizations focused on one se-
lected set of activities only (Stabell and Fjeldstad 1998: 414), e.g. solving 
specific customer problems as consultants, researchers, designers or out-
sourcers, and “value networks”: firms using “mediating technologies” to 
link different groups of customers (Stabell and Fjeldstad 1998: 427). Value 
networks, exemplified by financial services, telecommunications or Inter-
net companies, provide underlying platforms for communication and ex-
change between various parties like depositors and borrowers in the case of 
banks, or content providers and users in digital business, where all may act 
as customers and suppliers at the same time, and the addition of one new 
customer increases value to all others network participants1. The conclusion 
of the criticism is a need for an alternative approach to industry analysis, 
important particularly for technology-based industries with the most turbu-
lent high-tech industry – a framework focusing on complicated networks of 
relations and taking into account multiple possible configurations of value 
creation and delivery, not only the typical supplier-customer scenario. The 
present book intends to introduce this new way of looking at the high-tech 
industry, revising established analytical frameworks and proposing new 
ones. It incorporates theories from the diverse domains of technology, 
management science and social theory and tests their relevance using cases 
of market leaders in several industry sectors. 
1.1.2 Modularization 
Supply chains in various industries are increasingly modularized - proc-
esses and operations are rearranged by connecting “components”, coming 
from various companies (Veryard 2002). Companies internationalize their 
                                           
1 For a detailed typology of possible value networks as alternatives to the established 
frameworks for industry analysis, comp. (Tapscott et al. 2000) 
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operations by subcontracting manufacturing tasks and outsourcing adminis-
trative processes to third parties, focusing instead on intangible assets (in-
cluding brand and intellectual property). 
In the 1990s, observers witnesses a stunning popularity of outsourcing as 
a new governance form, promising the reduction of fixed costs, particularly 
for technology-intensive processes such as the management of I.C.T. infra-
structure. The diffusion of outsourcing can partly be attributed to band-
wagon effects (Loh and Venkatraman 1992), with firms thoughtlessly imi-
tating decisions of their peers, perceived as established industry practices. 
Recent decisions of major organizations may reverse the trend – in 2004, 
JPMorgan Chase prematurely terminated a $5 billion contract with IBM, 
one of the largest outsourcing contracts in the history, and decided to in-
source the concerned activities, focusing on operational efficiency to gain 
substantial cost benefits compared with the contractual terms and condi-
tions. The upcoming outsourcing-insourcing debate will most likely dem-
onstrate the usefulness of both approaches, depending on multiple situ-
ational factors. 
Modularization means that every value chain segment can be subject to a 
make-or-buy decision. Particularly organizations dealing with advanced 
technologies are prone to the trend: not surprisingly, the largest technology 
companies actively pursue innovative approaches to operations manage-
ment, shifting production to Electronic Manufacturing Services (EMS) 
firms and using offshore software developers. 
1.1.3 Co-opetition and horizontal partnerships 
Another global business tendency is co-opetition. The term was coined by 
Barry Nalebuff and Adam Brandenburger (1997), who applied the princi-
ples of game theory to strategic management, demonstrating the blurring 
boundary between cooperation and competition. Successful innovative 
strategies often involve partnering with own competitors in specific areas, 
while still competing in others. Empirical research confirms the omnipres-
ence of such horizontal alliances – already in the 1980s, rivals in the semi-
conductor sector were actively forming partnerships (Stuart 1998: 671-
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672), and recent years brought even more cases when direct competitors 
were joining forces. 
For technology companies, partnering with competitors helps establish 
standards, develop technologies and boost their diffusion, as well as inno-
vate with high risk projects, where investments and competences are con-
tributed by both partners. Working with own competitors could also be 
used as a political measure to block their activities and restrict strategies – 
the technique was used by Microsoft, acquiring minority stakes in finan-
cially troubled rivals Apple Computer, Corel and Inprise to keep their 
products in the market, while aligning the product development plans with 
own strategy. Finally, in cases when competing firms lack differentiation, 
while developing comparable products, they may benefit from joining 
forces, as in the case of a successful alliance between Japanese semicon-
ductor units of Hitachi and Mitsubishi Electric, which later transformed 
into a joint-venture company Renesas Technology. 
1.1.4 Complementary vertical partnerships 
Resources available to an organization define its strategic opportunities, but 
these resources and competencies do not necessarily need to be developed 
internally. Creative strategies use existing resources as a leverage to gain 
other needed assets, owned by third-parties (Hammel and Prahalad 1993). 
A company may pursue vertical alliances to develop products beyond its 
existing expertise, pooling resources through a combination of own skills 
with the inputs from partners (Hammel and Prahalad 1990a). A prominent 
example is the entry of computer software giant Microsoft into new mar-
kets, including Internet content delivery, interactive television, business 
systems and gaming consoles, enabled by appropriate specialist partners, 
ranging from semiconductor and hardware manufacturers to software de-
velopers, content and service providers. Instead of simple supplier-
customer relationships, Microsoft created a complex networks of compa-
nies, working together to develop and promote technologies. Some of key 
Microsoft partners were never its suppliers: Intel was developing micro-
processors, used by Microsoft partners to produce computer hardware, but 
the symbiotic relationship between the two complementors - companies of-
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fering complementary products and services, while not being mutual sup-
pliers and customers - made Windows system work better on specific Intel 
chips, and offered customers incentives to upgrade to new chip generations, 
when new Windows features were released (Nalebuff and Brandenburger 
1997: 30). Financial results of software companies are linked to the diffu-
sion of dedicated hardware, and the business of IT services companies de-
pends on the availability, cost and functionality of software solutions. It 
should therefore be no surprise that companies not only appreciate the im-
portance of complementors, but also actively manage them to improve the 
concerned offering and stimulate demand. In many cases, it is difficult to 
distinguish suppliers and complementors, as components coming from all 
these parties may be critical for a company’s success. 
1.1.5 Community-driven innovation networks 
The popularity of horizontal and vertical partnerships turns many markets 
into complex networks of interrelated companies, partnering in some areas 
and competing in others, functioning as an ecosystem, which maintains a 
short-term balance while undergoing dynamic changes. Traditional, one-
dimensional analyses of industry structure, e.g. Porter’s (1985) five forces 
model, fail to address this complexity, as companies operate in multiple 
markets, their positions in one field influence strategies adopted in other 
areas, and labels of suppliers, customers and competitors become too sim-
plistic, failing to capture the actual roles of companies. Moreover, these 
roles are dynamically changing - a company could develop an own in-
house alternative to a solution, which so far was offered by its complemen-
tor, while the complementor, anticipating such a scenario, would want to 
maintain good relations with its upcoming competitor, and try to innovate 
and find a new niche to continue benefiting from his installed base. 
Industry network analysts propose alternative frameworks which could 
be used to understand the observed industry developments, including the 
dichotomies of cooperation and free-riding (Gulati 1995: 622-623), mo-
nogamy and polygamy (with monogamy referring to the exclusivity of 
partnerships and lock-in effects, making partners “blind” to new alliance 
opportunities) (Powell et al. 2002; Duysters and Lemmens 2003: 54), over-
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embeddedness (where a company sacrifices its own justified interests to 
please an alliance partner and maintain good relations) (Granovetter 1992: 
7) and path-dependency (describing cases when new strategic options are 
restricted by existing partnerships and technological commitments) (Duys-
ters and Lemmens 2003: 53-55). 
Innovation is often generated through collaborative efforts of multiple 
parties, combining resources to jointly develop and promote new products 
– managers need therefore a novel perspective and relevant frameworks, 
capturing the complexity of modern markets and dominant partnership pat-
terns. 
1.2 High-tech industry 
1.2.1 Definition 
The definition of the high-tech industry is a subject of an ongoing debate 
among academic and public institutions, understanding the industry in dif-
ferent ways and thus offering incompatible statistical measures. The alter-
native approaches focus respectively on the composition of workforce 
(human capital-based measure, assuming that a relatively high share of sci-
entists and engineers represents the innovative potential of a sector), R&D 
intensity (relation of R&D expenditures to overall sales), or the nature of 
used technology ( “high”, advanced, involving digitalization). The human 
capital-based approach leads to counter-intuitive results, for example the 
inclusion of services - architecture, life insurance, banking and consulting - 
as well as heavy industry sectors - petroleum exploration, chemical engi-
neering, utilities and cigarettes production (Markusen et al. 2001: 29). 
OECD and Eurostat define high-tech industries based on the R&D inten-
sity, using the high-tech label for aerospace, computer and office equip-
ment, electronics, telecommunications, scientific instruments, pharmaceuti-
cals, chemicals and electrical machinery (Hatzichronoglou 1997; Eurostat 
2005). Some researchers propose to define the high-tech industry as com-
posed of both sectors using advanced technology, as well as those purchas-
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ing goods and services of the former ones as inputs to their own production 
processes (Hecker 1999: 18). 
The present book adopts a more restrictive definition, popularized by the 
American Electronics Association: high-tech industry consists of compa-
nies in the broad categories of advanced technology manufacturing, com-
munication services, software and computer-related services (AeA 2002). 
The definition excludes biotechnology, engineering and research services 
sectors, as well as wholesale and retail of high-tech goods – these sectors 
are essentially different in their adoption of technologies, cost structures 
and demand characteristics. 
High-tech industry described in the following chapters includes compa-
nies, developing and selling digital technologies, based on advanced tech-
nical knowledge (characterized by high R&D intensity), and is synony-
mous with a broad understanding of Information and Communication 
Technologies (I.C.T.), including software, hardware, telecommunications 
and Internet industries. The proposed high-tech definition encompasses 
also the category of information goods (Shapiro and Varian 1999: 3), in-
formation-based products with high production costs and low marginal cost 
of subsequent reproduction, such as software programs, knowledge or mul-
timedia encoded in digital form. These unique characteristics determine the 
industry structure with high fixed costs requiring substantial initial invest-
ments, problems with assessing the value of information before it is actu-
ally consumed, and needs to prevent product copying by means of an effec-
tive intellectual property protection. High-tech industry includes 
nevertheless also hardware and services, not sharing some of these charac-
teristics, but strategically and technologically related to the information 
goods. 
Technology in organizations used to be interpreted as an objective, exter-
nal force, determining other organizational variables (Orlikowski 1992: 
399), in line with early understanding of technology as “hardware”, physi-
cal machines and tools used in production processes. Recently, researchers 
tend to present technology (in particular Information and Communication 
Technologies) as socially constructed (Bijker et al. 1987), “interacting” 
with its designers and users (Orlikowski 1992), being a product of human 
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action, adjusted to requirements and customizable in various ways. The 
early deterministic character of I.C.T. vanished over time - centralized so-
lutions, requiring specific data processing structures and procedures, were 
replaced by distributed architectures, offering easy access to technology 
from every desk, supporting various uses and functioning as underlying 
workplace environment, a platform for building dedicated business applica-
tions. New technologies are thus “open-ended” (Orlikowski and Hoffman 
1997), their implementations require explanation and appropriation, with 
features and functions gradually emerging during implementation projects 
and further everyday use, characterized therefore as “technologies-in-
practice” (Orlikowski 2000: 407), or ambiguous “equivoques” (Weick 
2000). 
1.2.2 Technology fusion and industry convergence 
The social construction of I.C.T. is the source of flexibility of the high-
tech industry, cyclically establishing and destroying specialized technology 
niches. In parallel, changes in technological environment are an equally 
important force driving the industry development: the high-tech field is the 
most frequently quoted example of technology fusion, combination of ex-
isting technologies into hybrid solutions with new features and benefits, 
demonstrating synergies between the previously distinct fields, and 
undermining the traditional maxim “one technology – one industry” 
(Kodama 1992: 70). The historical cases of technology fusion were driven 
by substantial, long-term investment in competence building - e.g. in-house 
development of competences in the emerging domain of optoelectronics 
lasted for almost two decades (Miyazaki 1999: 45) - but the recent dynam-
ics of global economies require faster time-to-market, stimulating the for-
mation of R&D partnerships among organizations from potentially com-
plementing industries, cross-industry mergers and acquisitions. Time-based 
strategies, focused on being first to market with new products to benefit 
from monopoly premium, form the basis of current innovation management 
strategies, motivating companies to establish partnership networks, and de-
sign own products with greater flexibility and adaptability to allow future 
re-use of technological components in other solutions (Rothwell 1994). 
1.2 High-tech industry      25 
Apart from the fusion of underlying technologies and the gradual digi-
talization of all domains of everyday life, there is also a growing conver-
gence among industries and business models (the term “fusion” refers to 
physical aspects of technologies, while “convergence” tackles also intangi-
ble dimensions of business, when distinctive industry sectors and business 
models become interrelated and increasingly similar). Three industries with 
different historical roots, focused on computing, communications and me-
dia, converged in the 1990s to form the “digital economy” (Tapscott 1997). 
Companies traditionally operating in one of these fields had to extend their 
competence bases to keep up with the developments and maintain their 
strategic positions. Important players driving the current development of 
mobile telecommunications include companies as diverse in core business 
models and technologies as: NTT DoCoMo (telecom operator), Qualcomm 
(semiconductor company), Nokia and Motorola (telecommunications 
equipment and mobile phone makers) and Microsoft (software vendor). In 
spite of different roots and competences, their focus areas and strategies 
gradually converge, making them all compete for the leadership in mobile 
data services area. Similarly, the digital music distribution domain is 
equally attractive to hardware companies (like Apple, maintaining iTunes 
shop, driving the sales of the portable music player iPod, or Nokia, hoping 
to increase its mobile phone sales by improving the handset multimedia ca-
pabilities), software developers (including RealNetworks and Microsoft, 
promoting alternative multimedia streaming technologies through own 
online music outlets and distribution partnerships), Internet firms (such as 
Sharman Networks, managing the infamous peer-to-peer network Kazaa or 
Napster, offering not only paid music downloads but also a monthly media 
subscription system), telecom operators (including Japan’s AU-KDDI, of-
fering music downloads to mobile phones), and finally record companies 
(exemplified by Label Mobile, a digital music distribution joint-venture be-
tween the largest record labels in Japan). 
An interesting example of a strategy anticipating and driving the conver-
gence is the consumer electronics giant Sony. Holding a strong share in its 
core market, Sony embarked on a diversification in the late 1980s by ac-
quiring the American record label CBS Records and movie studios Colum-
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bia Pictures Entertainment. In the 1990s, the company launched game con-
sole PlayStation, attracting key game developers who enjoyed the rights to 
use characters and motives from popular Columbia Pictures movies. Later 
Sony introduced multiple lines of products focused on multimedia capabili-
ties, integrated with its home electronics portfolio: personal computers 
VAIO, Clié PDAs, television channel servers Cocoon and mobile phones. 
The sensitivity to convergence enabled the company to benefit from cross-
selling opportunities, even though it was a latecomer in many of the dis-
cussed domains. Sony implemented also an integrated marketing commu-
nications strategy, coordinating promotion of group’s companies, so that 
e.g. movies produced by Sony (including the blockbuster “Spider Man”) 
feature also Sony’s product placements (Luh 2003: 156-157). In 2004, 
Sony acquired the troubled Hollywood studio Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer – 
analysts criticized the decision due to MGM’s poor financial performance, 
but the real motives for acquiring a competitor of its own studios were 
again related to the convergence opportunities: Sony was able to establish 
the single largest film library with over 8,000 titles, using this content to 
increase its share in various media-related markets by balancing intellectual 
assets and new technologies, including the Internet on-demand-movies 
market (where Sony is present through Movielink, a partnership with other 
movie studios) and the battle over next-generation DVD standards (Sony 
supports Blue-Ray format, which competes with HD-DVD alternative, 
backed by Toshiba and four Hollywood studios, and the success will cer-
tainly depend on how much content is available in a given format). The lat-
ter is an interesting example of non-technological influences in the con-
verged industry: consumers will not choose a standard due to its superior 
technical features, but merely because of the larger number of available 
disks (complementary products), so the major influence on technology 
market comes in fact from content providers. 
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Fig. 1. Sony Group’s revenue structure, 2004. Data source: corporate annual report 
The convergence of information, communication and media sectors does 
not mean that firms can easily transfer their skills to other, previously unre-
lated markets. Specialist technical knowledge may not be applicable to new 
domains, and failing companies usually lack the ability to reengineer their 
products in systematic ways, sticking instead to established designs of 
technological components, as in the seminal cases of Xerox (pioneer of 
photo-copiers, missing the commercial opportunity of small personal pho-
tocopiers) or RCA (former leader in the radio transceiver market, later not 
able to compete with Sony in the portable radio segment) (Henderson and 
Clark 1990: 10). Individual segments and customer groups tend to require 
different marketing approaches – the same computing technology may be 
used for business purposes, gaming and digital media, each calling for dis-
tinctive marketing strategies to “package” the underlying technology. 
Companies successfully exploiting opportunities created by the industry 
convergence, balance their existing competencies and supplement them 
with resources from partners or acquired businesses – NTT DoCoMo enter-
ing the mobile data services market needed digital content partners, Micro-
soft liaised with television network NBC to create MSN Internet portal, and 
later recruited or acquired a large number of specialist software developer 
firms to supports the launch of its Xbox game console. 
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1.2.3 Innovations and market dynamics 
Convergence is not the only factor contributing to dramatic changes in the 
high-tech industry –innovation is source of market disruption, either en-
hancing or destroying corporate competences (Tushman and Anderson 
1986), so that leading companies may lose their positions when markets 
change and their core technologies are substituted. Particularly important 
are disruptive innovations, which may initially be not meeting performance 
requirements of mainstream customers, thus remaining unnoticed by in-
cumbents for some time, but improve over time, offering additional signifi-
cant benefits compared with their predecessor products (such as lower cost, 
smaller size, portability), combined with performance improvement poten-
tial (Christensen 2000). 
The success of an innovation depends on the availability of compatible, 
complementary goods - software for personal computers, content for Inter-
net, interactive digital television, or new generation DVD disks), offering 
customers an integrated solution to their problems (Moore 1999: 104-106). 
Successful innovations are thus generated by networks of partners, not just 
by single companies – a seminal example is the personal computer, devel-
oped by IBM jointly with Intel and Microsoft, but multiple other cases of 
innovative products, created thanks to strategic alliances with complemen-
tors, will later be presented in this book. Moreover, as technologies are so-
cially constructed and can have various uses, their success depends heavily 
on the existence of value propositions, compelling reasons to purchase the 
products, with a non-technological, marketing nature. 
Historical development of the high-tech industry indicates that technol-
ogy fusion, convergence and market disruptions swift the focus of corpo-
rate strategies as the sources of added value are changing. The high-tech 
industry was surprised by the risky decision of IBM to dispose of its com-
puting hardware manufacturing operations in 2004. In fact, the decision 
was only one element in a series of strategic adjustments: IBM sold its hard 
drive unit to Hitachi, personal computers to Lenovo, Asian server manufac-
turing operations to Great Wall Computer Group (in two latter cases form-
ing joint-ventures with the buyers to benefit from possible synergies), 
handed over the costly maintenance and development of numerous underly-
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ing software technologies to the open source community, while acquiring 
high-end software and services businesses, among others the business con-
sulting division of PriceWaterhouse Coopers, and taking over thousands of 
technical support specialists from their outsourcing customers. The margins 
in hardware market are shrinking, with manufacturing operations shifting 
to China and South-East Asia. Personal computers, hard drives, monitors 
and other devices are becoming commoditized – they are based on stan-
dardized designs, perceived by customers as not highly differentiated. At 
the same time, combination of software, technical services and other in-
formation goods is required to successfully compete in the growing market 
segments, such as digital media and business solutions. Historical analyses 
demonstrate that analogous trends were prevalent in the past (Attewell 
1992): years ago, semiconductors were important sources of added value, 
later the focus switched to computer hardware, which nowadays is merely a 
commoditized infrastructure (Carr 2003). This does not mean that hardware 
is no longer needed – it is an important complementor for software applica-
tions, and a necessary element of integrated solutions, but could be manu-
factured and sold to customers by specialized partners, not necessarily the 
software or services company itself (as in the cases of IBM’s strategic part-
nerships with Lenovo and Great Wall Computer Group). Figure 2 demon-
strates the changing focus of IBM in the years 1992-2004: the company in-
creased the share of software and services in its global revenues, keeping 
only high-end hardware sales such as enterprise mainframes at the end of 
the period. 
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Fig. 2. IBM revenues from hardware, software and services, 1992-2004. Data sources: 
corporate annual reports 
An opposite commoditization scenario is also possible - Sun Microsys-
tems, maker of Unix servers and dedicated Solaris operating system, al-
ready in 1999 made publicly available technical designs of its microproces-
sor architectures, later releasing also the operating system Solaris to the 
open source community to focus on high-end servers and enterprise ser-
vices. Both cases reveal a common theme, related to industry changes and 
growing interdependence of businesses, which no longer could be satisfied 
by proprietary solutions built by only one company, repeating itself in the 
long history of computing in the recent 50 years (Attewell 1992). 
1.3 Underlying business logic 
1.3.1 Building blocks for corporate strategies 
Companies have multiple ways of attaining their purposes – while certain 
business rules may be taken for granted, there is always a possibility that 
innovative strategies question them, as it happened with Toyota’s kanban 
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production model, co-opetitive alliances, or the open source software 
movement. 
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Fig. 3. Building blocks for corporate strategies 
Figure 3 suggests that corporate strategies can be decomposed into sev-
eral linked elements – starting with the most evident competitive strategies, 
revenue models, forms of governance and fashionable management tech-
niques, moving down to levels of which managers are not always aware: 
business models and metaphors of business, culturally conditioned ways of 
thinking about the world. Every level offers multiple incommensurable al-
ternatives, and creative managers could probably pursue any desired com-
bination, if they reflect on the taken-for-granted rules and implicitly ac-
cepted strategic scripts within their industry and culture. 
The multiplicity of available scenarios starts with alternative revenue 
models. The most obvious scenario is the traditional, sequential value 
chain, where a company receives itemized payments following every ship-
ment of goods and services (either directly from end customers, or through 
distributors and other intermediaries, including banks and leasing compa-
nies). Companies may also pursue subscription models, receiving bulk 
payments from customers, who in return are allowed to consume goods or 
use services over a certain period of time - as in the cases of buffet lunches 
in hotels, monthly bills for non-metered Internet connection, or software 
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subscription schemes, first introduced in 2001 by Computer Associates to 
replace the traditional software licensing, reducing risk and upfront invest-
ments for customers. Wide-spread are also hybrid models, where compa-
nies offer what some observers may interpret as free products and services, 
in fact focusing however on clear financial objectives. Glynn (1999) sum-
marized the possible ways of making money from free services – first of 
the scenarios is loss-leadership, where free offering induces payment for 
related goods and services, e.g. mobile phone companies may offer free 
phones in return for contractual commitments from customers, software 
companies bundle components, so far available at high price from third 
parties, to improve own sales, and vendors of game consoles intentionally 
sell them below unit cost to boost their popularity, expecting to earn money 
from the sales of dedicated game software and peripherals. Another option 
is media model, with free offering intended to establish a customer com-
munity, which could be targeted by advertising, research or cross-selling – 
the users of the company's products or services receive them for free, while 
other parties pay for accessing this user base, with the prominent examples 
of commercial television and Internet portals. Finally, offering a free ser-
vice may be a way to cut costs of own operations, as it happens in the case 
of Internet banking, reducing the needs for face-to-face customer interac-
tions in physical bank branches. One should also mention another, more 
questionable revenue model, widely observed among start-up companies 
during the Internet boom of the late 1990s: they were intentionally refrain-
ing from collecting any revenues, focusing instead on the creation of a 
loyal community, intending to sell this intangible asset to another company. 
Some of its adopters made small fortunes from the disposals, but the ac-
quiring companies subsequently had to select appropriate revenue-
generating alternatives. 
Governance forms are rooted in culture, legal system and other institu-
tional conditions – the book offers an extensive discussion of this issue in 
the following chapters, but it worthwhile summarizing multiple available 
options already at this stage. The multidivisional corporation (M-form), 
proposed in the 1960s as an ideal structure for large organizations and sup-
ported by transaction costs economists, was later challenged by both theo-
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rists and business practice for restricting the development of corporate 
competencies within the confines of individual business units (Hammel and 
Prahalad 1990b). Leibenstein’s X-inefficiency theory suggested that em-
ployment contracts are incomplete and employees have more discretion in 
carrying out their jobs than external contractors, whose performance is pre-
cisely controlled (Martin 2002: 392), providing first economic arguments 
in favor of partnership formation. Examples of alternative forms include 
business groupings and alliance networks, linkages with financial institu-
tions (in some countries strictly prohibited by local laws – while widely-
spread in others, e.g. in Japan), and component-based value chains (with 
contracted manufacturing and business process outsourcing). The recent 
diffusion of Internet technologies facilitates the virtualization of compa-
nies, which can easily outsource entire processes, implement remote tele-
work, and liaise with partners from other parts of the globe, never meeting 
their representatives face-to-face. 
Management fashions are prescriptions for internal organization and stra-
tegic change, resulting from usually short-lasting fascinations with con-
cepts and techniques, promoted by management bestsellers, slogans, con-
sulting services and even enterprise software systems (Klincewicz 2005). 
Fashions offer recommended models of organizing, best practices accom-
panied by relevant ideologies under the buzzwords of Total Quality Man-
agement, Business Process Reengineering, knowledge management, Bal-
anced Scorecard or Six Sigma. Although frequently criticized, management 
fashions remain an important source of inspiration for managers, turning 
into “management tools and techniques” (Rigby 2001), accompanying the 
broad portfolios of revenue models and governance forms available in 
various strategic configurations. 
Revenue models, governance forms and management fashions are rooted 
in more comprehensive business models, defining the purpose of business 
and accepted means of strategy implementation. Although Western finan-
cial management literature emphasizes the need for creating long-term 
ownership value (Brealey et al. 2001: 19), public companies are often more 
oriented towards daily company share prices and engineering quarterly 
profits, while small private firms are in turn inclined to focus on the short-
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term perspective to assure their survival and gradual growth. Japanese kai-
sha can afford to be less shareholder-driven thanks to the supply of capital 
by banks and partners in corporate networks, looking for stable growth and 
reliable suppliers rather than for maximization of profits or return on in-
vestment in financial terms. Many companies are founded to realize certain 
missions regardless of profits, for example some R&D joint-ventures (fo-
cused on costly activities, leading to potential profits in the future, more 
likely generated however by parent companies, which by that time would 
have dissolved the joint-venture), or standard consortia formed as commer-
cial organizations. Recent years proved the existence of another, highly un-
conventional model: the cases of Enron, WorldCom or Ahold demonstrated 
that top management may interpret “value creation” in radically different 
ways by using “creative accounting” to create value merely in corporate 
books, transferring costs to linked parties and artificially boosting profits. 
Such practices are certainly not recommended by literature and severely 
punished by law, but their wide-spread presence suggests the existence of 
implicit prescriptions, values and beliefs among some financial directors, 
regarding companies instrumentally as opportunities for brilliant careers, 
stages for quasi-theatrical performances (Boje and Rosile 2003). Finally, 
the concepts of national innovation systems and postulated involvement of 
governments in industry clusters (Porter 1990) exemplify cases when na-
tional (or regional) solidarity may outweigh other orientations, encouraging 
companies to work together in order to improve cluster competitiveness, 
not only pursuing individualist value creation objectives. 
The explanation for differences between Japanese keiretsu, Korean chae-
bol models, German Unternehmen, and the prevalent American corporate 
governance form is their embeddedness in local culture, tradition and laws 
(Granovetter 1992), expressing themselves through implicitly adopted 
metaphors of business. Metaphors are widely used in business world as ef-
fective means of communicating ideas (Bower 1991: 190), or tools for ana-
lyzing organizations, rooted in the rhetorical aspects of management sci-
ence (Morgan 1980) and economics (McCloskey 1983). They represent 
natural ways of thinking about abstract phenomena, as people willingly 
(but unconsciously) refer to other domains of their lives. Metaphors bring 
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along hidden assumptions, influencing the ways of thinking and looking at 
the outside world. The terminology used in strategic management is highly 
metaphorical (Arndt 1985) with many terms loaned from other spheres of 
social life, e.g. the term “strategy” coming from the military domain and 
“competition” from the ancient horse racing (McCloskey 1983: 503). Busi-
ness may thus be interpreted as warfare, blurring the distinctions between 
military tactics and actions targeting competitors (Porter (1985), as game, 
because the economic game theory inspired the concept of co-opetition 
(Nalebuff and Brandenburger 1997), as theater, where impression man-
agement becomes the principle of everyday life (Goffman 1959), family, 
turning firms into “relief organizations” (Granovetter 1992: 7), or as an-
other reflection of the “Confucian dynamism”, involving hierarchy, obedi-
ence and perseverance as the constituting principles of society and econ-
omy (Hofstede and Bond 1998). 
The prevalent metaphors may change in response to the transforming 
competitive environment, innovation and culture – as the present book will 
argue, firms in the high-tech industry drift towards a mixture of cooperative 
and competitive orientations, appreciating the importance of reliable, 
trusted partners, while not forgetting about the threats posed by rivals. 
1.3.2 Institutional, industry and management logics 
Revenue models, governance forms, management fashions and metaphors 
of business offer building blocks for corporate strategies, but the actual 
process of strategy setting is influenced by three “lenses”, defining stan-
dards and norms, shaping beliefs and attitudes, and offering repertoires of 
accepted actions. The lenses (themselves metaphorical) filter data about the 
environment and contain categories and interpretation patterns, helping 
make sense of information (von Krogh et al. 2000: 84). The lenses for the 
strategy setting process are: 
 
36      1 Introduction 
• institutional logic – comprising of institutional forces such as culture, le-
gal or educational system; 
• industry logic – taken-for-granted collection of best practices of an indus-
try; 
• management logic – linked to cognitive processes of decision makers, 
who interpret events in an organization and its environment. 
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Fig. 4. Three lenses in strategy setting process 
Even though the high-tech industry is regarded as globalized, a recent 
study proved that strategies and structures of international high-tech com-
panies preserve regional diversity (Duysters and Hagedoorn 2001: 354). 
This is coherent with the sociological concept of institutional embedded-
ness, stating that economic action is embedded in social structure (Uzzi 
1997: 35). Economic institutions arise from cultural beliefs (Granovetter 
1992: 5), and the effectiveness of strategies depends on broader social insti-
tutions, which may also be characterized as the institutional logic. The in-
fluences and inherent limitations of institutional logic can be evidenced by 
the fact that e.g. strategies successful e.g. in one cultural business setting 
cannot easily be transplanted to other environments (Kenney and Florida 
1995). Managers acquire their “frames of reference” from business schools, 
books or training institutions, internalize the communicated norms and 
principles (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 150), and institutionalize the rec-
ommended practices as part of the valid institutional logic. 
Industry itself offers a distinctive portfolio of strategic concepts (Huff 
1982: 126). Neoinstitutionalists in organization theory propose that organi-
zations tend to comply with standards observed in their immediate envi-
ronment (organizational field) by imitating strategies of other players (Di-
Maggio and Powell 1983: 148). Management techniques such as 
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benchmarking or strategic analyses of strengths and weaknesses are based 
on comparisons between own organization and competitors or analogous 
firms from other industries, and facilitate copying relevant practices to im-
prove organizational effectiveness. The common elements in corporate 
strategies can also be interpreted as archetypes (Greenwood and Hinings 
1993), subconscious interpretative schemes shared across an industry. 
Every industry will also have its own distinctive “strategic language”, help-
ing express strategic concepts and articulate tacit knowledge (Schwarz and 
Nandhakumar 2002: 77), difficult to understand for outsiders, as well as 
unique characteristics of applied technologies and innovation systems 
(Carlsson et al. 2002). 
On a personal level, top managers establish interpretations of business 
and environment, which they impose on their organizations through strate-
gies, structures, or cultural artifacts. These interpretations are referred to as 
dominant general management logic (Prahalad and Bettis 1986), maps, 
frames of reference, mindsets, schemata (Calori et al. 1994: 438-439), and 
once successfully shared with others, functioning as a “collective mind” in 
organizations (Weick and Roberts 1993). As every industry consists of 
companies pursuing independent strategies, defined by their management, 
these mindsets feed back into the industry structures and dominant strate-
gies. Leading firms may outperform other players through the pursuit of 
creative strategies, better strategic insights and different interpretations of 
the market – an industry foresight, allowing them to revise the underlying 
assumptions of the institutional and industry logics. On the other hand, the 
dominant management logic may also be a source of failure, as the “filter”, 
through which management looks at relevant industry data, distorts the re-
ality (Bettis and Prahalad 1995: 7), and potential emerging strategic oppor-
tunities are ignored if decision makers cannot grasp them using the avail-
able categories and interpretation patterns (von Krogh et al. 2000: 84). 
These three lenses can also transform the reality, as members of organiza-
tions constantly change (enact) the perceived environment through inter-
pretations, sense-making and subsequent actions (Weick 1995). 
The metaphor of lenses explains also why the high-tech industry differs 
from other industries by having its own underlying logic. The logic is con-
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ditioned by the characteristics of Information and Communication Tech-
nologies such as: network externalities (with disproportionate payoffs for 
technologies with large user bases, motivating vendors to create customer 
lock-ins), need for complementary solutions (stimulating the pursuit of 
partnerships), unique cost structures of information goods (allowing com-
panies to flexibly set their unit prices), disruption caused by innovations 
(radically changing market structure and successful strategies – as in the 
cases of personal computing, Windows, Internet, mobile telephony and as 
digital multimedia) and constant convergence with non-technological do-
mains. The rules change over time - within last ten years, the high-tech in-
dustry went through such a significant transformation that many compa-
nies, products and technologies from the early 1990s are no longer 
remembered, and possibly also future readers of this book may regard it 
merely as an account of certain historical developments, in spite of the au-
thor's intention to analyze general underlying mechanisms in the industry. 
 
2 Strategic alliances and high-tech value 
chain 
2.1 Perspectives on strategic alliances 
2.1.1 Importance of alliances 
Strategic alliances are wide-spread in the high-tech industry as an impor-
tant element of the underlying industry logic. Alliances are defined as insti-
tutional arrangements, which combine resources and governance forms of 
several partnering organizations, making them mutually interdependent 
(Inkpen 2001: 402-403). The importance of alliances for high-tech compa-
nies is strengthened by the need for complementors, trusted long-term sup-
pliers, as well as reference customers, who could become partners in diffus-
ing new technologies. Particularly important are vertical arrangements 
among organizations with different competence bases – due to the conver-
gence of technologies and markets, required knowledge and technologies 
cannot usually be developed internally in a satisfactorily short time, and 
partnerships offer the opportunity to combine resources in generating and 
diffusing innovations. Alliances are often formed to develop products, 
which would success commercially only if they were adopted as industry 
standards (Stuart 1998: 696), what in turn can also explain horizontal alli-
ances among competitors, uniting their forces to penetrate yet undiscov-
ered, high risk areas. The alliance formation is thus motivated by asymme-
try in resources – particularly in the high-tech sectors, many alliances link 
established large companies and small entrepreneurial firms, offering them 
mutual benefits of access to market and unique technologies. 
Alliances can take many organizational forms, ranging from equity-based 
joint ventures, through cooperative R&D agreements, technology licensing, 
marketing and distribution partnerships, and supply chain relations, to 
technical partnerships, specialist trainings to develop products for a specific 
technological platform, and industry consortia, formed to introduce and 
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manage standards (Inkpen 2001: 404). Researchers usually exclude merg-
ers, acquisitions and market-based transactions from the list of alliances, 
sometimes doing the same with distribution and technology purchase 
agreements (Gulati 1995: 620-621) - but in the technology sector, these ar-
rangements often include also non-contractual commitments, like knowl-
edge acquisition, or integration of own products, forming bases for long-
lasting relationships. The traditional, arm’s-length relations with suppliers, 
who may easily be replaced, transformed into embedded, long-term ties - 
especially as technology-intensive alliances often create lock-in effects, 
cementing the interorganizational linkages. The literature offers several ex-
planations of motives for alliance formation – the alternative approaches 
include: neoinstitutionalism, transaction cost economics, resource-based 
and social embeddedness perspectives. 
2.1.2 Neoinstitutionalism 
Neoinstitutionalism focuses on industry pressures to follow the footsteps of 
leading companies (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), which turned alliances in 
high-tech markets into “a routine strategic initiative” (Stuart 1998: 669). 
The popularity of outsourcing increased for example after a visible contract 
between IBM and Kodak in 1989 set the “best industry practice” (Loh and 
Venkatraman 1992: 335-336). Researchers observed a dramatic increase in 
the alliance formation rate since the 1980s, which could be attributed to 
both increasingly competitive business climate, as well as the faddish popu-
larity of partnership strategies (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996: 146; 
Gomes-Casseres 2001). The social position of a company depends among 
others on its contacts and reputation – alliances can therefore function as a 
form of endorsement, signaling the quality of a company to other potential 
partners, investors or customers (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996: 140; 
Gulati and Higgins 2003: 128-129), but they can also be interpreted as 
risky by investors: if a small firm forms an alliance with one of market 
leaders, it is assumed that the low-prestige member has offered generous 
financial terms to its to-become partner (Stuart 1998: 675). 
Imitation cannot however be the only motivation for forming alliances, es-
pecially as empirical evidence suggest indifferent reactions of the capital 
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market to alliance announcements, which have no significant impact on 
company valuation (Das et al. 1998: 37), or on the IPO success (Gulati and 
Higgins 2003: 137). Moreover, short-lasting commitments lead to fast alli-
ance dissolutions by firms entering alliances only to imitate other players, 
as opposed to those driven by strategic motivations (Koza and Lewin 1998: 
258). The underlying logic of the high-tech industry is certainly an impor-
tant factor stimulating partnership initiatives, but its role is linked to the na-
ture of technological products and complementary relations among firms, 
not addressed by the neoinstitutional perspective. 
2.1.3 Transaction cost economics 
Transaction cost theory resorts to economic arguments to explain why alli-
ances are preferred to other governance forms: market-based contracts and 
internalization of concerned activities by an organization (Inkpen 2001: 
406)2. These intermediate hybrids between markets and organizational hier-
archies are implemented when transaction costs are too high for arm’s 
length relations with suppliers, but still lower than these of a complete inte-
gration (Gulati 1995: 619) – for example, subcontracting requires a costly 
and time-consuming transfer of knowledge and control, so a firm would 
choose more reliable arrangements than open bidding, refraining also from 
doing the concerned work internally due to the required investments and 
opportunity costs, not outset by potential revenues. This is especially the 
case for small numbers conditions, which the partners can overcome by 
working with many parties to achieve the economies of specialization, 
scale, scope and experience (Grandori and Soda 1995: 185-186). 
The neoclassical interpretation of corporate governance suggests that 
hierarchically organized firms replace market for transactions in cases of 
market inefficiency: when there is uncertainty about the outcome or value 
of a transaction (e.g. high asset specificity), or appropriate performance in-
centives for each party cannot easily be created (Inkpen 2001: 406). Asset 
specificity increases when partners make relation-specific investments, pre-
                                           
2 An extensive review of existing empirical studies adopting this perspective, relevant 
for marketing and strategic management, can be found in (Rindfleisch and Heide 
1997). 
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senting no value outside of the partnership (Blumberg 2001: 832) – a firm 
may adjust its operations and technologies, invest in dedicated training, or 
even build its factory close to the partner’s plant. In software sector, a 
seminal example of such partner-specific investments were “conversions” 
of leading software makers to Microsoft Windows platform in the mid-
1990s, requiring training and substantial development work, not useful for 
other platforms, and thus cementing their relations with Microsoft. Trans-
action cost theorists propose that in such cases, companies use contractual 
commitments to reduce their risk and mitigate partner’s opportunism 
(Blumberg 2001) – indeed, major commitments from partners were accom-
panied by additional formalized incentives from Microsoft. 
The argumentation does not however apply to many known partnering 
situations. Transaction cost economics emphasizes cost efficiency as moti-
vation for forming alliances, but often the transaction costs of alliances as a 
governance form are relatively higher than for other scenarios (Eisenhardt 
and Schoonhoven 1996: 136). A seminal study of semiconductor sector 
proved that in highly uncertain situations, firms tend to form alliances con-
tradictory to the transaction cost economics recommendations, certainly fo-
cusing on other strategic factors, which outweigh the cost inefficiencies 
(Eisenhardt, Schoonhoven 1996: 147). Similarly, exchange relations be-
tween two partners are embedded in the history of prior relationships and 
the wider industry context, so individual transactions can not be interpreted 
as discrete events as the approach implicitly suggests (Gulati 1995: 619-
620). Alliances may continue even when the intended goals cannot be 
knowingly accomplished, as managerial decisions are influenced by psy-
chological factors, concerns about their company’s prestige (Inkpen and 
Ross 2001) and the image of a reliable partner in future projects with other 
companies (Gulati 1995: 622-623). Some researchers accuse transaction 
cost economics of displaying “a bias toward describing opportunistic rather 
than cooperative relations” (Uzzi 1997: 37), therefore simplifying the na-
ture of industry practices, where trust helps reduce uncertainty, supple-
menting or even substituting formalized contracts, which could not cover 
all possible aspects of a relationship (Blumberg 2001: 843). Finally, the ini-
tial contract merely initiates the alliance (Lei et al. 1997: 208), which may 
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dynamically change over time, involving communication and mutual learn-
ing, conflicts, problem solving processes and even competitive tensions. 
2.1.4 Resource-based approach 
The resource-based view emphasizes the importance of strategic objectives, 
and the logic of needs and opportunities, as opposed to solely cost-driven 
interpretations. This perspective, viewing firms as bundles of resources, 
with strengths resulting from their assets, which can be tangible (like tech-
nology and capital) or intangible (like reputation and managerial skills), has 
already been introduced earlier in this book, and will be guiding the further 
analysis of the high-tech industry. Firms try to exploit opportunities in the 
environment, especially the presence of potential partners - empirical re-
search proves correlations between high competition and alliance forma-
tion, as well as confirms the strategic use of alliances to improve own posi-
tion or visibility, or to meet other strategic objectives related to knowledge 
acquisition, legitimacy or market entry opportunities (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven 1996: 137). Interestingly, a partnership networks itself is re-
garded as an intangible resource, exploited by corporate strategies (Hall 
1993: 618). 
The complementary nature of high-tech products makes firms dependent 
on other players, susceptible to their influences and bargaining power – 
firms find themselves in vulnerable strategic positions (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven 1996: 137), trapped by the strategic interdependence, as one 
organization has resources useful for, but not owned by the other (Gulati 
1995: 621). Strategic management literature offers comprehensive lists of 
possible motivations for pursuing strategic alliances (Borys and Jemison 
1989: 237; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996: 139; Inkpen 2001: 405) – 
some of them are summarized below: 
• reducing risk of operations and promoting stability, important both for 
innovative, risky projects, as well as for everyday operations through the 
integration of supply chains; 
• providing legitimacy for the company by capitalizing on a partner’s repu-
tation, or his presence in local markets; 
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• legitimizing an emerging market or technology by getting resource com-
mitments from multiple parties; 
• gaining access to partner’s knowledge, and thus increasing a company’s 
flexibility and speed-to-market in launching new products, which benefit 
from shortened development cycles and specialist expertise of a partner. 
The knowledge asymmetry and organizational learning are major themes in 
resource-based literature on alliances: an alliance can become “a platform 
for learning” (Inkpen 2001: 408), where the strategic objective of any part-
ner is the access to the other party’s knowledge and skills, or even turn into 
an opportunistic “learning race”, in which the partner who learns the fastest 
dominates the relationship and possibly terminates it in the future (Inkpen 
and Beamish 1997: 177). Incompatible strategic objectives of partners may 
concern e.g. respective intentions to establish long-term presence in a cer-
tain market, as opposed to a mere access to a technology, which could later 
be used for own purposes (Lei et al. 1997: 207). A widely cited example is 
NEC, which managed to build its internal competencies at low cost by in-
ternalizing skills of various technology partners (Hamel and Prahalad 
1990b: 80). The concept of organizational absorptive capacity explains dif-
ferences in the ability to learn and apply the effects of these learning proc-
esses to own practices (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Firms investing in in-
house R&D or experimental small-scale manufacturing operations can bet-
ter understand the nature of specific technologies and processes, which are 
subsequently contracted to partners (Cohen and Levinthal 1990: 128). This 
approach is typical for Japanese companies, investing heavily in knowledge 
acquisition from various domains, which may never be commercially inter-
nalized, but helps coordinate the work of partners. In the resource-based 
perspective, organizations can effectively use alliances as “learning vehi-
cles” if they possess an appropriate absorptive capacity and organizational 
slack, enabling the learning processes (Larsson and Bengtsson 1998: 291), 
if the cooperation with alliance partners is open, corporate management is 
committed to the continuous improvement (Lei et al. 1997: 209), and last 
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but not least if the particular domain is important for their strategies (Ink-
pen and Dinur 1998: 462)3. 
The dynamic character of learning alliances involves shifts in bargaining 
power of specific partners, who acquire the desired intangible resources 
and can eliminate the dependency on other parties (Inkpen and Beamish 
1997: 179). This reveals two paradoxes: first of all, firms must have re-
sources to get other resources, being subject to the “irony of alliancing” 
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996: 137), which suggests that alliances can 
only be used by some firms, while the characteristics of others (e.g. low 
prestige, lack of specialist knowledge or limited access to market) limit 
their abilities to successfully implement cooperative strategies (Stuart 
1998: 694). Secondly, while a good partnership has to be based on the 
openness and mutual contributions by both parties, this attitude may also be 
self-destructive, as firms make themselves vulnerable to partners, who may 
capture the needed resources and abandon them – this establishes the “in-
terorganizational learning dilemma” (Doz 1988: 39; Larsson and Bengtsson 
1998: 285). 
These two paradoxes lead to the conclusion that partnering firms tend to 
have incompatible strategic positions and motivations – anecdotal exam-
ples of asymmetrical alliances show that large technology partners are usu-
ally focused on fast product development and commercialization, while 
small firms seek relations with powerful players to be able to continue re-
search to improve their technologies (Doz 1988: 47). Interestingly, as the 
cases of NTT DoCoMo and Microsoft, presented in this book, will demon-
strate, decisions of stronger partners are not always guided by obvious stra-
tegic principles: even though they learn, acquire the desired resources from 
their alliances and become able to internalize the concerned activities, they 
decide to continue working with the same partners, who seemingly cannot 
any longer offer considerable benefits. While offering important insights 
into the mechanisms of alliances, the resource-based view cannot yet pro-
vide satisfactory explanation for many situations encountered in the high-
                                           
3 Alliances involving core businesses of companies offer the greatest opportunities to 
learn, but also the greatest potential of transforming a partner into a new competitor 
(Lei et al. 1997: 214). 
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tech industry. The simplistic view of knowledge transfer from one 
company to another can also be criticized, as learning involves processes of 
knowledge generation (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995), not just imitation of 
partners (Inkpen and Beamish 1997: 192) Empirical findings show also that 
alliances are widely used by firms of all types, not only by second-tier 
competitors trying to catch-up (Hagedoorn 1995: 248), as it would be ex-
pected if “learning races” were the primary motivation for partnering. 
2.1.5 Social embeddedness perspective 
Social embeddedness or social network approach is a common name for a 
group of concepts, sharing assumptions about the nature of knowledge, in-
novation and interfirm relations. The embeddedness hypothesis, formulated 
by Schumpeter, Polanyi and Granovetter, states that actions of economic 
actors are embedded in a network of relationships, influencing these actions 
and their outcomes – for example the sense of harmony, inherent to the 
Japanese culture, contributed to the specific industrial organization of 
Japanese companies (Granovetter 1992: 5). Consequently, being part of a 
relationship network is not a subject to corporate decision, but the nature of 
economic life – while the literature often quotes Japanese automobile and 
Italian knitwear manufacturing as examples of embedded industries with 
close, trusting and often non-contractual relationships, recent studies prove 
the significance of embedded ties even in highly competitive industries, 
like female apparel market in New York (Uzzi 1997) and financial com-
munity in Chicago (Uzzi 1999). Transaction cost and resource-based per-
spectives suggest that alliances are used because they do not require per-
manent commitments from partners (Borys and Jemison 1989: 242), but the 
examples of embedded relations demonstrate that partnerships can last 
longer than capital investments, and offer more benefits to the involved 
parties. The embeddedness of various industries increases in response to 
the environmental uncertainty just like any open system increases its inter-
nal complexity to match the complexity of its environment. Example in-
clude: the fierce competition in the automobile sector, the complicatedness 
of the DNA-related scientific discoveries among biotechnology companies, 
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and the convergence of computers, telecommunications and media busi-
nesses in the high-tech market (Gulati et al. 2000: 210). 
Geographical proximity may also play an important role in alliance for-
mation – without any high-level coordination mechanisms, firms tend to 
form clusters, such as the Silicon Valley and the Route 128 in Massachu-
setts (Castilla et al. 2000). These networks of relations differ from inten-
tional, formalized consortia, dubbed “network alliances”, including e.g. 
code-sharing agreements in the airline industry or ATM networks main-
tained by banks and credit card organizations (Koza and Lewin 1998). 
The role of networks in creating knowledge and innovation cannot be 
underestimated. The “locus of innovation” resides not in individual firms 
but within “networks of learning” (Powell et al. 1996: 116), including uni-
versities, research laboratories, suppliers and customers, state agencies, un-
ions, trade associations and other bodies, which actively promote the for-
mation of industry clusters and stimulate knowledge exchange and 
generation through intensive reciprocal ties (Ebers and Jarillo 1997: 3). 
Application of this perspective to the level of an individual firm allows 
one to easily understand the limitations of the “learning race” concept. 
Knowledge, which is essentially tacit, is generated through interactions and 
exists in a wide interorganizational field, shared by many agents and prac-
tically impossible to be entirely internalized. Partnering cannot therefore be 
reduced to a zero-sum game, as there is no real dichotomy between coop-
eration and competition (Larsson and Bengtsson 1998). Strategic alliances 
usually involve mutual learning, not only learning from the other partner, 
as they create synergy and new value, such as knowledge and innovation 
(Larsson and Bengtsson 1998: 286), while opportunistic attitudes can be-
come self-destructive by restricting the innovative potential of a company. 
The “learning race” fallacy results also from adopting dyads as the unit of 
analysis, while taking a broader look at the industry enables one to discover 
the existence of complex networks and various non-contractual relations, 
critical for the relations between a company and its environment. 
The social embeddedness of a company has a significant impact on deci-
sion making and strategy development processes. For example, partners in 
embedded networks tend to “sacrifice rather than maximize on price, and 
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shift their focus from the narrow economically rational goal of wining im-
mediate gain and exploiting dependency to cultivating long-term, coopera-
tive ties” (Uzzi 1997: 37). In practical situations, this means both sacrifices 
for the sake of partner (incidental deliveries below cost, or willingness to 
make relation-specific investments), as well as openness towards competi-
tors to pursue co-opetitive strategies when considered appropriate. The mu-
tual willingness to sacrifices does not however mean that organizations 
forget about their own strategic objectives and turn into “relief organiza-
tions”, surrendering to excessive, economically unjustified claims from 
partners (Granovetter 1992: 7). Both under-socialized (atomistic) and over-
socialized views of the economic reality are potentially dangerous – in the 
former case, represented by the transaction cost economics, one may over-
look important aspects of interorganizational linkages, assuming opportun-
istic calculations, while the latter scenario gives a risky prominence of in-
terpersonal relations, social institutions and values over strategic motives of 
companies (Granovetter 1992): if all firms in an industry were linked by 
such over-embedded ties, there would be no incentives to offer value for 
money, let alone innovate. Over-embeddedness would limit the scope of 
search for new partnership ties, making firms “blind” to many opportuni-
ties, and encouraging them to merely replicate the existing ones in new 
contexts (Duysters and Lemmens 2003: 53-55) to stay locked-in in a net-
work (Gulati et al. 2000: 210-211). In reality, linkages between firms are 
based on combinations of both embedded and arm’s-length ties (Uzzi 1997: 
58), with many companies adopting creative strategies to increase the inno-
vative potential of their networks. The value of embeddedness is contin-
gent: pursuing embedded ties is not an imperative, in some cases it may 
even turn out to be counter-effective (Gulati and Higgins 2003: 127), so 
managers need to understand the industry logic to know which ties matter 
to their companies. 
An embedded network may turn into a social capital for organizations 
knowing how to benefit from the relations and involved resources (Duys-
ters and Lemmens 2003: 52), at the same time facilitating the formation of 
new alliances by offering information about a company’s reliability and 
competences (Gulati 1995: 620). Research on biotechnology firms con-
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firmed that increase in the number of R&D partnerships drives also other 
forms of collaboration (Powell et al. 1996: 121), for example in marketing, 
as companies acquire the relation management skills necessary to interact, 
induce trust and openness. Personal networking of company employees, 
acting as boundary-spanning individuals between the organization and its 
environment (Tushman 1977) may lead to the emergence of 
institutionalized collaboration forms (Ebers and Jarillo 1997: 12), with the 
particular importance of top managers, who signal the firm’s quality and 
most likely already possess the appropriate skills, needed to establish and 
maintain successful alliances (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996: 140-
141). Particularly in advanced technology sectors, firms are embedded in 
networks of informal collaborations – as Powell et al. (1996) report, an 
interviewed CEO of a biotechnology company, presented with a list of his 
firm’s formal partnership agreements, described it as “the tip of the iceberg 
– it excludes dozens of handshake deals and informal collaborations, as 
well as probably hundreds of collaborations by our company’s scientists 
with colleagues elsewhere” (Powell et al. 1996: 120). Extensive networks 
limit opportunism due to the impact of possible free-riding behaviors on 
firm’s reputation (Gulati 1995: 622-623), but at the same time make 
companies aware of “exit networks”, alternative partners who may be 
approached if an existing relationship is terminated (Blumberg 2001: 833). 
Companies intentionally stimulate network creation and internal dynam-
ics – for example, dominant firms organize partner events to create a “ba-
zaar”, facilitating contacts and third-party alliances (Gulati 1995: 627), in-
tended to strengthen the existing ties and increase the network’s overall 
innovativeness. As a result, the entire industry becomes structured based on 
the network ties, with competitive rivalry occurring between “strategic 
blocks” not individual players (Gomes-Casseres 1996; Gulati et al. 2000: 
205-207). 
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2.2 High-tech value chain 
2.2.1 Model of the high-tech value chain 
Most research studies concerning alliances focus on dyadic relations of 
partner pairs, overlooking the multiplicity of possible hybrid arrangements 
among firms, particularly important in the high-tech industry. On the other 
hand, analyses of alliance networks encounter methodological problems of 
setting the network boundaries (Inkpen 2001: 420). The present book pro-
poses an alternative unit of analysis, introduced as high-tech value chain: a 
network of relations, focused on a specific technology-driven value propo-
sition, and structured based on the nature of the Information and Commu-
nication Technologies. The underlying logic of the high-tech industry es-
tablishes a distinctive pattern of alliance formation with suppliers, 
complementors and competitors, repeated for any new class of product 
innovations. 
Industries with interdependent processes of value creation, including the 
high-tech industry, generate innovations through partnerships and vertical 
coordination. Delivering high-tech products and services involves interde-
pendent elements, which jointly constitute a “value chain”, establishing 
value for the final user. These relations can be explained using the model of 
high-tech value chain, demonstrating that only complex, end-to-end solu-
tions, involving hardware, software, services and content, can adequately 
address requirements of customers. The term “value chain” resembles the 
terminology used by Porter (1985) and the notion of value network (Stabell 
and Fjeldstad 1998; Christensen 2000), while emphasizing the sequential 
nature of value delivery. The structure of this chain is defined by the nature 
of the underlying digital technologies, of which high-tech products are 
composed. 
The model is inspired by previous, analogous attempts in the literature: 
Eselius et al. (2002: 80) discussed the specific value chain for wireless tele-
communications, while Cho and Ku (2004) proposed “SER-M approach” 
to map product lines of leading high-tech companies. 
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Fig. 5. High-tech value chain 
Individual elements of the chain can be delivered separately or embedded 
in the higher-level elements – for example, components such as semicon-
ductors or displays are included in laptops and mobile phones. The differ-
ence between value and supply chains is related to the possible product and 
financial flows – in the latter case, elements from specific suppliers are 
bundled and sold together, while in a value chain, solutions from various 
parties may be offered independently as complementary goods, but only 
their combination will deliver value. The interdependencies drive the for-
mation of alliances, and the framework visualizes the reasons, why alli-
ances are important for corporate strategies in the sector, including both 
vertical partnerships across different segments and horizontal cooperation, 
which helps generate value within one segment. Individual corporate 
strategies, strategic groups and specific products may change over time, but 
the model is based on wide technology categories, not business models, so 
it should remain valid as a general analytical framework regardless of the 
development of technologies and markets. While this book will further pre-
sent the application of the high-tech value chain to the modern high-tech 
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industry, it could also be successfully applied to historical developments, 
for example the mainframe computers with proprietary, custom-built solu-
tions (Attewell 1992), or the early television industry, where in the 1930s, 
television sets were the main sources of added value, and later the value 
generation shifted to service providing broadcasters and more recently, to 
content producers (Funke et al. 2003: 93). 
The chain is intended to describe one specific end-to-end solution, not a 
solution class – it is thus linked to certain companies, representing one 
“constellation” (Gomes-Casseres 1996), competing against another compa-
rable value chain, for example Microsoft-driven solution for digital media, 
competing with an alternative value proposition from Apple. 
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Fig. 6. Competing value chains of Apple and Microsoft in the digital media market 
The model of high-tech value chain differs from Porter’s value chain – in 
spite of possible naming confusions, the model is not generic, but specific 
to high-tech industry, where standard supply chain relations may be sup-
plemented by other forms of co-operation. The historical development of 
the high-tech industry led to decomposition of all-encompassing platforms 
into networks of multi-vendor products (Ceruzzi 2003). Certain high-tech 
value chain segments may function as customers for other companies – for 
example Microsoft, implementing its vision for digital media, had to supply 
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its software platforms to telecom providers, cable television networks and 
Internet Services Providers, because of their critical gate-keeping roles in 
technology diffusion among end-users. The company decided to focus on 
long-term penetration of the digital media market, and regarded relations 
with these intermediaries as partnerships, not only sales opportunities: in 
many cases, it invested in the companies, or formed other types of alli-
ances, reducing own short-term revenues, but aligning the firms in its own 
value chain, which finally materialized in 2004 with the release of dedi-
cated portable media players and launches of online music shops. Analyz-
ing the industry with the high-tech value chain framework helps identify 
critical relations, which otherwise could be misinterpreted as simple supply 
dependencies, thus ignoring potential for future value creation and for 
stimulation of the diffusion of new technologies.  
The high-tech value chain is a more adequate unit of analysis than dyads, 
traditionally used in research on strategic alliances, and than broadly de-
fined alliance networks, composed of multiple parties, including non-
commercial organizations and competitors. The same alliance network can 
capture relations is several competing value chains, as certain companies 
work in parallel with multiple standards – so the network approach proves 
difficult to operationalize in the high-tech industry, where almost every 
company is somehow linked with others4. The high-tech value chain is 
based on underlying technical dependencies, so it helps capture the tech-
nology-conditioned structure of an industry and look at available configura-
tion possibilities. There are thousands of such value chains, acting as sepa-
rate ecosystems, with specific standards and different levels of openness. 
2.2.2 Importance of content 
The last segment of the chain, described as “content” is the most puzzling 
one, often ignored by high-tech industry analysts. This segment links tech-
nology and knowledge from other areas – through content, technology can 
                                           
4 For example, an analysis of 129 semiconductor firms founded in Silicon Valley be-
tween 1947 and 1986 proved that almost all of them were connected by either direct 
partnerships or by sharing joint partners or personal linkages among founders (Cas-
tilla et al. 2000: 226-228). 
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invade new domains of social life and deepen the industry convergence. 
Literature concerning Internet and mobile technologies is based on a defini-
tion of content as digitalized information, which is provided to end users of 
information networks and dedicated devices. The general character of the 
high-tech value chain model calls however for a broader understanding of 
this segment – content is a type of information good, which primarily does 
not have digital character (unlike software), but supplements technological 
solutions. First of all, it can be information – for example news and docu-
mentation made available on the Internet. It comprises also of other multi-
media formats, including graphics, music and movies – their combination 
with underlying technologies helps create new value propositions, such as 
digital interactive television, online music shops or mobile location ser-
vices with area maps and guides. Companies promoting these value propo-
sitions need to offer complex solutions, covering the entire value chain – 
otherwise, gadgets like the portable music player iPod from Apple would 
not be interesting for customers, who could not find appropriate content – 
reason to use the device. 
The content segment of the high-tech value chain goes however beyond 
the convergence of telecommunications, computing, media and entertain-
ment (Ebert and Weiß 2003: 93; Kenper and Hans 2003), focused on indi-
vidual customers, and extends the notion of content to business organiza-
tions. Content may form a bridge between technology and management 
knowledge industries, merging specialist business knowledge and technol-
ogy. For example, enterprise-scale implementations of SAP R/3 required 
not only technical services, but also business consultancy and business 
process modeling, which was provided by IDS Scheer, a firm formed by 
professor August Scheer from the University of Saarbrücken. IDS Scheer 
developed in 1992 a software package ARIS intended to capture, analyze 
and optimize organizational processes. While technically relatively simple 
(and thus imitable), the software embedded also management knowledge, 
which was not available to SAP or other ERP system vendor at that time: 
so-called reference models, sets of recommended processes for organiza-
tions in specific industries, which could facilitate organizational change 
projects, acting as benchmarks or reusable templates. The reference models 
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were rooted in Scheer’s academic research concerning business processes, 
thus documenting the best practices of that time, and were accompanied by 
a dedicated process mapping methodology, proposed by Scheer in his vari-
ous books. SAP could have developed its own process modeling tool, but 
as a primarily technology firm, it did not possess the extensive specialist 
knowledge concerning process modeling, focusing rather on standardized 
procedures like resources scheduling for manufacturing purposes, account-
ing and financial management (which of course required sophisticated 
management knowledge as well, but from other areas). SAP decided to in-
vest in IDS Scheer in 1997, the toolset was tightly integrated with SAP R/3, 
and new versions of the SAP platform embedded some elements of ARIS. 
IDS Scheer’s continuous research on business processes, which were trans-
formed by the development of Internet infrastructure and changes in the le-
gal systems, helps maintain synergistic relations between these two compa-
nies. Similarly Microsoft, when entering niche markets with dedicated 
business solutions, had to resort to help from specialist companies in cases 
such as Internet-based supply chain management, support for enterprise 
compliance with corporate governance and auditing legislation (Sarbanes-
Oxley Act), or solutions for straight-through processing (STP) for financial 
services organizations. Microsoft contributed own software platforms and 
technical competencies, at the same time benefiting from complementary 
technologies and management knowledge of partners. 
One could also identify within the high-tech value chain several segments 
constituting either management knowledge industries (companies working 
with corporate customers on business problem solving) or digital enter-
tainment industries (formed by the same chain segments, but addressing the 
entertainment-related needs of individual customers). 
The segment of content is the part of the high-tech value chain most re-
sistant to internationalization – information and knowledge is usually spe-
cific, contextual, embedded in local relations and thus difficult to transfer. 
For example, Microsoft had to launch its international versions of MSN 
portal in partnerships with local media companies (particularly leading 
newspaper publishers), and NTT DoCoMo’s mobile commerce platform i-
mode proved difficult to export: its success in the home country was attrib-
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uted not only to the technology, but first of all to the content, relevant for 
customers in Japan. 
2.2.3 High-tech value chain versus other concepts 
It is worthwhile to summarize differences between the high-tech value 
chain model and similar approaches, presented in the literature. The most 
traditional framework comes from the domain of marketing: the concept of 
product levels (Levitt 1980: 86), for the purposes of high-tech marketing 
presented as “the whole product” (Moore 1999: 104-110), consists of vari-
ous elements, including hardware, software and services, making managers 
aware of the need to work with other parties to guarantee the completeness 
of their solutions for end-customers. The model is very general, not refer-
ring to the industry structure or the deterministic interdependencies be-
tween underlying technologies – it was originally proposed as a way of 
analyzing any, not necessarily technological, product offering. Another in-
fluential framework is “value network” (Christensen 2000: 36-47), decom-
posing high-tech products into separate elements, each of which could un-
dergo breakthrough innovations thus influencing the future of the entire 
product. The approach was however not intended to describe interorganiza-
tional relations, but technical product designs. Gomes-Casseres (1994, 
1996) proposed to look at the development and diffusion of new digital 
technologies through the lenses of alliance networks. As it was discussed 
earlier in this chapter, such an approach may in turn seem too extensive for 
strategic management purposes: for example a network of firms involved in 
launching Personal Digital Assistants includes companies working on 
competing standards and representing different approaches to the market. 
Focusing on individual high-tech value chains enables managers to better 
shape their strategies by easily identifying partners and competitors. They 
can also extend their scope of strategic options - a company may want to 
sacrifice one market (or in other words, its presence in one value chain) to 
strengthen its competitive position in another, more promising area. For 
example, in the middle of the 1990s, leading Unix hardware vendors in-
cluding Unisys, Dell, Compaq and HP spotted the opportunity offered by 
Microsoft in another value chain, and started long-term strategic divestiture 
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from the Unix-oriented market, using the involvement in two competing 
value chains to negotiate additional incentives from Microsoft. One com-
pany forms part of multiple chains, and it is important to be aware of their 
existence. When a key partner in one chain is competitor in another chain, 
unexpected problems may arise, troubling the relations. 
Another relevant model, platform leadership (Cusumano and Gawer 
2002), describes how companies attempt to dominate their respective mar-
kets by providing underlying technologies and forming partnerships with 
other vendors, who make their products compatible with these platforms. It 
is intended to support architectural decisions of the platform leader – a 
dominant company, which assures the support of third parties to promote 
own standards. The high-tech value chain approach emphasizes in turn the 
incompleteness of any technology platform coming from just one vendor – 
partners are needed not only to boost the platform’s diffusion, but also to 
create the actual platform through complementary product and service of-
ferings. Instead of focusing on ambitious efforts of single companies, it is 
thus better to analyze entire ecosystems and their dynamics – not forgetting 
that individual companies, value chain leaders, drive the chain develop-
ment and strive for dominant positions within the networks of partnerships. 
For example, the success of Windows as an operating system platform was 
not only due to the technical features and marketing efforts of Microsoft, 
but was also made possible by supportive partners, who realized that the 
system may dominate future markets. Windows NT benefited from the 
support coming from enterprise clustering specialists such as Tandem, 
Banyan Systems, Digital and AT&T, who decided to port their relevant 
technologies to the new platform, establishing NT’s credibility. Microsoft’s 
competitor Novell decided early on to focus future development on Win-
dows platform, thus sending a signal to customers, and temporarily filling 
critical gaps in networking capabilities of the environment, while Microsoft 
needed several years to fill them with own technologies. Backup software, 
system management solutions, toolkits for porting Unix applications to 
Windows and terminal technologies were all critical for Windows as a plat-
form – they were not just add-ons, but key technologies, defining the value 
of Windows for customers and thus stimulating its diffusion. Presenting 
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Windows as a solely Microsoft-owned platform would not capture the 
complex dynamics – the framework of high-tech value chain can address 
this analytical challenge by looking at Microsoft as the company which 
played the lead role in the chain, but not owned the entire ecosystem, being 
often restricted in certain technological or commercial decisions. 
Finally, it is important to differentiate between the high-tech value chain 
and a conglomerate. Pursuing a value chain strategy with partnerships, in-
vestments and possible backward or forward integration does not necessar-
ily mean diversification of a company’s core business. Value chain ap-
proach emphasizes synergies in business related to interactions of 
technological components, not always important for conglomerates with 
broad portfolios of unrelated high-tech businesses. Japanese Softbank used 
to be an example of such a conglomerate, with only minimum integration 
between Softbank-controlled firms. The company resembled a venture 
capital firm, not trying to assume consistent control over any single high-
tech value chain5. 
2.2.4 Tool for strategic decisions 
The model of high-tech value chain is presented as a tool for analyzing 
the business environment, the position of own company and the nature of 
its technologies, helping make informed decisions about future strategic di-
rections. The framework emphasizes the relational character of successful 
strategies in the high-tech industry: every company launching new product 
needs to consciously build an own ecosystem or become part of an existing 
one, so that its technology could be applied to specific problems. It is 
unlikely that one company develops internally all necessary competencies 
due to the technological complexity of every chain, including the need for 
specific non-technological content (such as information, media or business 
knowledge). The proprietary scenario is even undesired, as it naturally lim-
its the third-party support for the technology by discouraging potential part-
ners. The success of a value chain depends on interorganizational skills – 
                                           
5 Softbank has recently revised the strategy, focusing on integrated operations in se-
lected markets. 
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– the ability to drive partnerships, prepare compelling value propositions 
for customers, conceptually integrate the chain and justify the need for each 
element of the complete solution. 
The value chain model helps identify relevant strategic groups within the 
broad industrial field – traditional approaches to strategic group analysis 
may be over-simplistic, singling out companies based on variables such as 
similarity in resources and market approach (Porter 1998: 127-132), while 
companies similarly endowed in resources may focus on entirely different 
market niches (e.g. Norwegian web browser developer Opera responded to 
Microsoft’s dominance on PCs by porting its software to mobile devices), 
therefore being involved in distinctive value chains. It is important to be 
aware that every high-tech firm is part of at least one value chain, compet-
ing against another chain, not just against single companies – this thinking 
has a significant impact on how managers classify current or potential 
complementors and competitors within the network of interdependencies. 
Value chain is modular by nature – a company may attempt to assume con-
trol over a specific segment, or make a conscious strategic decision to leave 
the domain to partners. The cooperation within a value chain does not al-
ways need to be explicit, cemented by formal partnership agreements – of-
ten complementors do not form part of other products, but are nevertheless 
needed to guarantee appropriate performance and functionality. Microsoft 
and Intel products are purchased independently, Windows system and Pen-
tium processor are not reciprocal suppliers, yet their success could only be 
mutual, and this aspect is adequately addressed by the strategies of both 
vendors. 
Firms in any segment of the value chain can work on own products, or 
function as contracted service providers to other parties. Contract manufac-
turers include chip foundries, producing semiconductors based on external 
orders and specifications, Electronic Manufacturing Services companies, 
which can assemble hardware, and the most technically advanced Original 
Device Manufacturers, not only manufacturing, but also designing devices, 
which will be marketed by other companies). Contracted software develop-
ers are offshore and local software firms, writing specific parts of code to 
be embedded in other firms’ systems, developing dedicated software con-
60      2 Strategic alliances and high-tech value chain 
nectors, interface documentation, or conducting technical tests for their 
corporate customers. 
Application of the framework to an individual firm helps better under-
stand its current revenue model and market trends, stimulating potential 
shifts in the perceived sources of added value, so that new strategic options 
could be considered. This tendency resembles the notion of value riding 
(Funke et al. 2003: 95-96), creative ways of benefiting from the conver-
gence and the emergence of new value chains. Telecom operators with 
revenues traditionally determined by time-based network usage in voice 
services can switch to data transfer pricing, based on the access time and 
later on the amount of data sent, towards the subsequent adoption of next 
generation content-driven payments, where customers subscribe and pay 
for particular services, regardless of their actual use, so that the source of 
value and revenues for telecoms is no longer the sole network provision, 
but rather the delivery of content. Virtual Network Operators in the mobile 
telephony rent the network capacity from traditional telecoms, not main-
taining own network infrastructure and focusing instead on value-added 
services. Software vendors are trying to de-emphasize the initial customer 
investments in their products by changing traditional revenue models, 
based on one-off license payments upon the software acquisition, and fo-
cusing on recurring revenues from software subscriptions for time-limited 
licenses, rentals or programs made available by Application Services Pro-
viders (ASPs), transforming software into a service. Hardware makers are 
willing to enter into complex revenue-sharing deals with other parties to 
switch from prohibitive prices of their equipment, extending the revenue 
streams in time (through outsourcing, leasing or credit services), or spread-
ing them over the entire value chain, so that every consecutive purchase of 
complementary products offers also revenues for the principal hardware 
maker (as in the case of video game consoles, subsidized by vendors to 
boost their diffusion, but offering additional revenue opportunities from 
game developers and peripherals manufacturers, paying royalties from 
every item sold). “Value riding” makes companies once again aware of the 
interdependencies in value creation processes. Telecoms would certainly 
miss important new sources of revenue without handset makers, who estab-
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lished standards for mobile short text and multimedia messages, as well as 
logos and ring tones downloaded by the phone users. Software vendors en-
joy synergies with specialized ASPs, who can host their products and make 
them available to customers as a service. Makers of portable media players 
benefit from third-party online music shops. Some companies try to move 
up the value chain to be closer to customers by acquisitions and invest-
ments6, others rely on cooperation with third-parties, offering complemen-
tary solutions. 
open garden
walled garden
semi-walled garden
restricted entry
 
Fig. 7. Open, walled and semi-walled gardens in high-tech value chains 
Another enlightening aspect of the framework refers to the presence of 
entry and exit barriers, from which value chain leaders can benefit. They 
may limit possible entries by promoting proprietary technologies, not open 
to all interested parties, adopting so-called walled garden approach with a 
closed, privately controlled environment, accepting only authorized part-
ners. Alternatively, they may create a semi-walled garden, where standards 
are seemingly open, widely recognized, but their actual implementation in 
the specific value chain incorporates modifications, making them incom-
patible with the solutions used elsewhere and thus leaving control and bar-
gaining power to the value chain leader. Particularly the semi-walled gar-
den model is promising for the high-tech industry, as it stimulates 
                                           
6 Comp. media investments by telecoms (Raneberg 2003), attempts of Internet Services 
Providers (ISPs) to offer own content and real-life, offline services (Klein 2003), Mi-
crosoft’s investments in ISPs, ASPs, cable television networks and telecom firms (de-
scribed later in this book). 
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innovation and encourages many parties to join (technology closely resem-
bles widely accepted, open standards – yet incorporates minor modifica-
tions, making solutions incompatible). Next chapters of the book will 
present examples of companies which successfully created semi-walled 
gardens, working with all interested parties to boost innovativeness within 
their value chains, but at the same time selecting a group of trusted partners 
who were privileged in benefiting from newly introduced technologies. 
Exit barriers for walled and semi-walled gardens are in turn potentially 
high switching costs, locking the partner in the value chain due to their re-
lation-specific investments and the proprietary elements of technologies. 
This technological lock-in means that products and skills related to a par-
ticular chain are difficult to transfer to another ecosystem, and committed 
resources turn into sunk costs in the case of chain exit. 
2.2.5 Dominant chain segments 
The answer to a question of which segment is expected to dominate the 
high-tech value chain, may come as a disappointment. Market develop-
ments indicate that practically every segment of the value chain can be per-
ceived as the source of substantial added value. In spite of the obvious 
commoditization and decrease of margins in semiconductor sector, the 
creative strategy of Intel allowed it to assume the key role in some value 
chains. Intel established strong brands for its Pentium and Centrino proces-
sors, making customers ask for solutions using particularly this ingredient, 
even though alternatives from competitors including AMD were closely 
matching the parameters of Intel products, with no technical arguments 
against the substitution7. 
Mobile telecommunications field is another interesting example of 
competition among several value chain, driven by companies who 
participate in their chains respectively as: telecom operators (including 
NTT DoCoMo and Vodafone), software makers (Microsoft), 
semiconductor manufacturers (Qualcomm) and handset producers (Nokia, 
                                           
7 For more information on the strategic potential of ingredient branding, and how sup-
pliers of components can influence customer purchasing decisions, comp. (Norris 
1992). 
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(Qualcomm) and handset producers (Nokia, Motorola). Even within the 
same vertical market, value chains differ in the focus and sources of added 
value, perceived by customers and industry players. While traditional 
frameworks for the high-tech industry emphasize the importance of “killer 
applications”, compelling reasons to use certain technologies, coming from 
the segments of software and content (Downes and Mui 2000), there might 
be situations, when the popularity of certain content or software is driven 
by the availability of a “killer appliance”, device porting an application. 
Apple iPod established the digital music industry by justifying online song 
purchases, and launching a new fashion among young consumers. 
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Fig. 8. Market capitalization of new IPOs from high-tech value chain segments as per-
centage of annual high-tech IPO values, 1980-2004. Data sources: Meeker and Cas-
cianelli 2002, www.ipomonitor.com 
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 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2004 
Components 16% 200% 2% 378% 112% 
Devices -71% 13% 172% 617% -70% 
Infrastructure -32% 107% -5% 1174% -76% 
Software -39% 46% 126% 165% 16% 
Services - - 112% 294% -28% 
Content - - 95% 415% 565% 
Table 1. Changes to average valuation of newly listed technology companies. Data 
sources: Meeker and Cascianelli 2002, www.ipomonitor.com 
Even though no single value chain segment can be classified as definitely 
dominant, opinions of market players and investors represent nevertheless 
their perceptions of the changing sources of value in the industry. Figure 10 
demonstrates results of an analysis of 1803 IPOs of technology companies 
between 1980 and 20048. Initial company capitalizations for all relevant 
IPOs were aggregated to compute annual willingness of investors to put 
their money into specific high-tech value chain segments. The results evi-
dence a relative decline in the importance of device makers. Software en-
joyed popularity among investors until the late 1990s, when the interest 
shifted towards services and content. The longitudinal changes in impor-
tance of firms from a specific segment of the chain correspond also to the 
changing average valuations of new companies in every segment (table 1): 
moving from semiconductors in the 1980s, through devices and software to 
the recent stunning growth of content businesses valuations. Figures 11 and 
12 present additional information about all high-tech companies listed on 
the U.S. stock exchanges in April 2005 – relations between market capitali-
zation and revenues (P/S ratios) indicate that investors valued by that time 
                                           
8 The analysis excluded telecom and media – telecoms were usually entering the stock 
exchange as established or even dominant players, while media broadcasters became 
involved in the high-tech market only after the industry convergence of the mid-
1990s. The data used for analysis was coming from Morgan Stanley’s Technology 
IPO Yearbook (Meeker and Cascianelli 2002) and IPO Monitor listings 
(www.ipomonitor.com). Companies active in several value chain segments were as-
signed to the segment from which they were deriving the largest part of revenues at 
the time of IPO. 
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particularly high the software, semiconductor and infrastructure companies, 
while device makers enjoyed dramatically lower ratings than the industry 
average. 
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Fig. 9. Financial metrics of high-technology companies listed in the U.S.. Data source: 
Reuters, www.investor.reuters.com, April 25, 2005 
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Fig. 10. P/S ratios for high-technology companies listed in the U.S. – all companies and 
companies with market capitalization over $5 billion. Data source: Reuters, 
www.investor.reuters.com, April 25, 2005 
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2.2.6 Generic value chain strategies 
The book will further describe possible strategies within the value chain. 
Importantly, the types of strategies do not depend on the nature of tech-
nologies, as it has already been explained above: the industry convergence 
may lead to similar outcomes of equifinal approaches by companies from 
various segments. Firms from any value chain segment may assume the 
leading role and drive further development and diffusion of technologies, 
therefore it seems more appropriate to propose a generic typology, based 
on distinctive approaches to the market, ways of addressing the needs of 
end-customers, and patterns of cooperation with other value chain partners. 
The distinctive strategic roles, which will be described in detail in the fol-
lowing chapters, are: 
• value chain leader – company assuming control over a specific chain, 
stimulating the innovativeness and development of complementary seg-
ments (easily identifiable as it does not have direct competitors within a 
specific chain); 
• complementor (niche player) – company offering complementary prod-
ucts or services, filling gaps in a specific value chain with its specialized 
skills and solutions, and promoting them in conjunction with the chain 
leader’s offering, usually technologically locked-in within the chain; 
• contractor (service provider) – company doing contracted work for other 
players, giving up the intellectual property rights for the outcomes of its 
work, so that another party can own them, what leads to a division be-
tween competencies and property rights. 
These three ideal strategic types require different competencies, techno-
logical approaches and marketing orientations. It is useful to interpret own 
firm’s position within a specific value chain using this framework in order 
to make conscious, well-informed strategic decisions. The positions do not 
merely depend on individual decisions; they may also result from the un-
derlying structure of technologies and the chain itself, particularly for late 
entrants. For example, a company complementing solutions of a strong 
chain leader will have limited success in aspiring for the chain’s leadership 
itself - as a result, it may undermine its relations with the powerful partner, 
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and actually launch attempts to create an own value chain, competing 
against the existing constellation (commercial success of such a scenario is 
nevertheless possible if the company possesses strong competencies, con-
tact network to other potential partners and sufficient financial resources). 
The following chapters will explore these interdependencies and strategic 
scenarios available to firms, using examples of several value chains from 
diverse industry sectors. 
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3 NTT DoCoMo – innovation through 
partnerships 
3.1 Overview 
3.1.1 New product development and partnerships 
The present chapter offers a comprehensive case study, presenting how the 
high-tech value chain framework could be applied to analyze relations and 
strategies of industry players. It describes the astonishing success of Japa-
nese mobile telecommunications company NTT DoCoMo and its partners, 
local high-tech companies, was a source of ongoing discussions and con-
troversies in Western business literature. Managers were interested in the 
success factors and its replicability, and problems of Western telecoms with 
following the model were attributed to specific characteristics of the de-
mand for mobile data services in Japan. However, some of European firms 
were able to create successful mobile data businesses with DoCoMo’s help, 
what suggests that other, yet unknown factors contributed to the success. 
The present chapter will discuss other so far unexplored aspects of 
DoCoMo’s business model: the adoption of a unique governance form, 
combining long-term strategic alliances with arm’s length relations and in-
ternal activities, stimulating the development of new products and services. 
The partnership pattern differs from the Western approaches, while also 
departing from the traditional view of Japanese business groupings. It will 
be positioned as a new institutional form, conditioned by local culture and 
the changing nature of industry, which requires radically shorter develop-
ment times and increased competitiveness, and thus combining elements of 
the Confucian dynamism (Hofstede and Bond 1998) with ambitious strate-
gic intent. 
The case is also a good example of the complexity of high-tech solutions 
and the usefulness of the high-tech value chain framework for strategic de-
cisions. Instead of analyzing direct suppliers and customers, the focus shifts 
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towards the entire set of complementors, linked by shared underlying tech-
nologies. As DoCoMo’s experiences will show, all elements in the value 
chain are important – the company tried to streamline and control all of the 
chain’s segments, not only direct inputs and outputs of own operations. In 
order to manage its value chain, a firm has to maintain a balance between 
alliances and internalization, motivating partners to cooperate and benefit-
ing from their contributions. The approach, described in this case study, 
was rooted in the Japanese institutional logic, turned out to address all of 
these concerns – but the cultural embeddedness made it also difficult to 
replicate in other environments. As opposed to the home market success, 
effects of DoCoMo’s foreign investments were rather disappointing – a 
firm cannot simply replicate some elements of its chain to other institu-
tional settings. The high-tech value chain emphasizes the need for a thor-
ough analysis of relationship network, often questioning what is obvious 
for certain cultures and industries. 
3.1.2 Japanese institutional logic 
Cultural differences play an important role in partnership strategies, and lo-
cal partnering competences may prove difficult to apply in a different envi-
ronment. Even though the high-tech industry is regarded as globalized, a 
recent study proved that strategies and structures of international high-tech 
companies do not converge, preserving regional diversity (Duysters and 
Hagedoorn 2001: 354). This is coherent with the previously introduced 
concept of embeddedness, suggesting that the effectiveness of alliances 
will depend on broader social institutions (Grandori and Soda 1995: 190) or 
institutional logic, e.g. concepts of loyalty, trust and moral obligations. 
Japan, as other Eastern societies, was strongly influenced by the Confu-
cianism, which emphasized the importance of harmony in society, resulting 
from naturally unequal relationships among people, resembling mutual ob-
ligations within a family, different from (and even inconceivable within) 
the Western concepts of individualism. Hofstede and Bond (1998: 16) in-
troduced the notion of Confucian dynamism as a distinctive cultural vari-
able, representing value orientations, frequently used by cross-cultural 
studies. According to the framework, the Japanese are strongly oriented 
3.1 Overview      71 
towards the future, emphasizing the perseverance (linked to long-term ori-
entation in corporate strategies), thrift (offering “patient capital” as op-
posed to Western shareholder-oriented financial management) and the im-
portance of previously described status-based relationships (where 
respectful inequality becomes a natural feature of both societal and indus-
trial relations). While the general characteristics are common for other so-
cieties in the region (including South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and to a 
certain extent also mainland China), more detailed anthropological studies 
suggest that the institutional logic for organizational alliances in Japan is 
rooted in the cultural construct of ie (home), representing the tangible pos-
sessions of a group of people and the intangible organization of a family to 
which these people belong (Bhappu 2000: 410). The world of an individual 
is divided into things and people, which are parts of one’s ie, and the out-
siders, and the Japanese feudal system of reciprocal obligations cultivated 
connections even among distant relatives (Bhappu, 2000: 410-412). The 
historically dominant business groupings (zaibatsu) evolved from family 
businesses, promoting loyalty, cooperation and consensus, and not surpris-
ingly, these ties survived even the enforced abolishment of zaibatsu struc-
tures in the 1940s (Bhappu 2000: 412). Re-emerging groups were referred 
to as keiretsu, with subtle, long-lasting ties, not likely to disappear as “fun-
damental to the way in which Japanese firms operate” (Ming-Hong Lai 
1999: 423). 
The term keiretsu refers to various forms of alliances, characterized by 
strengthened internal control and symbiotic relations (e.g. streamlining of 
operations in supply-chain), asymmetries of status (resulting in uneven dis-
tribution of economic benefits and risks), and cohesiveness with order (by 
commercial justifications and personal ties) (Ming-Hong Lai 1999: 425-
427). Partnerships are preferred grouping patterns, opposed to acquisitions, 
which involve high costs, destroying value and demotivating employees 
(Dyer and Ouchi 1993: 53). The keiretsu system promotes stability and 
long-term investments, resulting in economy sectors being concentrated but 
not monopolistic due to intensive rivalry among direct competitors from 
different groups (Ferguson 1990: 64). 
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Kigyo keiretsu (vertical keiretsu) represents supply chains, with a domi-
nant role of one company, having sometimes minority shareholding in 
other firms (Ming-Hong Lai 1999: 428-430). Owing to this institutional ar-
rangement, automobile firms “managed to preserve low levels of vertical 
integration and close dedicated supplier relationships in the absence of 
hard, legalistic contracts and comprehensive ownership” (Ahmadjian and 
Lincoln 2001: 685). As Dyer and Ouchi (1993: 53) explain, “the goal is to 
create a “see-through” value chain where both party’s cost and problems 
are visible. Then both parties can work jointly to solve the problems and 
expand rather than split the pie”. This comes however at a cost: suppliers 
“often must agree to prices set by the final assembler, even when, at times, 
those figures will not return a profit” (Cutts 1992: 51), and make customer-
specific investments in physical assets and human capital, which tie them 
to one company and make their products highly customized. The secret of 
Japanese-style partnership are learning effects, positively linked to the sta-
bility of the relations: “U.S. manufacturers have repeatedly destroyed the 
experience curves of suppliers by ensuring that no one supplier could ac-
celerate down the experience curve to accumulate decisive cost advantages 
(Dyer and Ouchi 1993: 55). 
3.2 NTT DoCoMo and its value chain 
3.2.1 Company 
NTT DoCoMo is a wireless subsidiary of Japan’s telecom giant NTT (Nip-
pon Telephone and Telegraph), a former state-owned monopoly. DoCoMo 
was spun off in 1992, enjoying substantial growth in user subscriptions, 
and successfully floated in 1998. DoCoMo and its corporate parent were 
operating two parallel cellular networks: low-reach PHS network (trans-
ferred to DoCoMo by the end of 1998) and PDC network covering most of 
the country. 
In February 1999, DoCoMo introduced mobile data communication ser-
vice i-mode, which became a stunning success, attracting millions of sub-
scribers, generating substantial m-commerce revenues and setting an ex-
3.2 NTT DoCoMo and its value chain      73 
ample for the international community to follow. i-mode was a platform, 
aggregating web pages for mobile phone owners. Dedicated handsets of-
fered access to entertainment sites (including cartoons, ring tones, games), 
as well as more practical services (like stock charts, mobile banking or yel-
low pages). Due to high Internet connection fees in Japan, i-mode was for 
many people the only method of accessing the Internet (phones could also 
access unofficial sites, prepared using a simplified version of the web page 
description language). Official content providers were receiving subscrip-
tion fees, billed from users by DoCoMo. Thanks to i-mode, the company 
became the leading player in the wireless industry, setting standards for 
other companies and exporting its platform to other countries. This part of 
DoCoMo’s story is widely known and has been described by popular press 
and academic articles, although in many cases the provided interpretations 
seem superficial, referring mainly to the specificity of Japanese culture, 
generating demand for mobile communication. 
DoCoMo’s i-mode success induced also expectations that the company’s 
next ventures will be equally successful. Analysts were disappointed when 
two smaller competitors attacked DoCoMo and tapped at its subscriber 
base – J-Phone (currently: Vodafone) introduced in 2000 phones with em-
bedded digital cameras, and KDDI attracted more subscribers for its new 
generation services than DoCoMo. DoCoMo’s strategic technology project 
was the implementation of the 3rd generation (3G) mobile telephony (and 
launch of 3G service FOMA, Freedom Of Mobile Multimedia Access), but 
the company described changes to the new platform as evolution not revo-
lution, improving the quality of services and creating possibilities for 
launching new ones, in contrast with inflated expectations of market ob-
servers. 
The global fascination with i-mode positioned it as a phenomenon appar-
ently inconsistent with past strategies of DoCoMo and its corporate parent, 
former monopolist NTT. As this case study will show, i-mode was actually 
one of many innovative offerings, all launched through specific partnership 
patterns, practiced by DoCoMo over years. Although formal procurement 
procedures, described on DoCoMo’s website (NTT DoCoMo 2004a) re-
semble the ones adopted by international companies, their external attrib-
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utes might be confusing, as the actual partnership relations are rooted in the 
underlying Japanese institutional logic9. Further presentation of the case 
study will be structured by distinctive segments of the high-tech value 
chain, starting with the infrastructure, as the traditional focus of telecom-
munications companies. 
3.2.2 Infrastructure 
Telecommunications infrastructure is the driving force for product devel-
opment in the sector: new platforms increase network capacity, improve 
transmission quality, enable voice and data communication, as well as 
other innovative services. Not surprisingly, major investments are focused 
on this value chain segment, involving such technologies as packet switch-
ing (facilitating data transfer to handsets in ways similar to computer net-
works, with phones “always on” and users paying for the transferred data, 
not the connection time), or the 3rd generation mobile telephony (dubbed 
3G or UMTS, CDMA, W-CDMA depending on region and adopted tech-
nology, offering increased bandwidth and transmission speed, thus ena-
bling users e.g. to access multimedia content via their phones). These tech-
nologies consist of multiple infrastructure layers and platforms, requiring 
cooperation with various suppliers and a sequence of decisions concerning 
technology standards. 
Like most telecommunications operators, NTT DoCoMo has its own 
R&D unit, maintained to understand new technologies so that specifica-
tions for infrastructure providers can be prepared. Unlike other companies, 
DoCoMo’s R&D centre in Yokusuka has over 700 employees, while the 
company’s R&D budget is probably the highest in the telecom industry. 
DoCoMo and its parent company NTT intend not only to understand 
technologies, but also actively develop them and generate innovation by 
setting new standards for the global industry (Fransman 1995: 358-360). 
The company started testing 3G technologies in 1997, developed own 
                                           
9  DoCoMo’s corporate parent NTT was subject to government-level procurement 
agreements between U.S. and Japanese states, committing to “allocation of procure-
ment volume bases upon price, quality, delivery and other commercial factors” 
(Computing Japan 1997), but lacking transparency and diverging from international 
telecommunications standards. 
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pany started testing 3G technologies in 1997, developed own specification, 
called W-CDMA, which influenced relevant international standards, and 
launched W-CDMA services in 2001, ahead of most foreign counterparts. 
DoCoMo’s capabilities were developed through its technology partner-
ships – Motorola and Ericsson played important roles in the development 
of first networks, while local trusted infrastructure partners included NEC 
and Fujitsu. DoCoMo seemed to be motivated to support business of its lo-
cal partners to guarantee they have up-to-date knowledge thanks to techni-
cal alliances with Western companies, and can benefit from the experience 
curve effects through involvement foreign projects related to export of PHS 
and i-mode platforms. 
When DoCoMo developed specification for 3G network and invited sup-
pliers to participate in experimental project in 1997, there was a substantial 
disproportion in specialist knowledge between the involved Western com-
panies (Motorola, Lucent Technologies, Ericsson and Nokia) and their 
Japanese counterparts (NEC, Fujitsu and Matsushita). The participation in 
DoCoMo’s W-CDMA project was very risky for suppliers: specification 
was not yet approved by international standardization bodies, and infra-
structure development required substantial investments, which could not be 
reusable for other customers. The stakes in this game were certainly higher 
for Japanese companies, maintaining multiple levels of relations with 
DoCoMo, delivering not only W-CDMA infrastructure but also handsets 
and other solutions, as for them even potential sunk costs would guarantee 
continuous ties with the carrier. It explains why once key technology sup-
pliers like Motorola stopped playing significant roles in DoCoMo’s tech-
nology strategies, and decided to partner with Japanese companies in the 
area of new mobile technologies (Motorola and Siemens with NEC, Alcatel 
with Fujitsu, Ericsson with Sony). A recent study of global alliance patterns 
confirms the tendency: while in the 1980s and 1990s, Japanese high-tech 
companies tended to partner with multiple Western firms, by 2000 the larg-
est Japanese firms formed a tight national cluster, concentrating new alli-
ances among themselves (Knoke et al. 2002: 21). 
Implementations of many projects involved Western suppliers of unique 
technologies (e.g. PacketVideo and HP in multimedia streaming, UbiNetics 
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in new generation data transfer technology), especially as innovative vi-
sions of DoCoMo could often were only shared by equally visionary start-
ups. As Jeff Pancottine, managing business development of F5 Networks, 
delivering specialist software to DoCoMo, explained: “You have to have a 
unique solution and get designed in. (…) It’s a very technical audience that 
you are selling to. They love technology and want to understand it and in-
ternalize it” (Rutledge 2003). 
Unlike Western telecom operators, who usually motivate external parties 
by placing orders for their solutions, DoCoMo was able to encourage unso-
licited submissions, especially through its certification program. Any 
hardware or software company could apply for logos DoCoMo Value and 
Link to DoCoMo®. This method of cementing partnerships resembles af-
filiate programs of IT companies like Microsoft or IBM, but is unique 
among telecom operators. For Japanese partners, it offered a benefit of be-
ing linked to the successful giant: a primarily emotional, yet very important 
argument in Japan. 
3.2.3 Devices and components 
Another segment of the value chain presents a fully-fledged model of Japa-
nese-style partnership, with a group of trusted and submissive suppliers. 
While infrastructure solutions were non-repetitive and involved long-term 
projects of strategic importance to DoCoMo, handsets have short replace-
ment cycles and established dominant designs, reducing technological un-
certainty. Although their role is critical in mediating the end users’ experi-
ence of carrier’s services, Japanese telecom operators regard them as one of 
many elements of the value chain, just like automobile companies perceive 
components from their suppliers. This is an important difference from 
Western telecommunications industry, where handset makers were setting 
new standards and trends, gaining significant bargaining power in their re-
lations with telecom operators. 
In the early 1990s, first mobile phones were manufactured to carrier’s or-
der, thus giving DoCoMo control over the brand, end user price and of 
course detailed specification. The phones were sold through NTT’s retail 
network and branded as DoCoMo movaD, movaF etc. to indicate by a sin-
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gle letter the actual manufacturer. The number of mova handsets (the com-
pany retains the brand name for its phones, with a numbering system indi-
cating series and features – e.g. mova N505iS) released annually was con-
stantly growing – unlike the number of contracted suppliers, which 
remained stable over the years. In this way, an “inner circle” of mova mak-
ers was established, consisting of: Fujitsu, NEC, Matsushita (known for its 
brand Panasonic), Mitsubishi Electric and Japan Radio (incidentally, there 
were also two mova phones manufactured by Motorola and Ericsson). 
In the 1990s, with depressed Japanese economy and limited consumer 
demand, the regular orders for mobile phones presented an important busi-
ness opportunity for all electronics companies and fuelled their business 
growth (especially as millions of users were replacing phones on an annual 
basis). Facing pressures from industry and government, DoCoMo agreed to 
work also with other suppliers, but used co-branding to differentiate be-
tween them and the trusted (and thus recommended) partners: third-party 
phones were procured like mova phones, but sold as DoCoMo by phones 
(e.g. DoCoMo by Sony) to imply differences. Figure 11 presents graphi-
cally the closeness of cooperation between DoCoMo and handset suppliers, 
based on handset orders from the years 1992-2003 (the distance between a 
partner and DoCoMo represents the reverted number of orders placed in 
this timeframe) - 6 companies form the “inner circle” as of 2003, with Sony 
and Sharp admitted to the trusted group only recently. 
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Fig. 11. Inner and outer circles of DoCoMo handset partners 
Differences on technical level indeed existed – as Kanji Ohnishi from 
Sony Ericsson described the position of Sony, describing the times when 
they were a by maker: “We were the readers of the text (…) rather than the 
writers” (Meyer 2002), referring to the close cooperation between mova 
makers and DoCoMo in analyzing emerging technologies, acquiring 
knowledge, developing concepts and defining specifications for new hand-
sets before the details were disclosed to all other interested (and disadvan-
taged) parties. An example of the scale of disadvantages is the first PHS 
handsets, released in 1995 (PHS business was by that time managed by 
NTT not DoCoMo, but the partnership patterns were similar). Sony’s 
model weighted 190g, and the battery life allowed for 5 hours of conversa-
tion or 95 hours waiting time – while four other handsets weighted 95-
160g, with respective battery parameters of 3.2-5 and 80-400 hours, as well 
as additional innovative features. Even though Sony was trying hard to 
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compete by offering superior usability and fashionable phone designs, its 
phones were technologically disadvantaged. There were many Japanese 
companies, supplying handsets to other mobile phone networks, which did 
not try to work with DoCoMo (like Casio or Victor) or supplied handsets 
once (Kyocera, Denso) only to realize their weak position. One could easily 
understand the hopelessness of foreign manufacturers’ efforts to gain a sig-
nificant market share in the Japanese market. 
On the other hand, participants of the inner circle of mova makers bene-
fited from their cooperation with DoCoMo and supplied phones also for 
other networks in Japan and abroad. In order to prevent premature knowl-
edge-spillovers, DoCoMo’s contracts were prohibiting external uses of 
technologies embedded in phones for a period of 6 months – this practice 
was questioned by the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) in 1999 and 
formally abandoned. Although severely disadvantaged, some of the by 
makers proved to add significant value over time – Sharp developed a 
phone with embedded digital camera, Sony mastered multimedia features, 
and Toshiba delivered in 2002 the lightest 3G handset with long battery 
life, all playing critical roles in boosting diffusion of new services. 
DoCoMo’s partnership strategy with handset makers based on the mova-
by dichotomy was key to its innovativeness. The distinction was rooted in 
Japanese institutional logic, differentiating kankei gaisha (affiliated com-
panies) and dokuritsu gaisha (independent companies) (Dyer and Ouchi 
1993: 52). While DoCoMo remained open to new ideas and products from 
by makers, it also encouraged them to try harder so that maybe in the future 
they could become mova manufacturers based on the value they add. At the 
same time, the company was actively pursuing keiretsu-like partnerships 
with the “inner circle”. Implicit guarantees of repetitive orders encouraged 
investments, specific only to relationships with DoCoMo, and established 
predictive transaction patterns. This enabled suppliers to benefit from ex-
perience curve effects, concentrate on continuous improvement and invest 
in assimilating new technologies – differing from the style of partnership 
between telecom operators and handset manufacturers, where the latter 
have to bear the entire risk of innovations in phone design, while the for-
mer may rotate suppliers to emphasize own bargaining power, not letting 
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them experience learning effects translating into cost and technology ad-
vantages. 
The relations displayed also another component of vertical keiretsu: con-
tinuous competitive rivalry among trusted suppliers, intentionally estab-
lished and enforced by DoCoMo. Japanese high-tech companies have tradi-
tionally stimulated competition among suppliers by contracting two 
competitors and constantly pushing for cost reduction and innovation – 
even by acquiring new technology from one of them to share also with the 
other so that “they would always remind us that they could go elsewhere if 
we didn’t continuously improve” (Dyer and Ouchi 1993: 57), as one of 
NEC’s suppliers explained. The evidence for cycles of imitations are regu-
lar launches of new mova handset series: each one was embedding some 
important modifications, and virtually every mova maker was releasing his 
own version with a maximum lag of several months. 
Like in traditional vertical keiretsus, every supplier from the inner circle 
has to work with the others, sharing knowledge (usually to his own disad-
vantage) through regular group meetings, as well as probable passing of 
technical information by DoCoMo. The handset development was becom-
ing difficult, as the phones were expected to serve more functions, requir-
ing sophisticated software. The increased complexity resulted in frequent 
phone failures and subsequent handset recalls (although this information is 
never disclosed, the handset makers certainly bear at least part of the costs, 
so large recalls – like 230,000 of Matsushita phones in 2001 and 840,000 of 
NEC phones in 2003 – can be costly for them), and horizontal alliances 
among rivaling DoCoMo’s suppliers. For example Matsushita and NEC 
joined forces in 2001 to develop a two-processor platform for 3G handsets, 
and later in 2003 established a joint-venture Cosmobic Technology, devel-
oping software for the 3G platform. Another example of coordination ef-
forts was a decision of 19 technology companies, developing FOMA hand-
sets, to establish a shared patent pool, eliminating knowledge asymmetries 
and helping define a dominant design for the future phone (Meyer 2002). 
DoCoMo realized the complexity of handset business, alongside in-
creased costs and risks to the phone manufacturers, which were particularly 
hard to accept as the 3G network in Japan differed from foreign standards, 
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even the closest European specification for UMTS, so that Japanese experi-
ences and handset designs could not easily be replicated abroad. Develop-
ment of components was critical in reducing costs, power consumption and 
size of devices – DoCoMo traditionally cultivated close relationships with 
a local specialist company Yozan, which was supplying the mova handset 
makers, but Yozan decided to exit the semiconductor business in 2002, 
when it realized that its investments in developing partner-specific tech-
nologies were difficult to recoup abroad. DoCoMo started investing in 
phone standardization by acquiring a license for mobile operating system 
Symbian, investing in alternative embedded Linux vendor, forging a strate-
gic alliance with Intel to develop prototype next generation handset chips, 
and subsidizing development of semiconductors by Texas Instruments and 
Japanese Renesas Technology. 
In 2003, the company adopted also new measures to tie closer their most 
trusted partners: it invested into five partner companies (Fujitsu, Matsu-
shita, Mitsubishi Electric, NEC and Sharp) by covering 50% of the devel-
opment costs for new handsets in order to boost supply and reduce unit 
costs. The subsidies would also give DoCoMo another advantage: joint 
ownership of any new handset technology developed, equaling long-term 
ties with every concerned manufacturer and royalties from phones deliv-
ered for other 3G networks. In this way, the 12-years-long mating dance 
with mova makers was sealed by a marriage-like arrangement. 
3.2.4 Software 
Software plays a role of a ”glue” in high-tech markets, combining other 
layers of value chain. Most of technical problems in DoCoMo networks, as 
well as handset recalls, were caused by software issues. According to 
Sony’s representative, there were 100,000 software items to check on 2G 
and 500,000 items on 3G phone (Meyer 2002), so the complexity and lack 
of standards motivated companies to join forces in this area. 
The first handsets were using a locally developed operating system 
µITRON, commonly adopted by Japanese electronics companies, but later 
in the 1990s, DoCoMo entered partnerships with several providers of soft-
ware platform, suitable as mobile phone operating systems (Microsoft, 
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Symbian and 3COM – Palm), using them to learn and explore existing op-
portunities (Computing Japan 1999). Japanese firms were traditionally 
avoiding supply chains, where subcontractors were producing “black 
boxes”, not understood by assemblers, thus strengthening the bargaining 
power of suppliers (Dyer and Ouchi 1993: 61) - “parts evaluation capabil-
ity” was key to evaluate performance and cost structures of partners, espe-
cially in the case of breakthrough innovations (Ahmadjian and Lincoln 
2001: 687-688). 
DoCoMo selected Symbian operating system in 2003 and signed an 
agreement, allowing it to use the system’s source code and build a proprie-
tary user interface, distributed to handset makers. This approach could re-
duce future phone development costs, but also offers another means of con-
trolling suppliers: the standard would be open (Symbian as a recognized 
platform), but also encompass specific modifications controlled by 
DoCoMo. Interestingly, a year later the firm added support for Symbian’s 
competitor in the mobile operating system arena by investing in Monta-
Vista Software, producer of embedded Linux system. DoCoMo’ handset 
partners had therefore two recommended handset platforms – Linux and 
Symbian – with internal competition and incentives to innovate among 
supporters of both operating systems. 
Apart from the operating system, mobile phones accessing the i-mode 
platform required a dedicated web browser, counterpart of the standard ap-
plication on personal computers. When launching the new service, 
DoCoMo partnered with a small Japanese software house Access, which 
developed a language called cHTML, partly compliant with the web page 
standard HTML. Pages in cHTML could be developed without problems 
by web designers acquainted with HTML, and accessed through mobile 
phones with embedded Access’ browser application NetFront. This easi-
ness of development, and partly compliance with an established standard is 
often quoted as the main reason for the fast growth in the number of i-mode 
sites. In 2001, NetFront was installed on 70% of i-mode phones manufac-
tured for DoCoMo and the steady stream of revenues accounted for 30% of 
Access’ business (Normile 2001), moreover the company benefited later 
from DoCoMo’s export of i-mode platform to other countries. 
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DoCoMo’s perfection in establishing apparently open, but in fact proprie-
tary standards and using them not just to innovate with partners, but to in-
novate with selected partners only, while motivating all other parties to try 
even harder, is best evidenced by the launch of i-αppli Java platform in 
2001. Already in 1999, DoCoMo signed an agreement with Sun Microsys-
tems, intending to incorporate its Java technology into future i-mode 
phones. Java would be used to run custom applications, turning a mobile 
phone into a device resembling personal computer, where new software 
could be installed. Using the technology, one could develop interactive ap-
plications (as opposed to static i-mode websites) and games, strengthening 
the security of communication (e.g. each bank offering its services through 
i-mode could implement own secure authorization mechanisms). 
The plan to make Java available to mobile phone users was exciting for 
developers, but they were bitterly disappointed when they discovered that 
what was launched was not “Java” but “i-αppli”, and the name proved not 
to be DoCoMo’s only modification of the platform. The company did not 
disclose detailed specification of all Java classes implemented in its new 
handsets, retaining full control over applications developed for i-αppli. A 
group of official partners received sufficient details, and altogether only 38 
i-αppli websites were available at the platform’s launch in January 2001. A 
shortened (incomplete) version of specification was published on 
DoCoMo’s website for other parties exactly one month before the launch of 
i-αppli, making any serious development efforts impossible. Moreover, 
DoCoMo did not provide any programmer tools, which could facilitate the 
application development. In spite of all these problems, small software 
firms started offering unofficial development kits for i-αppli, and in June 
2001, there were some 4,450 sites with Java applets for DoCoMo mobiles 
(Mori 2001). 
3.2.5 Services 
The stunning success of i-mode platform would not be possible without 
services, enabling user communication. In spring 1997, DoCoMo launched 
a data communication service 10Yen Mail in partnership with a small Inter-
net Service Provider MasterNet, available through portable computers con-
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nected to mobile phones. In 1998, DoCoMo introduced its own Internet ac-
cess service mopera, undermining the reasons for using 10Yen Mail. mop-
era was not its direct copy – it offered superior technology and extended 
functionality, allowing users not only to exchange e-mails but also to 
browse the Internet, with different pricing model. DoCoMo decided not to 
compete with its partner directly, but to surpass his offering by a substitu-
tive new generation solution, and one year later, also i-mode included mes-
saging and web browsing functionality, which soon became core services 
for every new phone. 
Another popular service, i-shot (multimedia messaging, enabling users to 
take pictures with digital cameras embedded in the newest handsets and 
share them with other mobile phone users), emerged in a way similar to 
text messaging. In June 1999, PhotoNet launched its i-mode website, where 
users could upload and view photos taken with their cameras. PhotoNet had 
partnerships with a broad network of retailing points, accepting “normal” 
photos and scanning them to put on the website. The business proved to be 
very successful – but as the case of MasterNet demonstrated, being suc-
cessful as DoCoMo’s external supplier may encourage the powerful partner 
to substitute the offering with own solutions. In February 2000 DoCoMo 
released Toshiba’s handheld device camesse petit, allowing to take and 
send digital photos over the mobile network. Several months later, in No-
vember 2000, DoCoMo’s competitor J-Phone launched an improved offer-
ing: Sharp’s mobile phone with embedded camera. The service enjoyed a 
stunning popularity, and it took DoCoMo over one and half a year to come 
up with its own counterpart: i-shot service available since July 2002. The 
service was almost identical with J-Phone’s one, and substituted services of 
PhotoNet and other third-parties offered on i-mode platform – just like 
mopera replaced the 10Yen Mail by improved functionality and additional 
benefits. 
As i-mode platform did not offer compelling application for corporate 
customers, DoCoMo was constantly exploring new ways to improve its of-
fering for this market. The company partnered in this area with Puma 
Technology, Microsoft (through a joint-venture Mobimagic) and NTT 
Communications. Step by step DoCoMo was also launching own services, 
3.2 NTT DoCoMo and its value chain      85 
capturing specific niches of the corporate market, like BINWAN service, 
enabling wireless access to corporate mail accounts and thus substituting 
the services of Puma, Mobimagic and third-parties (according to estimates, 
in 2003 there were 136 Japanese companies, offering comparable solutions 
for corporate customers (Funk 2004), whose business was directly affected 
by the launch of BINWAN). 
3.2.6 Content 
DoCoMo-related publications present the company’s model of cooperation 
with content providers as the reason for i-mode success: while never paying 
for the content supplied by partners, the company created a market, which 
attracted many players, contributing to the platform’s popularity. In fact, 
the astonishing i-mode revenues were driven mainly by services (including 
mails, corresponding to short text messages in GSM networks, and mailing 
digital photo), enabled in turn by handset design and software platforms. 
The role of content providers seems to be over-rated in Western versions of 
i-mode story, especially as the content-based revenues have never met the 
enthusiastic forecast figures, and DoCoMo started looking for alternative 
sources of revenue as payment facilitator in 2004. The present case study 
proposes to look at content within the broad context of the high-tech value 
chain, within which Japanese content providers played certainly important, 
but definitely not leading roles. 
DoCoMo established an approval procedure for every company inter-
ested in becoming an official content partner. This status was attractive 
both in terms of increased number of site visits (official sites were listed on 
“i-mode menu”, launched whenever user was accessing the service), as 
well as in financial terms, as the accepted partners could benefit from 
DoCoMo’s micropayments system. DoCoMo acted as a clearinghouse, bill-
ing users for the services they access and redistributing the fees to content 
partners (subtracting a 9% margin). Users were billed for monthly subscrip-
tions to specific services by only three possible fees: 100 yen, 200 yen or 
300 yen, matching the prices of paper-based magazines. DoCoMo’s official 
story about the micropayments solution emphasized its convenience for 
content suppliers and users, apparently rooted in the Japanese tradition of 
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“lean thinking” (Ticoll 2001). While the analogy is compelling, the pay-
ment system was actually technically inferior to most Internet-based solu-
tions, could not bill individual website visits or transactions only monthly 
subscriptions, so it could not be used for online payments or shopping. 
Nevertheless, many i-mode providers would probably never have consid-
ered launching own paid subscription services fearing difficulties with fees 
collection, which issue was addressed by DoCoMo. 
Apart from conveniences, there were also numerous restrictions imposed 
on content providers – the process of becoming an official i-mode partner 
was long and strenuous. DoCoMo required its providers to update content 
more than once a day, making it “addictive” (encouraging users to return to 
the site) and enabling them to experience benefits (i.e. offering services, 
not only information) (Lynch and Clark 2000). This required not only in-
teractive designs, but also a dedicated manpower, and DoCoMo was strict 
in enforcing compliance with the requirements. One day before the launch 
of i-mode, Takeshi Natsuno went through all the 69 i-mode websites and 
refused to put online two of them because of low quality content (J@pan 
Inc. 2001), so on February 22, 1999, there were altogether 67 official con-
tent providers, including banks, two securities firms, airlines, travel agen-
cies, radio stations and yellow pages (Fujimoto 1999). Applications for the 
official i-mode appearance were analyzed at DoCoMo’s discretion, and po-
tential partners were required to go through one of DoCoMo’s regional 
branches to launch websites first locally before the national roll-out (Col-
lier 2003). 
The system resembled ways DoCoMo used to work with other partners: 
selecting an inner circle of suppliers, but also remaining open to sugges-
tions of external parties, motivated to innovate by observing benefits, 
which the trusted companies derived from the partnership. i-mode websites 
could easily be built by hobbyists, and private pages were accessible from 
DoCoMo phones (but not summarized in i-mode menu for fast and easy ac-
cess). At the same time, the competition among official content providers 
was fierce, and i-mode platform itself was intensifying the rivalry – certifi-
cation alone did not equal a successful business, and the critical factor, 
driving customer subscriptions, was the position of a website on i-mode 
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menu, changing monthly based on the number of already subscribed users. 
Just like handset makers, content providers admitted to the “inner circle” 
had some confidence that the sole fact can generate revenues, but within 
the circle, they were experiencing constant competitive pressures, being 
aware that other companies are offering similar content and certainly hav-
ing advantages in some areas. The importance of being highly ranked on i-
mode menu cannot be exaggerated: in June 1999, there were already 989 
official i-mode content providers, and in April 2000, 9,337 sites competed 
for the attention of over 6mln users (Shibata 2000). 
DoCoMo was promoting the business of selected content partners, espe-
cially ambitious start-up companies, sharing its vision and accepting the 
proposed “rules of the game”, including continuous innovation and loyalty. 
The most prominent example is Cybird, new media company, offering con-
tent including: ring tones, wallpapers, games, horoscopes, movies, sport 
news, maps and travel information. The development of Cybird’s business 
was benefiting from a vicious cycle, with positive feedbacks between its 
popularity and ranking on i-mode menu: being popular, it ranked high, 
meaning that even more users visited websites, which were easier to access 
in specific content categories. The company became one of DoCoMo’s 
trusted partners, accompanying it abroad when i-mode platform was ex-
ported. DoCoMo did not compete with Cybird mainly because the com-
pany acted as content aggregator, licensing and delivering diversified enter-
tainment services. Another successful content provider was Index 
Corporation, which launched an amazingly popular “The God of Love” 
(renai no kamisama) fortune telling service (Mann 2001). Index’s com-
mitment to DoCoMo (and DoCoMo’s bargaining power) is best evidenced 
by the fact that although the company works also with other mobile opera-
tors, its fortune telling service is available only via i-mode: it sacrificed po-
tential subscription-based revenues to maintain good relations with its cor-
porate patron, benefiting over time from investments by DoCoMo-related 
companies and export opportunities with i-mode platform. 
DoCoMo approached also important content partners from offline busi-
nesses, for example Bandai (leading Japanese toy maker, creator of toys 
Power Rangers and Tamagotchi), Disney or Sony (maker of the popular 
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video game console Playstation). When Java-based service i-αppli was 
launched, DoCoMo worked with the leading Japanese game makers and of-
fered them detailed specification of i-αppli, not available to the wide public 
– for example, Namco, known for game classics such as PacMan, revived 
lifecycles of games, no longer suitable for modern computers, by porting 
them to mobile phones. 
DoCoMo has actually never declared that it would not become a content 
provider itself. The risk of DoCoMo delivering content would certainly 
discourage partners, and its management implied in various interviews no 
interests in the space due to the company’s lack of relevant knowledge and 
skills. Nevertheless, at the same time DoCoMo was actively investing in 
joint-ventures and exclusive alliances, intended to launch own services and 
capture segments of the content market, including formation of AirMedia 
(mobile music shop), D2 Communications (mobile advertising agency), 
and Location Agent (offering location-based services like maps or area in-
formation), as well as the purchase of a stake in AOL Japan to use its Inter-
net content for i-mode (Williams 2001). Although some of the ventures 
failed, DoCoMo’s attempts confirmed the pattern of innovations, driven by 
and later substituting ideas of partners. The company applied its proven 
method of partners management to the content area by creating an open 
market for concepts, and inviting as many parties as possible to bear the 
cost and the risk, only to pick the successful solutions and improve them 
with the trusted suppliers. 
An example of the mechanism is Air Media, formed by DoCoMo and 
Matsushita to manage wireless record shop, with subsequent involvement 
of Sony and trading house Itochu. In January 2001, it started offering M-
Stage service, distributing songs from 15 music companies. DoCoMo’s in-
terest in the market was related to the astonishing success of simpler ser-
vices offered by i-mode partners. Chaku-mero were short melodies, 
downloaded by users to their mobile phones as ring tones. These third-
party services enjoyed a high uptake and benefited many parties, including 
not only DoCoMo (data transfer fees and 9% of subscriptions) and content 
providers, but also music composers and the Japanese Society for Rights of 
Authors, Composers and Publishers (JASRAC). With M-Stage, DoCoMo 
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tried to innovate by going further than content partners and creating a mar-
ket with CD-quality songs. Although it would not enter into direct competi-
tion with the ring tone providers, they would experience sales decline, as 
most users downloading chaku mero were music collectors, storing on av-
erage 30-40 melodies in phones (Poliakov 2004). M-Stage was expected to 
surpass the quality of partners’ offering and benefit from the existing de-
mand, created thanks to the openness of i-mode platform. Nevertheless, the 
service did not generate as much interest as expected - the first dedicated 
phone was working in the old PHS network only, and could not be used for 
other purposes (not even for voice communication), while download time 
and costs were prohibitive. 
DoCoMo’s latest innovation, combining multiple elements of the high-
tech value chain, is a mobile phone with embedded FeliCa chip. FeliCa 
was originally developed by Sony as a contactless intelligent card, which 
could act as electronic wallets (used e.g. to pay for drinks in vending ma-
chines, coffee in bars, newspapers in kiosks) or public transport tickets 
(Clark 2003). DoCoMo tries to establish new revenue streams, moving be-
yond the traffic business and content delivery to real-life transactions, act-
ing as payment facilitator (Einhorn 2004), rivaling financial institutions 
(which can regard this also as a new opportunity, like the Japanese credit 
card company JCB, one of the first specialists working closely with 
DoCoMo in this area), as well as getting involved with consumer retail 
market (DoCoMo signed e.g. a revenue-sharing agreement with media re-
tailer GEO with a network of 600 shops (NTT DoCoMo 2004b)). 
3.3 Discussion 
3.3.1 Plural governance model 
DoCoMo’s partnerships displayed consistent partner management patterns, 
used for new concepts or products. As explained on the graph below, the 
company was starting by defining the “game”: setting business rules and 
making sure the new area is attractive for potential partners, like in the case 
of micropayments for i-mode platform or sizeable orders for W-CDMA in-
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frastructure. This innovation in business model was followed by innovative 
technical designs of future platforms – using semi-open approach, adjusting 
widely accepted standards by proprietary modifications, as it happened 
with i-mode or i-αppli. Solutions based on these standards were relatively 
easy to deliver, as necessary skills and knowledge were already available, 
yet their proprietary character prohibited partners from supplying them to 
competitors. In the further process, DoCoMo tried to maintain a balance 
between openness (inviting all potential providers to generate new solu-
tions without actual reimbursements for their efforts) and close partnerships 
(working with the inner circle of trusted suppliers, who benefit financially), 
so that companies not enjoying intimate relationships were motivated to in-
novate, while official suppliers were competing against each other as an 
oligopoly. For particularly promising markets, DoCoMo was launching 
own offerings, substituting solution from partners, while certain trusted 
partners were also tied more closely by investments and other long-term 
commitments like shared ownership of technologies. The model, confirmed 
for various new products launched by DoCoMo, inherently stimulated in-
novativeness of multiple parties. 
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Fig. 12. Model of DoCoMo’s relations with partners 
The chapter studies one company, but corresponding partnership mecha-
nisms were reported in Japanese automobile industry, and DoCoMo’s case 
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proved their relevance for high-tech companies. DoCoMo’s approach com-
bined proven techniques of American companies like AOL and Microsoft 
(especially establishing “walled-gardens”) with common Japanese institu-
tional arrangements, as well as strives for technological supremacy, inher-
ited from its corporate parent NTT. The Japanese-style of partnerships, pre-
sented by the DoCoMo model, displays interesting differences when 
compared with the dynamics of partnerships in Western industry: these re-
lations have been described as “practicing polygamy with good taste” 
(Powell et al. 2002), denoting networks of multiple relations, whereas 
DoCoMo shows rather preference for “monogamy” or “multiple mar-
riages” with trusted partners, while not remaining entirely closed to inci-
dental encounters with third-parties, generating new value or even turning 
into longer-term relations. 
The model can also be analyzed as an innovative institutional form, dif-
ferent from the arm’s length relations and embedded partnerships, replac-
ing both market and traditional governance mechanisms of keiretsu. The 
mixture of embedded and arm’s length ties, intentionally maintained by 
DoCoMo, guarantees at the same time stability (within the close circle of 
trusted partners) and innovativeness (by stimulating competition among 
trusted partners, and between them and outsiders). The new governance 
form certainly emerged from NTT’s historical dominance over submissive 
suppliers, and resembled relations in integrated supply chains of other 
Japanese companies, but it was not only rooted in the Japanese institutional 
logic. One should not ignore the importance of DoCoMo’s strategic intent 
(for example, the company deliberately adopted the same model to manage 
also its relations with content providers, which were radically different 
from past technical partnerships) – interestingly, as the following chapter 
will describe, Microsoft operating in different geographical environment 
and industry sector, was successfully pursuing a similar governance form. 
First explanation, discussed as the leitmotiv of the present article, was the 
desire to stimulate innovation across the high-tech value chain, speed up 
development and diffusion of new technologies by guaranteeing the supply 
of complementary products, and create healthy competition among part-
ners, who nevertheless do not face the adversities of “normal” markets. 
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DoCoMo was able to align strategies of its partners by selecting the inner 
circle and imposing own vision to direct partners’ product development. 
The motivation went beyond overcoming the asymmetry in resources, as 
proposed by the resource-based view on partnerships. In many cases 
DoCoMo was actually controlling the key resources (e.g. i-mode and i-
αppli standards, phone operating system or custom-built chips), and had 
sufficient skills in-house to potentially replace partners, but decided not to 
do so, regarding alliances as a method to generate new innovations in the 
future, as long as partners are motivated to try even harder (as there always 
are other companies waiting to take their place) and cope with new techni-
cal challenges. In cases when DoCoMo substituted partners’ products, the 
concerned parties were always outsiders, not forming the inner circle, so 
that the implicit commitments towards trusted allies were not endangered. 
Additional argument refers to the ability to evaluate performance of part-
ners by comparing many available providers and inducing continuous im-
provement based on cost and technical criteria. The governance form satis-
fied the transaction cost economics postulates with reference to the cost 
efficiencies from long-term cooperation – it comes as no surprise that Japa-
nese handsets are significantly cheaper and based on newer technologies 
than their Western counterparts, as the trusted suppliers benefited from the 
experience curve effects, while DoCoMo was able to press its technologi-
cally and commercially locked-in suppliers for constant cost reductions. 
Changes in the number and intensity of ties with other organizations are in-
terpreted in the literature as an important mechanism, allowing firms to 
manage their suppliers to achieve price efficiencies (Baker 1990: 591-597). 
Transaction cost reduction was however important in Japan mainly for ma-
ture products – as figure 14 indicates, initial stages of new concept devel-
opment were open to all parties, while the inner circle was closing once a 
dominant design was established, so that DoCoMo’s governance model 
was actually dynamic, with different motivations at different stages of 
product development and diffusion. Moreover, to achieve long-term cost 
reduction, DoCoMo did not supplement relationships by transactions with 
other parties, as Western organizations are hypothesized to do (Baker 1990: 
595-596). It actually did the opposite by investing into key third-party 
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components (like operating system and chips for the mobile handsets) and 
into several trusted partners, so that they could securely draft long-term 
plans focused on cost improvement. Transaction cost arguments cannot 
thus explain the nature of the described partnership model, focused on NPD 
process, while certainly remaining an important factor for mature products. 
Hybrid interorganizational arrangements, mixing market-based competi-
tion and trusted relations, were in Western literature interpreted mainly as 
offering cost efficiencies. However, the so-called plural governance forms, 
where companies simultaneously use internal operations and partners, e.g. 
within franchise restaurant chains (Bradach 1997) or component sourcing 
relations (Heide 2003), can also influence non-quantitative aspects of NPD. 
Partners are subject to constant competitive pressures thanks to a self-
reinforcing control mechanism presented as ratcheting effect, where im-
provements by one party force the others to adjust, thus setting constantly 
higher standards (Bradach 1997: 289). DoCoMo enriched the framework 
by differentiating not only between own company and partners, but also 
distinguishing between the “lower” and “higher” partnership status, not 
definitely preventing aspiring companies from enjoying the benefits of the 
“higher” status, while using them as a constant threat for the existing 
trusted parties, encouraging unsolicited submissions of new products and 
ideas. 
This demonstrates finally political aspects of the discussed governance 
form as the third possible motive for its emergence: it included a mixture of 
incentives and deterrents for different categories of partners. Persuasion 
proved to be more useful than contractual clauses (confirming other find-
ings concerning the plural governance forms (Bradach 1997: 287)) – for 
example, even without written commitments, trusted partners were not us-
ing the same technologies or products with DoCoMo’s competitors. The 
form played also an important signaling role for potentially interested par-
ties by making visible both the market entry barriers and DoCoMo’s bar-
gaining power, facilitating self-selection by potential partners (Heide 2003: 
25). Not surprisingly, foreign firms like Motorola, Nokia or Microsoft de-
cided in the late 1990s to refrain from substantial investments in relation-
ships with DoCoMo, and several Japanese electronics companies like Kyo-
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cera or Casio realized that their opportunities are limited, deciding to work 
rather with DoCoMo’s competitors. One should also remember the abso-
lute power DoCoMo had in controlling various segments of its value chain: 
just before launching i-mode in 1999, the firm refused to put online some 
of its partners’ websites, as they did not comply with previously defined 
(and difficult to measure) qualitative criteria. 
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Cooperation pattern Rationale 
Open technological platform with 
proprietary modifications (semi-
walled garden) 
• encouraging newcomers while maintaining control 
• strategic focus on key, unique resources 
Partnerships with companies 
across the entire value chain 
• control of solutions for end users 
• similar governance forms applied to every relation 
Commercial and technological 
preference for trusted partners 
(inner circle) 
• promoting competence building and experience curve 
effects 
• embeddedness, inducing reciprocal loyalty 
Payments to trusted partners • encourage partner-specific investments and long-term 
focus of cooperative strategies 
• guarantee timely supply of innovative complementary 
products 
Competition among trusted part-
ners 
• limiting dependence on individual partners 
• stimulating innovativeness and cost reduction 
• avoiding over-embeddedness 
Openness to ideas from other 
companies (outer circle) 
• stimulating innovativeness, inflow of ideas from do-
mains unexplored by trusted partners 
• development of new ideas and concepts at the cost of 
partners 
Inhouse R&D related to tech-
nologies of complementors 
• absorptive capacities in partner domains 
• ability to choose the right partners, set development 
directions and evaluate their performance 
Learning alliances with techno-
logy leaders 
• inflow of key innovations from external sources, sup-
plementing inhouse R&D 
Substitution of partner products 
by own new generation solutions 
• stimulating innovativeness within the inner circle 
Gradual institutionalization of re-
lations with trusted partners 
• long-term cost reduction through process innovations 
in mature technologies 
• gradual internalization of partner technologies 
Table 2. Characteristics of DoCoMo’s plural governance model 
3.3.2 Unique characteristics of DoCoMo’s value chain 
In the recent years, relations of other mobile telecommunications compa-
nies with technology partners changed, imitating the ecosystem of 
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DoCoMo, but they are still rooted in a different mindset, not paying atten-
tion to interdependencies in the high-tech value chain. Telecoms are usu-
ally not motivated to support businesses of their partners, and prefer arm’s 
length supply ties. A recent trend is ordering customized handsets branded 
by the carrier – but the phone design and customization concepts come 
from handset manufacturers not carriers. Outside of Japan, mobile phone 
manufacturers drive the development of the mobile industry thanks to the 
strength of their brands and technological lead – not surprisingly, 
DoCoMo’s discussion partners in establishing new standards for 3G te-
lephony were technology companies, not telecom operators, and the carrier 
was able to combine resources of the entire value chain to boost innova-
tiveness. 
New product development in telecom sector is usually divided into op-
erator- and infrastructure-maker driven projects – and electronics compa-
nies such as Nokia, Motorola or Qualcomm are sources of major product 
innovations, used later by operators (Steinbock 2003). Western mobile 
markets can be presented as complex networks of independent actors, with 
competition and substitution relations at every level thanks to anti-
monopolist interconnection rules and the use of mediating technologies 
(Andersen and Fjeldstad 2003: 402). Analysis of the alliances among U.S. 
telecommunications market players showed e.g. that in years 1999-2001, 
only 1% of all agreements involved content providers, and projects were 
usually focused on infrastructure development (Grover and Saeed 2003: 
121). As opposed to this, DoCoMo’s system is streamlined by an asymmet-
ric alliance with the dominant (but not monopolist) telecom operator - some 
parties are thus probably not able to pursue all of their ambitious goals, but 
the entire value chain experiences a steady growth and development of new 
products. Additional difference in mindsets can be demonstrated by an alli-
ance Innholdsnett (Andersen and Fjeldstad 2003: 405)), formed by Norwe-
gian content providers to offset the bargaining power of telecom carriers. 
Suppliers of DoCoMo were also pursuing horizontal alliances, but with 
radically different motivations: e.g. handset manufacturers allied to reduce 
competitive rivalry in product development and to pool patents, necessary 
to develop a prototype 3G phone. Traditional Japanese alliances seem also 
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to be longer-lasting than vertical integration or capital investment, as addi-
tionally evidenced by DoCoMo’s foreign joint-ventures with Microsoft, 
acquisition of AOL Japan or its investments in foreign telecom operators 
AT&T Wireless and Hutchison, which all were costly, but turned out not to 
offer expected benefits and had sooner or later to be abandoned, as opposed 
to the cooperation with local trusted suppliers, involving no shareholding 
but mutual understanding and long-term orientation. 
Observers of the Japanese partnership system, particularly in automobile 
industry, often ignored the commercial character of relations, emphasizing 
their apparent over-embeddedness. DoCoMo pursued its partnerships with 
good strategic justifications, and established a system, involving competi-
tive dynamics with rivalry among suppliers based on quality and innova-
tiveness, where support for other parties was linked to business benefits, 
and partnerships were lasting because all parties understood these premises. 
The company was setting its own strategic directions, which surely were 
embedded in Japanese institutional logic, but not solely driven by the cus-
toms or norms: it creatively used the resource of local social institutions. 
This may also be interpreted as rooted in the dimension of Confucian dy-
namism, focused on perseverance and accepting inequalities as natural in 
social life (similarly, Western interpretations of keiretsus are flawed by as-
suming the analogy to the metaphor of family, with unconditional obliga-
tions and emotional attachment). The rivalry among DoCoMo’s partners 
differed from model market competition with opportunistic agents, and was 
not simply adopted by DoCoMo as an influence instrument (unlike the 
mixture of transactions and relations in Western firms (Baker 1990: 595-
596), rooted in individualist mentality), but rather evolved from the Japa-
nese institutional logic and keiretsu tradition, which was re-evaluated after 
the 1990s economic crisis. The independence and willingness to confront 
established norms was also demonstrated by cases when DoCoMo decided 
to substitute offerings of its partners. A parallel tendency was described for 
the automobile industry, where in the late 1990s researchers identified 
“significant cracks in the system of mutual obligations” (Ahmadjian and 
Lincoln 2001: 684), which turned out to be linked to changes in underlying 
technologies. “Relation-specific investments have the greatest value early 
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in an industry’s life cycle when the learning curve is steepest and levels of 
(e.g. technological and supply chain) uncertainty are high. As know-how is 
routinized and diffused, processes standardize, asset specificity falls, and 
the value of bilateral commitments and cooperation falls with it” (Ahmad-
jian and Lincoln 2001: 697). The same mechanism can be observed for 
DoCoMo: with decreasing uncertainty and growing standardization, the 
company waged to relax ties with some partners and launch own improved 
offering – long-term, keiretsu-style partnerships are thus not necessarily 
definite industry structures, while being instrumental in inducing new 
product development. 
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Fig. 13. Interdependencies within DoCoMo’s value chain 
3.3 Discussion      99 
InfrastructureComponents Software Services ContentDevices
Branding
Knowledge and specification
Sales to end customers
Reliance on external suppliers
Direct orders
Financial flows
Initiatives & ideas
Facilitation of 
other businesses
 
Fig. 14. Interdependencies within value chains of typical Western mobile phone opera-
tors 
Figures 13 and 14 summarize the differences between DoCoMo’s and a 
typical Western telecom operator’s approach to partners in the high-tech 
value chain. First of all, they differ in the extent to which own brand is used 
for products and services. Another striking difference concerns the process 
of building in-house skills and knowledge base, so that new product devel-
opment could be influenced or driven by the operator, as opposed to ac-
cepting “black boxes” shipped by partners and relying on their innovative-
ness without own involvement. Apart from orders for specific products, 
DoCoMo was engaged in activities deepening relations with partners - sub-
sidies to stimulate research and development, exchange of concepts and 
ideas, as well as facilitating other businesses (by establishing export oppor-
tunities or indicating potential customers for companies like NEC, 
DoCoMo encouraged them to invest in learning and developing new tech-
nologies, which sometimes might have even been delivered to the carrier 
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below their actual cost, covered nevertheless by repeated sales in the fu-
ture). 
3.3.3 Imitation barriers 
The chapter offered a detailed overview of partnerships in new product de-
velopment processes of the leading Japanese high-tech company. The in-
sight can help define own strategic directions – but thoughtless replication 
of the DoCoMo’s model to other institutional environments would not be 
effective, especially due to different understandings of what “embedded re-
lations” with partners should encompass. Corresponding transfer problems 
have already been encountered by foreign transplants of Japanese compa-
nies (Kenney and Florida 1995) and even by DoCoMo itself with its inter-
national ventures, where the company was hoping that this could establish 
trusting relationships similar to the ones it had with Japanese partners. An-
other challenge to a direct mimicry is posed by specific structural positions 
of DoCoMo, especially its prestige (Stuart 1998: 694), encouraging other 
companies to enter into partnerships and accept the rules set by their high 
profile cooperator. 
The case study points to sources of DoCoMo’s innovativeness, acting as 
guidelines for strategies and operations of Western high-tech companies. 
Past i-mode “success stories” emphasized the cultural elements of Japanese 
demand for mobile services as the source of the platform’s popularity, thus 
implying worthlessness of any imitation attempts. Rethinking the role of 
partnerships in new product development at DoCoMo, interested compa-
nies should understand that imitating only superficial layers of DoCoMo’s 
offering is not sufficient, and consider a more complex benchmarking exer-
cise. 
Western telecommunications firms replicated the external attributes of 
DoCoMo’s relations with content providers, including revenue models and 
technologies, which were extensively described in relevant publications. In 
spite of this, none of them enjoyed such an impressive diffusion of wireless 
data services as DoCoMo – analysts attributed this to the culture-bound 
demand for the services, but the present articles suggests that cultural fac-
tors played also an important role in structuring the partnerships, critical for 
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launching new services. Japanese institutional logic enabled DoCoMo to 
work with loyal and submissive partners, striving for innovation, and the 
partnership model for i-mode content providers resembled DoCoMo’s 
standard governance form, while for Western companies it was unique, dif-
ficult to implement and not easy to accept by partners, who themselves 
strive for domination in the high-tech value chain. 
At last, companies supplying technologies or products to Japanese com-
panies will certainly benefit from an opportunity to reassess their positions 
in value chains and own roles compared with other partners. Suppliers of 
unique technologies might want to consider establishing a business model, 
offering potentially longer-lasting partnership opportunities, especially re-
alizing the risks of one-off transactions resulting in knowledge transfer, 
enabling their Japanese partners to master the technologies and subse-
quently substitute them by own solutions. 
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4 Microsoft – strategy of the value chain 
leader 
4.1 Interorganizational politics and strategic 
alliances 
Traditional approaches to industrial networks and partnership agreements 
emphasize their cooperative aspects (Elg and Johanssson 1997: 365), which 
lead to the efficiency improvements and innovation. Similarly, relationship 
marketing literature is focused on mutual interests of both partners, assum-
ing that a trusting relationship, meeting partner’s expectations, inevitably 
leads to beneficial economic exchanges (Grönroos 1996:8). Networks of 
firms are however formed through political processes, which balance both 
mutual and conflicting interests of various parties (Astley and Zajac 1991: 
399; Elg and Johansson 1997: 361), and power struggles often dominate 
the interorganizational relations (McLoughlin et al. 2001: 275). 
The political perspective is linked to the interpretation of organizations as 
political entities, with members pursuing own, potentially conflicting inter-
ests (McLoughlin et al. 2001: 276), and a limited number of actors coordi-
nating scarce resources, which are important to other firms, and thus estab-
lish asymmetries in power (Elg and Johansson 1997: 363). Conflict is 
viewed as a natural element of social life, not only a failure in communica-
tion (McLoughlin et al. 2001: 278). Political actions of firms are linked to 
the controlled resources and structural positions – this view is consistent 
with the resource-based perspective on partnerships, and learning races, 
where the acquisition of knowledge shifts the power balance. Dominant 
firms will defend and exploit their positions by controlling the flow or re-
sources and the conditions of exchange, while smaller partners will try to 
reduce the dependencies (Elg, Johansson 1997: 366). The perspective helps 
address critical questions, concerning the processual aspects of partner-
ships. Dynamic view of alliances, which evolve over time, focuses on joint 
problem solving and the gradual emergence of trust among partners (Ring 
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and Van de Ven 1994; Das and Teng 2002). At different stages of the part-
nership process, formal elements such as bargaining, contract fulfillment 
and role interactions are complemented by informal sense making, psycho-
logical contract and interpersonal relations (Ring, Van de Ven 1994: 97), 
thus creating opportunities to use social influence mechanisms. Firms use 
multiple direct mechanisms, influencing other players and making them 
follow the firm’s desired actions (Elg and Johansson 1997: 364; Avakian 
1999: 42): 
• inducement – involving motivational investment, making the co-
operation more rewarding for loyal partners; 
• coercion – worsening of the other party’s situation unless it selects a sug-
gested alternative, e.g. by restricting access to specific resources, or 
threatening to compete; 
• obligation – binding the opponent to make him follow an intended course 
of action; 
• persuasion – presenting rational and emotional appeals. 
The creative use of governance form by DoCoMo, described in the previ-
ous chapter, combined these direct influence mechanisms to align partner 
strategies by offering them incentives, but also threatening with competi-
tion and substitution. Firms controlling key technologies can maintain their 
dominant positions not only because of superior technologies and compel-
ling strategic visions, but also thanks to the incorporation of political ac-
tions into their business models (Avakian 1999: 43-45). 
Power does not need to be linked to the resources possessed by an or-
ganization – systemic power can equally result from specific relations and 
social structures (Astley and Zajac 1991: 403; McLoughlin et al. 2001: 
281). Political process consists of both observable moves (surface politics), 
as well as subtle activities, not directly involving resource exchanges, espe-
cially preventing issues from being discussed and decisions from being 
made (deep structure politics) (Elg and Johansson 1997: 365-366). A po-
litically-oriented company can benefit (Elg and Johansson 1997: 367-368): 
• from connections within a network by building coalitions and “fighting 
wars”; 
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• from effects on the reputation of partners, as every firm is watched by 
other parties; 
• from exploiting competitive forces to align partners, supporting them in 
rivalry with their competitors; 
• from establishing entry barriers to the network; 
• from affecting decision rules, rationalizing political motivations, or man-
aging perceptions of partners; 
• from a simple lack of action or decision, which helps pursue own inter-
ests, e.g. by blocking initiatives of other players. 
Finally, partner selection and socialization processes are also used to 
align partners with the focal firm’s strategy by internalization of goals and 
convergence of strategies (Wathne and Heide 2000: 44-47). 
The present chapter will apply the perspective to strategies of the high-
tech value chain leader to illustrate, how a dominant firm can use a broad 
portfolio of political “tools” to manage its partners. Recent history of high-
tech companies demonstrates, that a mere formation of partner coalitions 
does not guarantee the future dominance. The chain leader may loose its 
position to other players, as it happened with MIPS, creator of the RISC 
platform, lacking the ability to coordinate partners, or IBM, who had 
successfully established the standard for personal computing, but 
subsequently lost control over the new market (Chesbrough and Teece 
2002: 130-133). The political power of a company helps establish and 
successfully defend a technological standard (Anderson and Tushman 
1990: 616), as well as maintain the supremacy in a related value chain. 
Resource-dependency theory suggests that in an alliance, a partner 
contributing more resources has more chances to control the other party – 
but the following case of Microsoft shows that intelligent use of political 
tactics can optimize partner contributions for the benefit of one player. 
Political sociology offers a useful analogy to the dynamics of high-tech 
industry. The seminal study of the rise of the fortune and political influence 
of Medici family in the renaissance Florence (Padgett and Ansell 1993) ex-
plains mechanisms, which helped this family and its most powerful repre-
sentative Cosimo de’ Medici exercise power through networks of relations 
and interlocking interests. Medicis brought about dramatic changes in the 
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political and economic organization of the state, without holding any for-
mal position in the government or other administrative institutions. The 
style of exercising power was compared to the game of chess, where suc-
cessful strategies involve locking-in other players, restricting their options 
and making them pursue strategies convenient for the winner – Cosimo de’ 
Medici excelled in this type of game without direct decisions, prescriptions 
or orders (Padgett and Ansell 1993: 1264). The sociologists referred to the 
phenomenon as to a blockmodel, with multiple ties, through which the 
Medicis were restricting the freedom of choice of other families - including 
strong ties (marriages, business partnerships, trade relations, real estate 
ownership or bank employment) and weak ties (friendship, patronage, per-
sonal loans and reciprocal honorary obligations resulting from earlier help 
with legal issues) (Padgett and Ansell 1993: 1274-1277). The network of 
locked-in families remained loyal to the Medicis in ways resembling the 
relative loyalty of Microsoft partners - the heritage of political sociology 
will thus help understand the phenomenon of strategic interlocks with the 
discretionary use of incentives and deterrents to induce and maintain part-
ner loyalty. 
4.2 Microsoft as value chain leader 
Microsoft is nowadays one of the largest high-tech companies, leading in 
multiple value chains. It was founded in 1975 by Bill Gates and Paul Allen 
as software development company, and six years later was contracted by 
IBM to develop operating system for its new PC. IBM needed help from 
Microsoft and Intel to quickly launch the new product, but later these two 
partners took over the leading role in the personal computing market, defin-
ing new standards without IBM’s involvement. Microsoft introduced nu-
merous new product families to diversify from the original operating sys-
tem focus. The company worked with Apple Computers to develop 
productivity applications for Mac computers, including text editor and 
spreadsheet software, and in this way learned the merits of graphical envi-
ronment with an intuitive user interface, later adopted by the developers of 
Windows. In addition, Microsoft’s technology and skill bases expanded by 
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acquisitions – for example, the 1987 purchase of Forethought, developer of 
the leading presentation software for Macintosh, enabled the company to 
offer a comprehensive software bundle Microsoft Office. Literature dis-
cusses also legal disputes and tricks of Microsoft – including unlicensed 
use of compression technology owned by Stac Electronics (Johnston 1994), 
or Apple QuickTime source code (Picarille and Johnston 1995), reinforcing 
the not entirely justified image of Microsoft as an unscrupulous player. 
Years 1993-1994 were important for Microsoft, marking its entrance in 
the enterprise computing market. The company was traditionally offering 
software for personal computers, but the launch of Windows NT, a client-
server system, started a new era in its history. The present analysis of part-
nership strategies will primarily concern the years after 1994, when this 
change occurred - in the development of earlier products, Microsoft tried to 
be self-sufficient by satisfying all functionality requirements from custom-
ers with own software (Cusumano and Selby 1995), but the introduction of 
a universal computing platform required complementary products, support 
and implementation services, as well as close cooperation with hardware 
companies. Although Windows NT evolved from technologies already 
used in previous Windows versions and DOS, the NT concept was a break-
through innovation: an attempts to enter the high-end market, dominated by 
expensive mainframe and Unix systems. Before the launch of NT, personal 
computers running Windows or Mac operating systems were regarded as 
user-friendly tools, automating everyday office tasks, such as writing 
documents or conducting simple calculations, lacking the processing power 
and stability needed to automate mission critical tasks in enterprises, for 
example run databases, support book-keeping, schedule production or plan 
inventories. The first release of Windows NT was not stable enough to 
support these tasks either, with no support from specialized enterprise soft-
ware, hardware, or IT services companies, but Microsoft embarked on a 
new strategy to enter the high-end enterprise-wide computing market, soon 
becoming one of key market players. 
The success of NT can be interpreted as an example of disruptive innova-
tion (Christensen 2000), initially characterized by significantly inferior per-
formance, compared with incumbents’ products, but simultaneously offer-
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ing also other functionality, important for customers (like graphical user in-
terface, ease-of-use and lower cost of necessary hardware), over time im-
proving the critical performance parameter to exceed predecessors. Equally 
important are however commercial elements of the product strategy. Aca-
demic and popular literature, as well as documentation of numerous law-
suits involving Microsoft, describe the use of proprietary technological 
standards and product bundling to eliminate competitors and enter related 
segments. More importantly, the company formed a wide coalition of part-
ners, supporting Windows NT, even though this support was often damag-
ing their traditional revenue streams and own technology platforms. This 
process was costly and required specific partner management skills – but 
based on the adopted partnership model for Windows NT, Microsoft was 
later able to diversify into new areas, also not related to personal com-
puters, driving the convergence of computing, communication and media 
businesses. 
Even though Microsoft was frequently substituting partner products with 
own solutions, there were numerous companies maintaining close comple-
mentary relationships, not affected by the technology developments. A 
seminal example of this trusted relationship is Intel, which jointly with Mi-
crosoft established the dominant design of personal computers, and both 
companies worked later as an informal technology coalition, often pre-
sented as “Wintel”. New versions of Windows were optimized to work 
with upcoming releases of Intel processors, and the firms collaborated also 
on the design of new technology platforms and features, such as support for 
peripheral hardware, 3D graphics or network telephony. There were also 
cases, when Microsoft blocked some of Intel’s initiatives to make sure their 
strategies don’t collide – e.g. when Intel started developing own software 
for digital media, and entered a domain eyed by the software giant, Micro-
soft demanded its partner to stop the development, threatening that Win-
dows might not support new features of the next processor generation Pen-
tium MMX, thus restricting Intel’s sales opportunities (Thibodeau 1998). 
While the relationships was certainly beneficial for both parties, Microsoft 
still seemed to derive more benefits from it, influencing strategies of Intel. 
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1995 implementation of Plug-and-Play framework for peripheral devices 
1995 multimedia streaming over the Internet project 
1996 cross-licensing of proprietary protocols for Internet conferencing 
1996 Microsoft works on a version of DirectX graphics for Intel MMX Pentium processor 
1997 specification for Simply Interactive PC (SIPC) 
1997 work on sending data over airwaves (with Compaq) 
1997 ACPI specification for computer power management (with Toshiba) 
1997 Device Bay specification for removing and inserting peripherals (with Compaq) 
1997 prototype PC supporting FireWire IEEE1394 standard for peripherals 
1997 IRDA standard for infrared communication (with HP and Sharp) 
1997 joint investment in Wildfire Communications, speech-recognition specialist 
1997 work on multimedia Advanced Streaming Format (with 19 other companies) 
1997 Microsoft licenses Intel Application Launch Accelerator to embed in Windows 98 
1997 Virtual Interface Architecture for developing cluster applications (with Compaq) 
1998 e-commerce alliance Pandemic created (with Compaq and SAP) 
1998 Intel Intercast software for web TV included in Windows 98 
1998 alliance promoting ASDL technology (with Compaq and telecom providers) 
1999 Universal Plug-and-Play initiative (with HP) 
1999 prototype server appliance with embedded Windows 
2000 Intel processor selected for Xbox game console 
2000 prototype TabletPC 
2001 Speech Application Language Tags (SALT) Forum (with Cisco and other companies) 
2002 work on optimizing designs and software for Windows-powered portable devices 
2002 reference architecture for portable video devices 
2002 work on Palladium processors, supporting encryption and digital rights management 
2003 promotion of EFI technology to replace computer BIOS 
Table 3. Selected joint initiatives of Microsoft and Intel, 1995-2003 
Similarly important for Microsoft were large IT services providers, and 
the history of relations between Microsoft and Digital-Compaq-HP family 
is the best example of the mantis grip of the software company. Though a 
series of arrangements, Microsoft aligned the partner’s strategy to guaran-
tee support for Windows platform. The approach not only comprised of 
typical agreements and joint initiatives, but also of discretionary invest-
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ments, contracts for services or standard setting initiatives in areas not 
critical for Microsoft, but important for the partner. The techniques will be 
discussed in detail later in this chapter, but Digital and its corporate succes-
sors are excellent examples of gradual strategic alignment, limiting the 
partner’s alternatives and leaving it dependent on Microsoft, resembling the 
strong grip of a mantis. 
 
Table 4. Selected joint initiatives by Microsoft, Digital, Tandem, Compaq and HP, 
1995-2002 
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Digital 
   
1994 joint COM 
specification 
   
1994 NT clustering    
1994 contract to man-
age MS websites 
   
1995 strategic alliance: 
training investment Tandem 
  
1995 Digital Open 
VMS linked to NT 
1995 NT clustering 
Compaq HP 
1996 first system inte-
grator for MS Internet 
server 
 
1996 strategic alli-
ance: training invest-
ment 
1996 work on handheld 
computers, Simply Inter-
active PCs, NT cluster-
ing 
1996 campaign for 
SMEs, work on hand-
held computers, SI PCs 
 
 
1997 Compaq 
acquires Tandem 
 
 
 
1997 Digital licenses 
COM to use in own 
platforms  
1997 Device Bay speci-
fication, standard for 
sending data over air-
waves, Virtual Interface 
Architecture for cluster-
aware applications 
1997 HP licenses 
COM; work on IRDA, 
Simple Web Printing 
HP acquires VeriFone 
and Symantec’s unit 
working with NT 
  1997 Compaq testifies 
against Microsoft and 
confirms illegal bundling 
practices 
1997 strategic alliance: 
training, Unix integra-
tion, projects to reduce 
the PC costs; OpenMail 
development suspended 
1998 migration services 
from HP OpenMail to 
Exchange, Expeditor 
workflow for Exchange 
 1998 strategic alliance: 
work on NT platform, 
support for COM 
1998 PocketPCs for 
Chinese market 
1998 Compaq acquires 
Digital 
 1998 contract to manage 
MS websites and data-
bases 
 
  1998 e-commerce alliance Pandemic 
  1998 alliance promoting 
ADSL technology 
 
  1998 joint investment in 
a broadband Internet 
venture RoadRunner 
1999 Universal Plug-
and-Play initiative, 
work on Intel’s 64-bit 
processor 
  2000 promoting partner 
solutions for Exchange 
 
  2000 joint investment in 
ASP provider Digex, al-
liance to provide ASP 
services in the U.K. 
(with Cable&Wireless) 
 
  2000 Windows Media as 
default format for iPaq 
 
 2002 HP acquires 
Compaq 
 
  
2002 strategic alliance: 
joint multimillion dollar 
investments, training of 
5,000 employees 
   2002 contract for MS 
technical support 
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The most interesting case from Microsoft’s history concerns the co-
option of direct competitors, who used to promote own mainframe or Unix 
platforms, and making them act as complementors for Windows NT. Start-
ing with no established supporters in 1994, within 5 years Microsoft man-
aged to form strong ties with the most important players in enterprise com-
puting market. The companies decided to create Windows-based versions 
of their best-selling software, manufacture Windows hardware, and often 
even phase out product lines competing with Microsoft solutions. Micro-
soft initially developed several versions of Windows NT, supporting proc-
essor platforms of various vendors, as by that time Intel’s standard was 
competing with PowerPC, MIPS and Digital Alpha CPUs. Due to NT’s 
availability for various computing architectures, the co-option process 
started with Tandem and Digital, who were paid to train specialists and de-
velop Windows-compliant solutions, but subsequent partners did not need 
to be attracted by direct financial means, as the bandwagon started rolling. 
Even IBM, competing with Microsoft by offering OS/2 operating system, 
for its mainframe platform AS/400 developed integration with Windows 
not the own counterpart (Goldberg 1996). The only market player who de-
cided against cooperation was Sun Microsystems, fighting legal battles 
against Microsoft related to the use of its Java standard in Internet Ex-
plorer, but Microsoft contracted a German software developer Software 
A.G. to offer Sun integration kit (DiDio 1996), so that practically every 
available Unix or mainframe platform became interoperable with Windows 
NT, and multiple developer tools were available to migrate specific appli-
cations to the environment. 
Microsoft benefited from the partnerships not only by restricting poten-
tial or existing competitors, but also by gaining new complementary solu-
tions for Windows. For example, high-availability enterprise-wide comput-
ing required server clustering – adequate Unix solutions were redesigned 
by partners for NT platform, increasing its credibility. Multiple software 
components developed by partners were also licensed by Microsoft and 
embedded in Windows, and joint development initiatives helped re-use 
Unix-oriented skills to improve next generations of Windows. Partners 
abandoning their original businesses and committing to work with Win-
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dows, were later gratified by Microsoft through other projects, developing 
jointly with the software giant new standards and specifications, what gave 
them head-start over competitors in certain markets. By the time the next 
generation of NT, Windows 2000 was released, Microsoft no longer 
needed to support multiple processor and hardware architectures, as all 
vendors conformed to Intel standards, and every significant hardware 
maker was offering Windows equipment. Within 5 years, Microsoft be-
came an important player in the enterprise computing market, and the in-
strumentality of political actions cannot be underestimated. 
AT&T GIS
(NCR Corp.)
Tandem
Compaq
Digital
HP
NEC
Fujitsu
Banyan
Systems
Amdahl
IBM
Sun
Unisys
Dell
clustering solution
NT hardware
SGI
processor support
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SCO
investment
contract, license
training
Software A.G.
work on specifications
Microsoft
Intel
integration
CE hardware
 
Fig. 15. Microsoft’s multiple ties with key Unix and mainframe market players, 1994-
1999 
Windows NT is only one of many examples of Microsoft’s blockmodel – 
other technology platforms were promoted among new partners using simi-
lar techniques. Literature discusses the notion of demand engineering 
(Nalebuff and Brandenburger 1997: 30), where the focal company gener-
ates demand for its innovative technology by stimulating the development 
of dedicated solutions, which could benefit from new features of the tech-
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nology. Intel guaranteed demand for increasing computer processing power 
and new processor generations by boosting the development of multimedia 
and communication solutions, which required faster data processing than 
standard computers. Microsoft used similar techniques to stimulate the dif-
fusion of its platforms by guaranteeing the supply of important killer appli-
cations (Downes and Mui 2000), offering customers compelling reasons to 
buy the new technology. Moreover, the company was promoting technolo-
gies by forming partnerships with potential customers and in this way 
“buying the market”. As table 5 demonstrates, the strategy was very costly 
for Microsoft - especially compared with the much cheaper scenario of co-
opting NT supporters. In order to sell dedicated solutions for Internet pro-
viders and interactive media, it was investing in companies from various 
market segments and offering revenue opportunities to make them adopt 
Microsoft standards (Microsoft was e.g. purchasing network capacity from 
committed Internet companies for its MSN service). The arrangements 
blurred the boundaries between suppliers, competitors and customers - all 
of them were at the same time buying Microsoft products, reselling them, 
supplying own solutions to Microsoft, as well as helping to diffuse Micro-
soft platform by complementing it for end customers. 
 
Table 5. Microsoft’s investments in telecom, Internet and television providers 
 
4.2 Microsoft as value chain leader      115 
 
Year Company Value Segment 
1997 Comcast $1B cable tv 
1999 UPC (Netherlands) NA cable tv 
 NTL (U.K.) $500M cable tv 
 Portugal Telecom (Portugal) $38.6M telecom 
 NorthPoint Communications $30M ISP 
 AT&T $5B telecom/cable tv 
 Nextel Communications $600M telecom 
 Concentric Network $7.5M ASP 
 Rogers Communications (Canada) $400M cable tv 
 DSL.net $15M ISP 
 Globo Cabo (Brazil) $126M cable tv 
 United Global Communications NA cable tv 
 Asia Global Crossing (Asia) $200M ISP 
 USWeb/CKS $67.5M ASP 
 Telmex (Mexico) NA telecom 
 Data Return $5M ASP 
2000 Corio $10M ASP 
 Digex $50M ASP 
 Jato Communications $10M ASP 
 Interland $5M ASP 
 Gilat Satellite Networks (Israel) $50M satellite ISP 
 BroadBand Office $25M ASP 
 TITUS Communications NA ISP 
 CAIS Internet $40M ISP 
 FutureLink $10M ASP 
 Telewest Communications NA cable tv 
 Blixer (Italy) NA ISP 
 USinternetworking $50M ASP 
2001 Telecom (New Zealand) $128M telecom 
 KT (South Korea) $500M telecom 
  Total > 
$9B 
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4.3 Partner management techniques 
4.3.1 Overview 
Microsoft was active in multiple markets, through many value chains and 
groups of partners, as opposed to the previously described NTT DoCoMo, 
focused on one value chain only. This richness of experiences helped the 
company develop its partner management techniques, so far unmatched by 
industry rivals, guaranteeing continuous growth of sales and profits. Micro-
soft was probably the first software company seriously appreciating the 
role of complementors. Its partnership and certification programs were cop-
ied by other companies, but the actual partner management framework 
comprised of various elements, which were not widely known or even 
identified by competitors. Analysis of the specific techniques used to man-
age partners will benefit from the adopted political perspective: politics is 
about making people do, what otherwise they would not be doing (Avakian 
1999: 42). The further discussion will outline the identified techniques, dif-
ferentiating between financial, marketing and technical incentives, and de-
terrents used as potential threats to partners businesses, all intended to mo-
tivate them and restrict their potential opportunism. 
4.3.2 Financial incentives 
4.3.2.1 Minority investments 
The trade-off between acquisitions and strategic alliances is a popular 
topic of academic literature (Roberts and Liu 2001; Dyer et al. 2004; Kale 
and Puranam 2004), but as Microsoft’s history suggests, financial invest-
ments and alliances are independent phenomena, not two contradictory 
scenarios on a governance form continuum, as some authors suggest. Eq-
uity investment can help implement product strategies by tying partners 
and inducing reciprocity – similarly to the Florentine families, where loans 
and shared investments were used to establish inter-family linkages, ac-
companying marriages or employment relations. Japanese keiretsu groups 
practice cross-shareholding to guarantee the system’s stability, and the 
high-tech industry knows numerous examples of companies aggressively 
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investing in smaller players to align their strategies and have access to their 
unique technologies. Possible motivations for minority investments in-
clude: 
• return on investment; 
• payola; 
• control over partners strategies; 
• access to resources; 
• signaling function of the investments. 
Minority shareholding differs from an acquisition, which helps control 
the acquired business – marginal investment is simply another partnership 
technique, focused not on direct return on investment, but rather generating 
added value by binding partners. Investments in technology start-ups were 
risky and may not offer a fast payback, moreover investment ideas are of-
ten generated by people working with Microsoft products not finance man-
agement. Application of venture capital logic to partnership management of 
a high-tech company does not represent the motivations of a value chain 
leader, involved in a political game with complementors and competitors. 
Investments in partner companies should rather be interpreted as means to 
stimulate technology diffusion – companies like Microsoft are willing to 
pay the firms to encourage them to develop products complementing their 
technology platforms. This approach seems to be particularly effective for 
competence-destroying innovations, usually opposed by companies, whose 
knowledge bases and technologies become obsolete (Anderson and 
Tushman 1990: 612), and cash inducement helps align their strategies. First 
providers of complementary products often must be motivated by financial 
incentives to address the “chicken-and-egg” problem: if there is no in-
stalled user base, companies are not willing to invest in the development of 
compatible products, but users would not buy solutions without available 
complementary goods (Hill 1997: 14). This approach can be expensive and 
risky, but successful introduction of first products launches self-reinforcing 
bandwagon effects, and no further investments are needed for new partners, 
as in the case of Windows NT or Microsoft’s Internet and multimedia tech-
nologies. 
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The investment can also block and „convert” a hostile firm – for exam-
ple, Microsoft co-opted InfoImage and Interliant, important partners of its 
competitor Lotus IBM, by offering them financial benefits and technical 
opportunities related to own technologies (Deckmyn 1999; Deckmyn 
2000). According to an analyst, “whereas once a company may have had its 
own agenda and been marching towards its own goals, an injection of Mi-
crosoft money meant that the company was turned around and had begun 
marching in Microsoft’s direction” (Avakian 1999: 47). Welfare economics 
introduced the term payola to describe situations, when a party is “paid to 
play” - support or promote specific products. The term was originally ap-
plied to the radio industry, which was receiving payments from record 
companies for airing specific songs (Coase 1979: 269), but its examples 
can easily be found in other settings, when a party is “bribed” to support 
specific products: in the cases of product placement in movies, retailer dis-
counts for special promotion in bookshops (Caves 2000: 294-295), over-
stating popularity of specific items by broadcasters and retailers in pub-
lished sales rankings (Vogel 2001: 487), or claques in theaters. Although 
the term payola has never been used with reference to technology products, 
among high-tech companies, struggling to establish own standards, payola 
plays important strategic role, helping buy users or supporters. Apart from 
co-option, Microsoft used financial investments to settle patent and trade 
secret disputes – in 1994, it acquired 15% of Stac Electronics for $39.9M, 
putting an end to controversies concerning use of its patented compression 
technology in Microsoft DOS (Johnston 1994), and one year later, similar 
measures were adopted to resolve issues of the intellectual ownership of 
OLE technology: Microsoft bought 10% of shares in Wang Laboratories 
for $90M (Ouellette, Weinberg 1995). Later investments in competitors 
such as Apple Computers and Inprise (Borland) were similarly combined 
with dispute-settling technology licensing agreements. 
Minority stockholding helps control partners’ strategies, but harmony 
within business groups is not a characteristic feature of Western partner-
ships - this is best evidenced by the failure of NTT DoCoMo, which tried to 
forge long-lasting alliances by taking minority shares in foreign mobile 
telecoms Hutchison and AT&T Wireless, and ended up supplying finance 
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to troubled businesses, finally not accepting DoCoMo’s i-mode platform as 
a standard. DoCoMo had no real control over their strategies, while the 
company’s other partnerships, not involving investment, turned out to be 
more reliable, and enabled DoCoMo to penetrate key markets with Ger-
many’s E-Plus, France’s Bouygues Telecom, or Spain’s Telefonica Mo-
viles. Similarly for Microsoft, investments alone did not guarantee the loy-
alty and commitment of partners - most evident examples of such 
disappointments are: Internet content provider Individual, partnering with 
Microsoft’s arch-rival Netscape to supply personalization service (Lash 
1997), and multimedia streaming specialist Real Networks, pursuing its 
own ambitious strategy, for which Microsoft’s technologies and standards 
for media market were only obstacles (Evers and McMillan 2003). 
Access to unique resources could be a motive for investments, but effec-
tive control over technologies is possible only through majority sharehold-
ing or complete acquisitions. Non-equity based alliances might be prefer-
able depending on the types of possible synergies among partners and the 
nature of involved resources (Dyer et al. 2004: 111-114). When Microsoft 
was preparing the launch of its video game console Xbox, it acquired or in-
vested in multiple game developer firms, and later supplemented the group 
by of one of the largest specialists, Rare (Becker 2002). Internalization 
seemed to be the only plausible way to guarantee the supply of a satisfac-
tory number of games in short time - in December 2001, a month after the 
Xbox release, 38 games were available, most of them developed specifi-
cally for the new platform (Weinstein 2001). 
Minority investments became a formalized ritual, not only offering the 
partners money, but more importantly, endorsing them as trusted comple-
mentors to potential customers or other partners. A label of Microsoft-
invested company could be a strong selling point for a company’s products, 
suggesting the existence of strategic linkages between the two players. A 
demise of trust in mutual relations could in turn lead to de-investment as in 
the case of Microsoft selling off in 1998 shares of Real Networks, which 
dared to testify in court against Microsoft (Nash 1998). The signaling role 
of marginal investments cannot be overestimated – for example, by provid-
ing financial support to former competitors, Microsoft was demonstrating 
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its dominant power and announcing radical changes to the competitive en-
vironment, sending a message to customers, and showing which company 
they can rely on as financially healthy and offering future-proof products. 
 
Year Company Competitive 
domain 
Investment 
value 
Further actions 
1997 Progressive 
Networks (later: 
Real Networks) 
digital multimedia 
(Real Media) 
$30M disposal for estimated 
127$M (1998) 
1997 Apple Computer operating system 
(Mac) and digital 
multimedia 
(QuickTime) 
$150M Apple agreed to bun-
dle Internet Explorer 
with Mac OS 
1999 Banyan Systems operating system 
(VINES) 
$10M Banyan’s exit from 
software business 
(1999), becoming 
ePresence (ISP) 
1999 Inprise (later: 
Borland) 
developer tools $25M + 
$100M 
license 
revenue 
Inprise licensed Mi-
crosoft Foundation 
Classes and SDKs and 
supported them in its 
development tools 
1999 InfoImage e-mail server, por-
tal (key Lotus IBM 
partner) 
$10M InfoImage developed 
components inte-
grated with Micro-
soft’s portal 
2000 Interliant e-mail server (key 
Lotus IBM partner 
in ASP market) 
$10M Interliant’s 
bankruptcy (2003) 
2000 Corel operating system 
(Linux), Office 
tools (Word Per-
fect) 
$135M disposal for $12.9M 
(2003) 
Table 6. Microsoft’s minority investments in competitors 
4.3.2.2 Direct financial transfers 
Over the years, Microsoft perfected its portfolio of non-equity based finan-
cial incentives through direct and indirect transfers, which effectively re-
placed shareholding in providing money for the partner companies, not 
requiring reporting to Microsoft’s investors. The available forms included 
joint development projects (with shared risk and resource input), subcon-
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tracted development work (one-directional payment, offering revenue 
opportunities to the partner) or ordering partner’s services and products 
for internal purposes. 
Joint ventures among key players in the converging computing, commu-
nications and media industries, became a standard inter-organizational ar-
rangement in the 1990s, even though from today’s perspective, their effec-
tiveness may be questionable. For example, due to its efforts to enter the 
emerging mobile data services segment, Microsoft established joint-
ventures with Qualcomm (Wireless Knowledge - 1998), NTT DoCoMo 
(Mobimagic - 1999) and Ericsson (Ericsson Microsoft Mobile Venture - 
2000) – none of them bore tangible fruits, all were later dissolved or inter-
nalized by partners, and Microsoft’s contributions turned out to be worth-
less in the end. However, a more careful investigation shows that the ven-
tures played an important blocking role. NTT DoCoMo did not select 
default operating system for mobile handsets until 2003, releasing in the 
meantime many handheld devices based on Windows CE. Ericsson’s in-
volvement opened doors to Microsoft Mobile Explorer, web browser de-
signed for mobile phones, offering MME a head start on the competing 
WAP browser providers. Additionally, Qualcomm’s focus on value-added 
mobile data services facilitated its decision to halt further development of 
Eudora mail server, competitor of Microsoft Exchange. In 2000, Microsoft 
contributed $385M in cash to form a joint-venture Avanade with Andersen 
Consulting, employing several thousand technical consultants dedicated 
solely to Microsoft-based business solutions, instrumental in positioning 
Windows 2000 as the platform for enterprise-wide applications (Dash 
2000). 
Subcontracted development projects are traditionally used by high-tech 
companies to outsource non-core tasks, either requiring specific skills (e.g. 
development and maintenance of spell checker module, not related to other 
product technologies, while requiring a sound knowledge of linguistics), or 
time-consuming but not sophisticated (e.g. software testing based on prede-
fined procedures). Microsoft relied on subcontractors for complex projects, 
combining various technologies, especially when the final product was 
hardware, as in the cases of Xbox, smart phones, portable media players 
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and Windows Media Center PCs. The firm controlled the ownership of 
IPRs, even though it was not be able to capitalize on them internally, lack-
ing the appropriate skills. For software technologies, there were multiple 
solutions involving either licensing or ownership transfers; Microsoft also 
uses Indian off-shore software houses to do the testing work for new re-
leases of its operating system. Microsoft case revealed however a popular-
ity of another type of subcontracting, not related to specific internal devel-
opment projects, but concerning complementary solutions, where Microsoft 
was not assuming IPR control and only paid the third-party to develop cer-
tain product, in line with the previously discussed model of payola. The 
practice was initiated by “buying” support for Windows NT – contracting 
various firms (including Tandem Computers, Digital Equipment Corpora-
tion and Banyan Systems) to work on integration between NT and their 
own platforms, so that they could also benefit from selling these connectors 
and migration services. The companies were probably not sufficiently mo-
tivated to work on adequate technologies by the mere appeal of NT tech-
nology, as the costly development would simultaneously decrease installed 
bases of their own platforms – payments from Microsoft helped overcome 
the fears and spelled a prolonged death sentence to the other platforms. The 
same approach supported diffusion of other technologies – Microsoft con-
tracted in 1999 Transvirtual Technologies (support for Microsoft standards 
in virtual machine Kaffe Java for embedded systems (Sliwa 1999)) and Ac-
tiveState Tool Corporation (development of Windows version of Perl 
(Shankland 1999)). The company was from time to time using the devel-
opment contracts also for other reasons: to help financially troubled com-
panies, which it partly owned (e.g. Internet providers UUNet Technologies 
and XO Communications), or to fight political battles (as in the case of 
SCO Group, Unix vendor, who sued Linux community members for copy-
right infringement – soon afterwards, Microsoft infused SCO with cash 
trough a sizeable licensing agreement). 
An innovative aspect of Microsoft’s strategy was a close integration be-
tween procurement processes and the partnership program. Every large 
company needs to rely on third parties for IT infrastructure and support 
services, but Microsoft was selecting solutions not only technically supe-
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rior, but also “politically correct”. Purchasing decisions functioned as both 
endorsements for partners, as well as implicit pressure mechanisms, and 
historical analysis of Microsoft’s relations with partners proves a surprising 
co-occurrence of orders for internal use and certain commitments by sup-
pliers. Evidence made public in various Microsoft-related litigations and 
lawsuits indicated the subtle but categorical tone in negotiations with 
OEMs or other partners, with all offered incentives accompanied by implic-
itly expected mutuality. Large services contracts to support Microsoft’s IT 
infrastructure were key motivators respectively for Digital, Compaq and 
HP since 1994, and every renewal of the contract was followed by new 
commitments from the service provider. Microsoft’s decision to implement 
SAP R/3 for internal purposes (Cafasso 1994) made SAP support various 
Microsoft technologies, including SQL Server database and Exchange mail 
server. The purchase of Computer Associates InocuLAN antivirus software 
(Golde 1997) coincided with an alignment of the company’s strategy 
around future-generation Windows platform. A contract for the Internet 
provision for MSN, awarded to MCI (Wong 1997), was similarly synchro-
nized with MCI’s migration to Microsoft technologies, purchase of licenses 
and commitment to promote the standards to telecoms customers (Mac-
Donald 1996). 
The multiplicity of used direct financial transfers suggests that Microsoft 
had a systemic approach to partners, not focusing on single transactions but 
rather on a broad network of interdependencies. Payments inefficient from 
the perspective of financial management were crucial in gaining support for 
emerging technologies, but convincing competitors to become your com-
plementors is difficult and costly. For Microsoft, it was not enough to pay 
other companies for working with Windows – they had their own products, 
employees and competencies, so the “partnership package” had to include 
strategic visions and migration paths for existing technologies, helping 
convert the companies into reliable partners, and convincing them that they 
could play equally important and profitable roles in the new market. The 
strategy was unique, as usually vendors of disruptive technologies focus on 
surpassing and eliminating incumbents (Christensen 2000) – while here in-
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cumbents were invited to join the disruptor’s team, without a need to jetti-
son what was precious to them. 
4.3.2.3 Indirect financial transfers 
There were many forms of indirect financial transfers used by Microsoft, 
including investments through third-parties or decreasing partners’ costs at 
the company’s expense. Literature on strategic alliances interprets the dedi-
cation of resources as investments in partners – for example, an assignment 
of employees, adjustment of administrative procedures or purchase of dedi-
cated equipment (Rokkan et al. 2003: 210). 
Due to its strong position in the financial market, Microsoft was able to 
link capital seekers with appropriate funding sources, including venture 
capital firms or trusted companies such as Compaq or Intel. The mecha-
nism was based on informal personal relations among Microsoft’s directors 
and investor representatives – for example, Microsoft helped SCO Group 
receive $50M investment from a venture fund BayCapital Star, by convinc-
ingly presenting SCO’s prospects in relation to Microsoft’s strategy 
(McMillan and Evers 2004). In order to stimulate the development of com-
plementary solutions for Microsoft .Net Framework and Web Services 
standards, the company established Investor Connection program, working 
with venture capital funds to offer their corporate customers necessary in-
frastructure, access to knowledge and support in designing solutions (Luen-
ing 2001). Such links could certainly increase the credibility of small tech-
nology start-ups, affecting their valuation and the availability of funds. 
Research studies confirm high levels of social embeddedness of 
transactions between institutional capital suppliers and their clients (Uzzi 
1999), and close ties with significant third-parties function as an important 
endorsement, helping companies succeed in IPOs or searches for venture 
funding (Gulati and Higgins 2003). 
Techniques decreasing partner’s transaction costs present even more po-
tential. They include: pricing the access to technology (licenses or train-
ing), providing reference designs for partners’ products and supporting 
marketing activities (the last technique will be described in detail in the 
subsequent section, focused entirely on marketing incentives). Microsoft 
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was providing selected trusted partners with royalty-free source code, at-
tractively priced developer tools and subsidized training – the deviations 
from standard pricelists were adopted at the company’s discretion, promot-
ing business of preferred partners and thus stimulating developments of se-
lected complementary products. Attractiveness of these offers was chang-
ing over time: first large system integration partner Digital was offered free 
training for 1,500 engineers (Goldberg and Bozman 1995), while next ser-
vice partners were “only” granted convenient commercial terms of the 
knowledge transfer programs. Correspondingly, changes to the official 
pricing and licensing policies, concerning all partners and customers, were 
used to influence their strategies. The 1997 release of Microsoft Money, 
personal finance program, turned banks – so far customers – into partners, 
not charged for the Money software platform, components of which they 
were distributing to own clients, who remained the only party paying for it 
to Microsoft (MacDonald 1997). In 2001 Microsoft showed also strong 
support for the emerging Application Service Providers market by modify-
ing its entire licensing model so that ASP firms did not have to pay upfront 
for customer software rentals (Vijayan 2001). The power of pricing argu-
ments is best evidenced by the case of IBM: while negotiating a licensing 
deal to install Windows 95 on IBM PCs, Microsoft demanded IBM to delay 
the release of a new version of its Lotus Smart Suite, competing with Mi-
crosoft Office, and IBM’s refusal increased royalties it had to pay for Win-
dows (Wasserman 1999a). 
Attractive pricing of own technologies helps also penetrate the market by 
discouraging other companies from developing comparable, competing 
functionality (Avakian 1999: 45). This approach helped Microsoft establish 
its position among PC makers with DOS in the 1980s – hardware firms en-
joyed the overall cost reduction and abandoned own investments in the op-
erating system area, becoming locked-in by the accepted technology. The 
rationale of penetration pricing of emerging technologies refers to the 
learning effects and economies of scale, leading to subsequent dramatic de-
crease of unit costs, which compensate for the initial losses (Hill 1997: 16). 
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Year Partner 
Employees trained in 
MS technology 
Investment by MS 
1995 Digital 1,500 ~$50-100M 
1996 Tandem Computers 1,000 $30M 
Ernst & Young NA - 
HP NA - 
KPMG 500 - 
1997 
Unisys 2,000 - 
Cambridge Technology 
Partners 
1,000 - 
Compaq NA - 
ICL (Fujitsu) 4,000 - 
NCR 1,000 - 
1998 
Wang Laboratories 2,500 - 
Banyan Systems 500 $10M 
1999 
EDS 7,000 - 
Andersen Consulting 3,000 - 
Avanade 500 $358M 2000 
KPMG 500 - 
Table 7. Competence building in Microsoft technologies among the largest IT services 
organizations 
The tradition of providing product reference designs is rooted in the 
software business, where tools, pre-defined templates and code samples 
were key in gaining a wide-spread acceptance among the developer com-
munity. Microsoft adopted a corresponding approach to the hardware mar-
ket. In the 1990s, it worked closely with component and device makers on 
the reduction of end-user prices of Windows hardware, acknowledging the 
importance of hardware costs for software diffusion. Later it even started 
contracting third-parties to design prototype devices, offered jointly with 
Microsoft software to OEM partners. Owing to the arrangement, hardware 
makers no longer need to conduct own R&D in the concerned areas, using 
reference designs provided by Microsoft and dedicated contract manufac-
turers. The provision of reference designs helps boost adoption of new 
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technologies both in software and hardware markets – if applied creatively, 
it can also outstrip partners of their competencies and successfully lock-in 
by making dependent on technological standards. 
4.3.3 Marketing incentives 
4.3.3.1 Promotion 
The most common partner incentive used by high-tech companies is joint 
promotion, done either by transferring funds to partners, or running cam-
paigns with them. Owing to the scale of operations, Microsoft was able to 
run global integrated marketing communications campaigns, sharing de-
signs and know-how. The preparation of marketing templates, scripts and 
manuals is also a form of investment in the partner community, reducing 
the necessary cost for partners interested in running a campaign. Microsoft 
offers the incentives only to committed, certified partners, who have dem-
onstrated the importance of the link by investing in establishing skills and 
designing own products in relevant ways (Microsoft’s partnership program 
formalizes the rules, indicating who and under which conditions is entitled 
to what types of marketing and business support). Joint promotion is 
additionally attractive for partners, as it extends the appeal of Microsoft’s 
brand to their certified products – for example, a marketing campaign 
“Plays for Sure”, launched in 2004 by Microsoft, promoted partner devices 
playing multimedia in Windows Media Format, assuring customers that 
products compliant with the standard are reliable and approved by 
Microsoft specialists (Borland 2004). 
4.3.3.2 Sales 
Funding joint promotions is nowadays a common practice in the high-tech 
industry, but Microsoft was reinforcing their results by a consistent sales 
strategy. The company provided underlying platforms for partner solutions, 
establishing innovative sales channels through technology development. 
For example, Windows 95 with Internet Explorer offered a unique way of 
distributing Internet Service Provider subscriptions: the operating system 
included drivers for phone modems, and Microsoft hosted the Internet Re-
ferrals Server: a customer, clicking on the icon “Connect to the Internet”, 
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dialed a dedicated phone number and was presented with a list of available 
ISPs (authorized by Microsoft), from which she could select one to setup 
the connection (Pelline 1996). This is one of many examples of product 
bundling, a practice typical for Microsoft, and criticized by anti-trust au-
thorities around the world. The legal criticism concerned however the bun-
dling of own products to undermine sales opportunities of competitors, 
while the above example demonstrates, how the platform design helped 
Microsoft improve its bargaining power by offering sales-related incentives 
to selected partners. For them, the opportunity to have their products bun-
dled with Windows or other Microsoft offerings spelled good sales pros-
pects due to the substantial installed base which can be accessed in this 
way. 
Microsoft benefited also from the bundling of complementary goods, im-
proving the sales of own platform, and offering partners further sales op-
portunities for product extensions. This was the case for: Macromedia 
Shockwave (web animation viewer bundled with Internet Explorer, sup-
plemented by commercial tools for creating the media files (Ricciuti 
1996)), Symantec WinFax (offered with Outlook to send faxes from com-
puter, upgradeable to fully featured version (Luening 1998)) or Crystal En-
terprise (pre-defined reporting module for Microsoft CRM, which required 
an upgrade if a customer was interested in preparing custom reports (Cow-
ley 2002)). Partners had therefore twofold revenue opportunities: initial 
payment for the bundled component from Microsoft, and sales of its up-
grades. Moreover, some cases involved symbolic bundling, when Microsoft 
embedded non-critical components from a partner with the sole purpose of 
promoting the partnership and rewarding the loyal company – for example, 
Windows 2000 included a minor utility software from Computer Associ-
ates’ Unicenter solution, and the fact enabled to position Unicenter as the 
right solution supporting the operating system platform, while comparable 
alternatives did not enjoy the privilege (Heskett 1998). 
Microsoft was one of the first high-tech companies, which made own 
sales employees responsible for the sales of partner products – their targets 
involved of course also sales of relevant Microsoft licenses, pulled through 
by partner solutions. For example, an implementation of a specialist busi-
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ness solution requires Windows and SQL Server licenses, and the deal may 
be equally profitable to Microsoft and partners, while the complementary 
application is actually needed to sell the underlying platform. Microsoft’s 
sales strategy is based on “go-to-market” initiatives, where account manag-
ers work with key customers in a vertical market, offering them complex 
business packages, consisting of own and third-party products, accompa-
nied by implementation services from a reliable partner. Instead of selling 
off-the-shelf commoditized software such as Windows or Office, Microsoft 
focuses on how these products can add value and address customers’ prob-
lems, involving partners in the sales process to benefit from their comple-
mentary technologies and competencies. The established and locked-in cus-
tomer base of Microsoft platform is critical for partners as a target market, 
potentially accessible through existing Microsoft-controlled communica-
tion channels, and is restricted in technology decisions by the already im-
plemented system platforms. This is a reciprocal dependence, as Microsoft 
benefits from the availability of new value-adding solutions for own plat-
forms, keeping customers satisfied, so that they renew support contracts or 
migrate to newer software versions. 
4.3.3.3 Positioning own products 
An important incentive, promoting the openness in partner relations, was 
related to how Microsoft positioned own products, presenting them as 
complementary or inferior to partner solutions. When releasing new prod-
ucts in domains previously controlled by partners, Microsoft was convinc-
ing the affected partners to further cooperate and supplement the products 
instead of competing with them, even if the products were posing consider-
able threats to their businesses. For example, Microsoft entered document 
management market with SharePoint Portal Server – its first version was 
positioned as collaboration portal for teams and departments, gaining sup-
port from major document management vendors, the second version was 
already released as a scalable enterprise-wide platform for managing 
documents, competing with the incumbent solutions, but the initial posi-
tioning kept partners loyal and supportive for some time. Similarly, Micro-
soft’s plan to enter CRM market was opposed by many partners – CRM 
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specialists, who perceived it as a direct threat, but were reassured when the 
company started promoting the new product among small and medium-size 
organizations only. Microsoft can successfully partner with key players like 
Siebel in CRM area, or SAP in the ERP domain, while working on own 
competitive solutions – the partners try in turn to benefit from the time that 
is left to them and penetrate the Microsoft customer base before the com-
panies become competitors. 
Microsoft’s approach resembles salami tactics, discussed in international 
politics literature. The Soviet Union assumed control over the Central and 
Eastern Europe after the Second World War by gradually exerting influ-
ence over new countries and domains of life, while not alarming other 
countries thanks to the slow, seemingly non-violent nature of the process. 
Hungarian communist Mátyás Rákosi compared the ways of dealing away 
with the internal opposition to slicing the salami – slowly cutting thin slices 
until all the sausage is chopped without protests. The salami metaphor em-
phasizes hidden agendas and crafty character of the product marketing 
process: intentional positioning of own products as inferior to keep poten-
tial competitors confident, and later strike them by revealing the actual po-
tential of a product. 
4.3.3.4 Certification 
Certification programs offer affiliation with the dominant player’s brand. 
They assure customers about potential benefits of partner solutions, their 
compatibility with technology platforms and design, based on recent stan-
dards and best practices. Microsoft adopted two certification frameworks – 
for partner companies and for their products. Partner certification is linked 
to professional training and examination, and partners are required to em-
ploy a prescribed number of engineers specializing in Microsoft technolo-
gies. Product certification refers to solution architecture and features, and is 
awarded after independent technical tests. Customers working with a certi-
fied Microsoft partner can expect the company to possess adequate techni-
cal competencies, while their decision to purchase products certified as 
compliant with certain platforms I based on implicit guarantees of product 
quality – certifications perform important signaling functions in complex 
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markets, offering means to differentiate suppliers. Microsoft introduced 
multiple partnership levels, with the most experienced gold partners - al-
though the partnership program rules are formalized, they are not audited 
by third parties, so it is at Microsoft’s discretion to promote a specific part-
ner to the higher status, thus offering yet another instrument of power. 
Similarly for certified products, Microsoft tends to select some of many 
comparable partner solutions to include them in “go-to-market” initiatives, 
deliberately promoting the most loyal partners, who do not offer solutions 
for competitive operating system or database platforms. 
Apart from the benefits, partnership programs are troublesome to part-
ners: they require substantial investments in training and certification, es-
pecially as Microsoft regularly overhauls the curricula, requiring compa-
nies to upgrade their knowledge once new technologies are released, while 
product certification is costly: testing is a paid service, and product devel-
opment must comply with Microsoft standards and development methods. 
4.3.4 Technological incentives 
4.3.4.1 Platform management 
The technology strategy of Microsoft is a seminal example of platform 
management: offering a software layer, on top of which third-parties can 
build own solutions. Partner products become technically dependent on the 
platform, and could not be implemented in a stand-alone mode. Partners are 
aware of the dependency, carefully weighting arguments before they decide 
to support a specific technology, and Microsoft has to assure them of the 
continuous development of its systems, as well as offer migration paths be-
tween technology versions. For example, when managing the transition 
from 16- to 32-bit Windows, the firm had to minimize the technology’s 
impact on partners, investing to make it backwards-compatible. Third-party 
projects require the platform openness, with programming interfaces and 
development tools – Microsoft was offering them for Windows, and later 
started designing other products in similar ways. Office customization was 
enabled by Visual Basic for Applications, and Internet Explorer supported 
ActiveX controls, adding interaction possibilities to websites. The strategy 
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of value chain leader involves substantial investments in technology devel-
opment – power in partner relations is inextricably linked to responsibility. 
 
4.3.4.2 Partner-oriented product development 
In order to gain support for its platform, Microsoft had to design it in ways 
compliant partner products, ranging from microprocessors and computers 
to available programs or Internet websites. This required a good under-
standing of partners’ needs, specificity of their solutions and future direc-
tions of technology development. Every release of Windows included sup-
port for specific processors (initially, Windows NT was ported to several 
alternative processors to better penetrate the market – while later the sup-
port was restricted to Intel and Intel-clones, as hardware makers gave up 
the other architectures), hardware (with drivers for peripheral devices, up-
dated and tested by Microsoft) and software. Software integration was also 
helpful in penetrating the user base of competitors – as in the case of 
document import-export filters for text editor WordPerfect in Microsoft 
Word, and connectors to products from Oracle, Sun, Lotus or Novell. 
Partner-oriented development is also evidenced by involvement in initia-
tives and standard setting consortia, extending beyond Microsoft’s core 
competences. It pursued hardware-related initiatives with partners to estab-
lish new standards and support them in Windows – their examples include: 
interfaces Plug-and-Play and Universal Plug-and-Play (enabling Windows 
to automatically recognize and configure connected peripherals), computer 
standardization projects with Intel and Compaq, focused on reducing the 
manufacturing cost and optimizing performance, early support for emerg-
ing standards such as USB, FireWire and WiFi, and work with Intel and 
ARM to optimize Windows CE for various hardware architectures. Micro-
soft implemented also software interfaces, intended to enable interoperabil-
ity of multiple software systems in Windows environment – for example 
ODSI (for third-party directory services), MAPI (for messaging and work-
flow products), DirectX (facilitating the work of game developers, who 
could write games regardless of the graphics hardware configuration of a 
specific machine). The complementary nature of high-tech products made 
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in many cases the partner-oriented development a necessity – when Micro-
soft wanted to enter the emerging market of B2B marketplaces with its 
online transaction processing platform BizTalk, it decided to offer connec-
tors to four major online exchanges from Ariba, Commerce One, Clarus 
Corp. and VerticalNet, Inc. (Sliwa 2000), investing in connector develop-
ment but gaining access to more potential customers than its competitor 
IBM, supporting only one of those portal standards. 
4.3.4.3 Product inferiority 
Technology-related literature discusses new products, initially not appeal-
ing to mainstream markets, but gradually improving performance and sub-
stituting previous alternatives (Christensen 2000). Their inferiority results 
from the nature of technology development cycles, where disruptive tech-
nologies are catching up with incumbents. Microsoft history offers how-
ever examples of a more sophisticated approach, based on intentional infe-
riority. The company was liaising with partners, keeping low profile of 
certain products, for which partner-made counterparts existed. By deliber-
ately halting the development of own components, it offered “grace peri-
ods” for partner applications. Microsoft DOS included embedded antivirus 
functionality, but when launching Windows, the company decided to leave 
this domain to partners (Johnston 1995). When releasing Windows XP in 
2001, Microsoft wanted to satisfy existing media software partners and of-
fer them business opportunities, especially as the system bundled various 
features previously contributing to their revenues – the company decided 
not to offer DVD playback and MP3 ripping functionality, promoting 
commercial add-ins from CyberLink, InterVideo and Ravisent (Wilcox 
2001a). Online shop MSN Music launched in 2004 did not exploit all op-
portunities offered by Windows Media format, which could support time-
limited music rentals and monthly subscriptions – Microsoft intentionally 
left these options to partners and restricted own sales to pay-per-song 
downloads. Intentional inferiority could be dangerous for partners, lulling 
them into security, while the value chain leader’s decision not to develop 
certain functionality could easily be changed: after some time, Microsoft 
released own antivirus software, and started offering DVD and MP3 sup-
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port in Windows. Nevertheless, the intentional inferiority offers at least 
temporary revenue opportunities for partners, becoming an important tech-
nical incentive in strategic alliances. 
4.3.4.4 Knowledge transfer 
Training, technical documentation and dedicated support help transfer spe-
cialist knowledge to partners and enable them to build own solutions. They 
can also form an alternative source of revenue, and many firms are indeci-
sive as to whether they should focus on cashing from partners, or establish-
ing long-term advantage by building their competences to boost technology 
diffusion – interpreting the knowledge transfer as a revenue opportunity or 
as an investment. Revenues driven by customer projects implemented 
jointly with partners are certainly more promising than earning money 
merely from partners, and partner training events are often delivered at cost 
or even below cost. Microsoft’s experiences demonstrate the benefits of 
flexible pricing approach to knowledge transfer – the company was willing 
to cover all costs for first partners, needed to gain critical mass for new 
technologies (for example, 1,500 of Digital employees were trained at Mi-
crosoft’s expense), and large partners were offered attractive commercial 
conditions in return for their commitments to product development, support 
and employee certification (as previously discussed with reference to ar-
rangements with system integrators, promoting Windows NT for enterprise 
solutions). 
Knowledge transfer for partners can therefore be interpreted as resulting 
from interplay between four possible motives: 
• financial motive – offering revenue for the company, either direct (from 
partner training and support), or indirect (as partners are expected to sell 
the company’s solutions more effectively); 
• technological motive – supplementing the high-tech value chain for a 
specific technology by complementary products and professional imple-
mentation services; 
• commitment motive – inducing partner loyalty and reciprocity, when the 
company indirectly invests in a partner by covering costs, or the partner 
makes relation-specific investments in training and certification, later 
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limiting opportunism, as investments generate sunk costs once the rela-
tionship is terminated (Wathne and Heide 2000: 46); 
• marketing motive – by signaling partner competencies to customers and 
growing support for own platform - for example, partnership with one of 
the largest system integrator EDS was critical to the successful introduc-
tion of Windows 2000, as large customers were often disappointed by the 
quality of Microsoft technical support, and adding 7,000 experienced 
Windows-trained professionals from EDS was an important signal in the 
market (Cole-Gomolski 1999). 
Discretional financing of activities helps influence the strategies of part-
ners and should be managed as part of a comprehensive partnership pro-
gram. Requiring partners to make own investments in training and certifi-
cation facilitates in turn their self-selection into the relationships, as they 
have to prove their willingness to bear the costs and efforts (Wathne and 
Heide 2000: 46). Knowledge transfer activities include not only training, 
but also assignment of own technical specialists, who work with partners 
on specific sales or development projects, help design their solutions, and 
evaluate technological or marketing plans. Corporate culture influences at-
titudes and perceptions of partners as extensions of one’s own company, 
facilitates joint projects even when not every their aspect is governed by 
non-disclosure agreements, and enables informal access to information and 
decision makers. 
4.3.4.5 Learning by doing 
Learning by doing is an important technical incentive for partners, enabling 
them to experiment with technologies and build relevant competencies. 
Tacit knowledge, which is particularly important for technology projects, 
can only be acquired in action and cannot be substituted by even best for-
mal training or documentation. For emerging technologies and new product 
platforms, Microsoft helped partners acquire necessary skills by offering 
learning opportunities through contracted projects, joint development and 
supply of specialist services for the company’s internal use, enabling them 
to subsequently approach customers and demonstrate own proficiency and 
references. These projects had thus three parallel functions: 
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• financial – being an incentive for partners; 
• tangible – delivering specific technical outcomes, useful for Microsoft’s 
operations or technology development; 
• intangible – helping partners learn by doing, so that they better know Mi-
crosoft platform and can deliver dedicated solutions for customers. 
Joint partner projects, focused on the establishment of new standards, 
were also intended to build a reliable complementor and service provider 
base for Microsoft technologies. An alliance with the networking giant 
Cisco Systems offered important specialist contribution to Active Directory 
included in Windows 2000, but also improved Cisco’s competencies re-
lated to Microsoft platform. Cisco was historically focused on Unix-based 
solutions, and through the project involvement gained a deep understanding 
of Windows, later balancing its technical knowledge and contributing to the 
diffusion of Microsoft standards (DiDio 1997). Multimedia streaming and 
editing formats ASF and AAF were in turn developed by Microsoft-led 
coalition of partners, software and media companies such as Adobe Sys-
tems, Avid Technology, Digidesign, Pinnacle Systems, Softimage, Sonic 
Foundry and Truevision, which thanks to the involvement and early access 
to the standards, built own compatible product lines (Busse 1998). 
4.3.4.6 Stimulating knowledge generation 
Knowledge and skills in new technology-related areas do not need to be 
transferred directly from the value chain leader – the company can also be-
come a knowledge facilitator. Microsoft established a partner community, 
in which different partners were able to achieve additional synergies, con-
tributing to the diffusion of technologies. Literature on strategic alliances 
compared similar activities with a “bazaar”, where other market partici-
pants meet and cooperate (Gulati 1995: 20), as personal interactions and 
interorganizational dynamics play vital roles in knowledge generation and 
sharing (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). Microsoft runs regular events for 
partners and individual developers, stimulating personal networking among 
business and technical people. The company uses Internet to create a vir-
tual community as a self-support system, and online discussion groups 
were recently supplemented by the use of social networking technologies: 
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thematic chat rooms, user-built encyclopedias (wikis) and streaming media 
on a partner community website named Channel9 (Evers 2004). 
To further stimulate knowledge generation and competence development, 
Microsoft thinks about strategies for partners. It applied competency man-
agement perspective not only internally, but also to businesses of other 
firms, identifying their core competences and planning their evolution in 
parallel to the development of Microsoft’s products. Trusted partners bene-
fited from repeated ties, working with the software giant on many related 
projects and in this way improving own skills – for example, in hardware 
area, Microsoft partnered with the same companies on the development of 
respectively Windows CE-based handheld computers, Tablet PCs, smart-
phones, Media Center PCs and portable media players. All of the devices 
shared common software and hardware components, while each product 
category had also particular features, requiring new technical expertise – 
Microsoft’s partners could thus re-use some knowledge, and supplement it 
by new elements, still benefiting from the experience effects and compe-
tence building. This approach helps reduce potential resistance of partners 
by showing that the promoted innovations are competence-enhancing, what 
helps shorten the technology adoption process (Anderson and Tushman 
1990: 612). As the response of the community of practitioners is critical for 
the commercial success of new technologies (Anderson and Tushman 
1990: 611), Microsoft took the initiative to facilitate communication among 
the community members and in this way influence their perceptions and 
technology decisions. 
4.3.4.7 Technical privileging 
Even though Microsoft technologies seemed open for interested parties, the 
control of proprietary technical standards enabled Microsoft to privilege or 
disadvantage individual partners. Exclusivity, traditionally used in other 
business sectors, does not seem a plausible contractual means in the high-
tech industry, where knowledge spillovers are difficult to prevent, and lim-
iting clauses usually questioned by antitrust authorities – instead, compa-
nies restrict access to specialist knowledge about technologies, involving 
selected partners in their development and bundling their components in 
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own products. Standard developer tools, documentation and code samples 
were often not sufficient to develop integrated solutions in certain areas. 
For example, toolkits for Unix-Windows applications porting, written by 
Microsoft partners in the 1990s, required access to the actual Windows 
source code. The case of Bristol Technologies shows the real bargaining 
power of Microsoft. After several years of successful cooperation, Bristol 
was denied access to the code (or rather required to sign a revised, unfavor-
able contract), and had to give up the product development (Sykes 1998). 
Similarly, not all Application Programming Interfaces for Microsoft prod-
ucts were available to partners – there were several levels of APIs, some 
public, others available to certified partners, and certain APIs used only in-
ternally by Microsoft and its most trusted partners (legal settlements with 
the U.S. government concerning the use of monopoly power forced later 
the company to release interfaces and protocols to all interested parties). 
Microsoft’s approach was similar to DoCoMo’s semi-walled garden strat-
egy: using seemingly open standards, which could attract as many 
interested parties as possible, but modifying them slightly to control the 
group of partners having access to some added-value features of the 
technology, guaranteeing loyalty by an implicit technological blackmail. 
Partners involved in standard setting and development of specifications 
are privileged over other parties because of the early access to technologies 
and more profound knowledge than provided by official documentation. 
Microsoft was also embedding in its products components developed by 
certain partners, offering the selected companies opportunities to apply 
their insider knowledge to develop integrated solutions, using methods not 
available to other players. Wang Laboratories were working with Microsoft 
on the development of MAPI interface, an underlying messaging layer for 
Windows-based systems, and benefited from the work, promoting own re-
lated workflow system to the indignation of other workflow vendors 
(Ouellette 1995). On the other hand, Microsoft’s competitor in the portable 
devices market Palm was not able to strike an interoperability deal with the 
company – as a result, Palm-based appliances cannot be synchronized with 
Windows computers as easily, as those based on Windows CE (Garretson 
2002). 
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4.3.5 Deterrents 
4.3.5.1 Legal measures 
Control of partner strategies involves not only incentives, but also deter-
rents. The most frequently quoted means of restricting partners, used by 
Microsoft, were legal measures – its OEM and licensing agreements were 
frequently debated in courtrooms. The public criticism forced the company 
to amend its contract templates, dropping some controversial clauses, such 
as requirements to offer bundled products (e.g. Windows with Internet Ex-
plorer, or Internet Explorer with pre-defined Active Channels featuring 
content from Microsoft partners). Microsoft initially barred partners from 
selling competitive products - OEMs could not install other operating sys-
tems or browsers on PCs (Thibodeau 1999; Niccolai and Trott 1997; Ber-
ger 2002), ISPs and content providers were prohibited from informing cus-
tomers about the existence of alternatives to Internet Explorer (Goodin 
1998a; Goodin 1998b). Some licensing deals were constructed in ways 
making the distribution of competitive solutions unprofitable - royalties 
paid by OEMs for Windows were since 1990 calculated based on the over-
all number of computers they manufacture, regardless of which operating 
system they were shipped with, thus discouraging installations of competi-
tive solutions (Caldera 1996). Partners were also prevented from develop-
ing products integrated with Microsoft’s competitors - software developers 
working on applications for Windows 95 received non-disclosure agree-
ments, restricting involvement in enumerated initiatives, competing with 
Windows and Office technologies, as well as prohibiting work on own de-
velopment tools, which would potentially compete with Microsoft’s ones 
(Johnston et al. 1994). 
Such techniques also have disadvantages, as they may undermine the in-
trinsic motivation of partners, making the focal company potentially liable 
for breaching anti-trust legislation and affecting its image. Policy restric-
tions may discourage partners, but the political dimension of alliance 
strategies goes even further: relaxing the sometimes outrageous require-
ments will be interpreted by the market as a positive sign, attracting new 
supporters for emerging technologies. 
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4.3.5.2 Partner lock-in 
Lock-in conditions occur when a party cannot leave the relationship with-
out incurring losses or high switching costs (Farrell and Shapiro 1988). 
Companies try to take hostages from their partners in form of investments 
in relation-specific assets (Wathne and Heide 2000: 44-45), and the crea-
tive use of lock-ins became a core aspect of technology strategies and a 
wide-spread practice (Shapiro and Varian 1999). Semi-openness of techno-
logical standards creates an effective partner lock-in – their integrated 
products cannot easily be ported to other platforms, competencies acquired 
over time are inextricably linked to the supported technology, while sales 
and marketing relations with a partner limit their commercial options. 
Even seemingly open and transparent hardware drivers architecture in 
Windows, tested and packaged by Microsoft to support as many compatible 
devices as possible, offered a way to restrict partner strategies: in 2001, 
Kodak accused Microsoft of designing Windows XP to maintain control 
over the user experiences for digital cameras by streamlining all photo han-
dling processes on computer, directing users to Microsoft software bundled 
with Windows, and thus not leaving much space for solutions from third-
parties like Kodak, limiting their roles to hardware delivery (Wilcox 
2001b). When Microsoft introduced MAPI as a universal messaging inter-
face in Windows, Lotus and Novell – developers of e-mail software com-
peting with Microsoft Exchange – abandoned their proprietary develop-
ment efforts and raced to support MAPI only to later discover that 
Microsoft concealed from the general public some elements of the inter-
face, giving Exchange a head start on competing systems (Mohan 1995b). 
ISPs including AOL and Lycos, who licensed Internet Explorer 4.0 code to 
build custom browser versions, intended to induce customer loyalty to a 
specific company, were later not able to benefit from new features in IE 5.0 
like auto-completion of web forms, which were desired by customers, 
switching to the standard client versions (Krigel 1999). 
Probably the most inventive example of technology lock-in creation in 
Microsoft’s history was its legal settlement with InterTrust Technologies: 
InterTrust accused Microsoft of having infringed its digital rights manage-
ment patent by Windows Media technology. Microsoft agreed to pay Inter-
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Trust and license its patent, but its validity would be limited to standard 
implementations of the relevant Microsoft platform. If Microsoft’s partner 
– portable media player maker, online music shop, video-on-demand pro-
vider or media editing software vendor – wants to modify and add value to 
Microsoft Digital Rights Management, it would have to negotiate separate 
licensing terms with InterTrust. Because of the substantial costs, everybody 
prefers to stick to the standard version, thus not endangering to Microsoft’s 
dominance in the emerging digital media market (Roberts 2004). Technol-
ogy platform locks in partners, restricting their future technological choices 
and preventing entry in certain markets, while creative technology strate-
gies allow companies to use other parties to even deepen the lock-in, as in 
the case of litigation threats by an external patent owner. 
4.3.5.3 Extending own platform 
While intentional product inferiority and relevant positioning offered part-
ners revenue opportunities, the opposite scenario could be used as an im-
portant deterrent. Microsoft captured numerous niches, entering them with 
own products, often bundled as standard components of new versions of al-
ready established solutions, and details of the mechanism will be discussed 
in the following chapter. 
Innovation and launch of new products, competing with existing alterna-
tives available in the market and quickly capturing large market shares 
through the bundling seem to be a development of technology, in many 
cases Microsoft’s decisions raised concerns of anti-trust authorities, espe-
cially as Microsoft’s products were usually cheaper than previously avail-
able solutions. Literature has also identified a critical role of pre-emptive 
product announcements in eliminating potential competitors, who were 
abandoning their development plans once Microsoft announced the future 
availability of certain solutions (even if the announcements were only in 
early stages and concerned products never materialized) (Avakian 1999: 
47). This mechanism can be interpreted as a counterpart of the inferior 
product positioning, used as a powerful deterrent to manage expectations of 
market participants (Farrell and Saloner 1986: 942; Shapiro and Varian 
1999: 275). 
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4.3.5.4 Eliminating competitors 
The previously described payola helps not only motivate partners, but also 
restrict competitors or reduce support for competitive standards. Microsoft 
tried not to completely eliminate competitors, trying rather to make them 
dependent on own standards and limit their user bases. The company ac-
quired minority stakes in its traditional competitors Apple Computer, In-
prise and Corel, helping them financially in return for adjustment of their 
strategies to own plans. Linux supporters were incensed by Microsoft’s ac-
quisition of antivirus business unit of a Romanian software company Ge-
CAD Software – its product RAV AntiVirus was the best antivirus solution 
for Linux platform, no longer available after the acquisition (Evers and 
Roberts 2003). Additionally, Microsoft was offering benefits to partners, 
willing to suspend development of competitive products – for example, HP 
agreed to give up its e-mail server OpenMail for Windows NT platform 
and support Microsoft Exchange in return for involvement in various joint 
initiatives and the preferred supplier status for Unix mail platforms inte-
grated with Exchange (Mohan 1997). Microsoft was also trying to “con-
vert” key partners of its competitors (as the previously described Lotus 
IBM partners InfoImage and Interliant), or restrict competitors through le-
gal settlements. For example, the company agreed to pay a substantial set-
tlement in patent lawsuits with Sun Microsystems, but Sun committed to 
improve interoperability of its products with Microsoft platform and not to 
support the open-source competitor of Microsoft Office, OpenOffice, origi-
nally based on source code of Sun’s StarOffice (McMillan 2004). There 
were cases, when Microsoft intentionally modified own products to disable 
the usage of or deteriorate the performance of competitive applications - 
Real Networks media player failed to run once a competitive Microsoft’s 
product was installed (Johnston 1998), and web browser by Opera could 
not display correctly pages of MSN, as the portal was generating different 
page views, depending on what browser software was identified (Hansen 
and Festa 2004). 
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4.3.5.5 Sales and partnership model 
Another deterrent is Microsoft’s sales and partnership model, including 
elements of the plural governance form, discussed in the previous chapter: 
parallel work with multiple partners, who compete among themselves, and 
have additional motivation to innovate and differentiate their offerings. 
Hybrid sales model with multiple channels and partnership levels enables 
in turn creative distribution of margins and links it to partner investments in 
marketing, training and technology development. 
4.4 Discussion 
The following table summarizes the partner management techniques, 
analyzing their relevance and impact on the strategies of value chain part-
ners. Not every technique is equally effective, and often only a combination 
of several measures assures the desired outcomes. 
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 Technique 
Decreasing 
partner’s 
transaction 
cost? 
Stimulating 
partner’s re-
lation-specific 
investments? 
Stimulating 
partner’s in-
novativeness? 
Restricting 
partner’s 
new product 
development 
decisions? 
Minority invest-
ment 
 √  √ 
Direct transfers √ √ √ √ 
3rd-party invest-
ment 
 √  √ 
Pricing technology √ √ √ √ 
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
Reference designs √   √ 
Promotion √ √  √ 
Sales √   √ 
Positioning own 
products 
√  √  
M
a
rk
et
in
g
 
Certification  √  √ 
Platform mgmt √   √ 
Partner-oriented 
development 
√    
Product inferiority √  √  
Knowledge trans-
fer 
√ √ √ √ 
Learning by doing √ √ √ √ 
Stimulating 
knowledge 
generation 
√  √  
T
ec
h
n
ic
a
l 
in
ce
n
ti
v
es
 
Technical 
privileging 
√    
Legal measures  √  √ 
Partner lock-in  √  √ 
Extending 
platform 
  √  
Eliminating 
competitors 
 √  √ 
D
et
e
rr
e
n
ts
 
Sales and 
partnership model 
 √ √  
Table 8. Partner management techniques and their impact on the strategies of partners 
Technology develops through periods of radical and incremental changes, 
and its social nature manifests itself in the rise and fall of organizational 
communities, linked to specific technology variations (Tushman and 
Anderson 1986: 439-440). The collective process starts with an era of tech-
nological ferment, when various companies experiment by releasing com-
peting prototype products (Tushman and Anderson 1986: 441), struggling 
to either absorb the innovative technology or destroy  it to preserve its in-
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cumbent position (Anderson and Tushman 1990: 610-611). Variation and 
selection processes lead to competition among and substitution of multiple 
designs (Anderson and Tushman 1990: 612), and finally a dominant design 
emerges, becoming the accepted form of a new product class, so that fur-
ther developments are focused on incremental, not radical improvements 
(Tushman, Anderson 1986: 411). 
The emergence of dominant design was presented in the literature as so-
cial or even political process, where firms with diverse interests try to in-
fluence the opinions of practitioner community. The technological changes 
may be beneficial for incumbents, enabling them to balance their existing 
skills and technologies (competence-enhancing innovations), but equally 
often the changes can render organizational knowledge bases obsolete and 
damage business opportunities (competence-destroying innovations) 
(Tushman and Anderson 1986: 442). The process resembles Kuhn’s (1996) 
description of the emergence of new scientific paradigms: as long as the 
changes are only incremental, members of the academic community can 
benefit from their knowledge and continue “solving puzzles” within estab-
lished frameworks, but radical change occurs when a new paradigm calls 
for refutation of previous theories and thus destroys the value of existing 
skill bases. The adoption of a paradigm depends on the community, mem-
bers of which have varying motivations to support or reject the new ap-
proach, and the transition can be long and difficult. Similarly, the emer-
gence of new technological standards is a community-driven process - 
technology can only be successful if it has supporters, and the winning so-
lutions are not necessarily superior. “Dominant designs are not simply an 
artifact of the way in which innovations diffuse. (…) The emergence of 
dominant design is an outcome of the social or political dynamics of com-
promise and accommodation between actors of unequal influence.” 
(Anderson and Tushman 1990: 615-617). Once the design is collectively 
accepted, competing companies focus on incremental improvements, re-
lated to cost and variations of standard, interchangeable products, and in 
this ways reinforce the established social structures (Anderson and 
Tushman 1990: 618). 
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Fig. 16. Technological and social processes related to the emergence of a new dominant 
design 
Partner management techniques are therefore linked to the community-
based evolution, helping the focal firm establish a coalition of other players 
to support its proposed technology (Hill 1997; Roberts and Liu 2001). 
Availability of complementary products and their compatibility with exist-
ing solutions are critical for the success, so in emerging markets it pays 
back to “buy” partners. The stakes of companies are high, and previous in-
vestments in technology development need to be accompanied by 
additional expenditures to gain support for the innovation. Partners are not 
only needed to provide complementary products and services, adding 
credibility and benefits to the core technology, but also to shorten time-to-
market (Roberts and Liu 2001: 27) - Microsoft could potentially develop 
own solutions in all complementary areas, but this wouldn’t give it time-
based advantages over competitors. 
In addition, payola may be indispensable for partner companies, which 
regard the new technology as a threat. Their businesses would be nega-
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tively affected by its diffusion, so they could not find strategic justifications 
in favor of its support, especially as it may substitute their existing products 
and destroy competences. When Microsoft was co-opting partners to sup-
port Windows NT for enterprise computing, it had to deal with established 
companies, servicing and deriving large shares of revenues from the Unix 
market. Windows was regarded by most of them as a competence-
destroying innovation – and only political actions helped Microsoft con-
vince the first large partners to cooperate. Companies like Digital, Wang, 
Banyan or Tandem needed substantial incentives to start working with the 
platform. Their involvement sparked bandwagon effects among both cus-
tomers (as the strong corporate backing for Windows was noticed by client 
organizations) and other partners – so that once a critical mass was reached, 
further partners were deciding to support Windows without the additional 
incentives. Partner relationships, established to promote new platforms, 
have self-reinforcing character: a large installed user base leads to greater 
interest of partners, increasing in turn the customer demand and encourag-
ing new companies to enter into partnerships (Hill 1997: 9), but this 
“chicken-and-egg” problem can only be solved by convincing the first 
partners to offer the critical complementary products. 
The example of Windows-related partnerships leads to a conclusion that 
the stage of technology lifecycle is an important factor determining the 
right choice of partner management techniques. It is not possible to offer 
unequivocal guidelines about recommended governance forms for different 
lifecycle stages, as empirical data would contradict such a generalist model 
(Roberts and Liu 2001; Roberts and Liu 2003). It seems more important to 
understand, which particular incentives and deterrents are suitable for 
managing partners at which stage of the lifecycle. To simplify the analysis, 
only two distinctive phases are discussed: the era of ferment, when 
companies struggle to build the largest installed base, and the period of 
technology platform dominance (decline and substitution phases do not 
need to be addressed within the model, as they are inextricably linked to 
the introduction of new substitutes by the leading companies). Some 
partner-oriented activities may be particularly effective in expanding the 
installed base, while not being critical for the further technology 
development – for example, cash inducement is instrumental in co-opting 
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inducement is instrumental in co-opting providers of complementary prod-
ucts, but not necessary for established technologies. 
 
 Technique 
Expanding 
installed base 
Managing 
established platform 
Minority investment √  
Direct transfers √ √ 
3rd-party investment √  
Pricing technology √ √ 
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l 
Reference designs √ √ 
Promotion √ √ 
Sales √ √ 
Positioning own 
products 
 √ 
M
a
r
k
et
in
g
 
Certification √ √ 
Platform management √ √ 
Partner-oriented 
development 
√  
Product inferiority  √ 
Knowledge transfer √ √ 
Learning by doing √ √ 
Stimulating knowledge genera-
tion 
√ √ 
T
e
ch
n
ic
a
l 
in
c
en
ti
v
es
 
Technical 
privileging 
 √ 
Legal measures √ √ 
Partner lock-in  √ 
Extending platform √ √ 
Eliminating 
competitors 
√ √ 
D
et
er
re
n
ts
 
Sales and 
partnership model 
√ √ 
Table 9. Changing effectiveness of partner management techniques in technology life-
cycle 
Microsoft’s approach to partners revealed also another interesting aspect: 
the competence-destroying character of innovations, which usually is a bar-
rier to adoption and support from other companies, can be de-emphasized 
thanks to the use of adequate techniques. Moreover, the company used re-
curring ties to accelerate the introduction and adoption of breakthrough in-
novations – with partner-oriented technology development, it started doing 
competence planning for own partners, designing new products to re-use 
some of their existing skills, or even offering technical designs and recom-
mended contract manufacturers, especially for breakthrough products based 
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on custom versions of Windows CE, such as intelligent displays Mira, Tab-
let PCs, or Windows Media Centers. The partner-oriented design required 
optimization for existing architectures and skills, not only development of 
superior technology – but investments in this area and using repetitive ties 
with several dedicated partners turned out to be cheaper than building new 
partner coalitions and co-opting necessary players every time. Literature 
recommends structuring technology deals in ways maximizing potential 
revenue streams from customers throughout the entire technology lifecycle 
(Shapiro and Varian 1999: 143-148), initially showing willingness to en-
courage adoption by low pricing, in further stages benefiting from lock-in 
effects, and finally, carefully planning substitutive offering for the same 
market. Microsoft adopted this approach to partners, regarding alliances not 
as one-off means to boost product diffusion, but cultivating them to achieve 
synergies across many businesses, and preparing for the introduction of 
new product generations. Technologically locked-in partners were not re-
garded as victims, but as important social capital, useful in other projects, 
and therefore kept satisfied. Even though the values of particular partner 
contributions were declining over time due to technological change 
(Wathne and Heide 2000: 45), Microsoft was loyal to the selected group of 
companies, helping them upgrade their competencies and jointly work on 
emerging solution classes. 
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5 Complementors 
5.1 Overview 
5.1.1 The role of a niche player 
The discussion of the high-tech value chain was focused on the role of 
value chain leaders, but the present chapter analyzes in turn strategies of 
companies working with the chain leader and complementing his technol-
ogy. Focus on a narrowly-defined group of customers is one of strategic 
options, discussed in management literature. Niche players voluntarily limit 
the scope of their activities and addressable markets (Porter 1998: 42), 
finding specialist areas in which they could excel by concentrating their 
usually limited resources and using them more effectively than less-focused 
competitors. Numerous studies offer implicit suggestions that the transition 
from a specialist to a generalist firm is a natural scenario for strategy de-
velopment. However, there are many successful committed niche players or 
even entire industry segments adopting such strategies (Carroll 1984: 126-
127). Similarly, within the high-tech value chain, not every company needs 
to become a chain leader, as other options can be equally beneficial. Par-
ticularly young firms have improved survival chances, if they specialize on 
a narrow market segment and initially avoid competing against large or-
ganizations (Romanelli 1989: 374). Even though the core technologies, de-
veloped by innovative startups, could be used for many purposes, the firms 
do not have sufficient funds and need to focus on specific vertical applica-
tions and easily accessible customer groups (Cusumano 2004: 55-58). 
The importance of niches is also emphasized by the ecological perspec-
tive in organization theory10, presenting niches as emerging and closing 
without significant involvement of individual companies, with a determi-
                                           
10 For a review of relevant empirical research streams concerning the ecological perspec-
tive, comp. (Wholey and Brittain 1986). 
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nistic view of organization lifecycle. This inertia reduces potential impacts 
of corporate decisions and strategies (Boone and van Witteloostuijn 1995: 
268), and the dynamics is interpreted as inevitable, with organizational 
forms and strategies selected rather by “the environment”, than by individ-
ual players. The perspective cannot adequately interpret the phenomenon of 
interorganizational networking (Boone and van Witteloostuijn 1995: 265-
267), but its important contribution is an emphasis on the inevitability of 
organizational decline, as once crowded niches later lose appeal and close. 
Management literature regards the decline as a stimulus for innovation, in 
line with the statement that “necessity is the mother of invention” (Mone et 
al. 1998: 118). 
The theory of flagship (Rugman and D’Cruz 2000) discusses asymmetri-
cal alliances and symbiotic relationships, with the flagship company exer-
cising control over strategies of partners, who in turn have no reciprocal in-
fluence over the flagship’s plans and activities. This view resembles the 
organizational ecology - it externalizes the locus of strategic control, a 
niche player is completely dependent on his large partner, who at the same 
time wants to maintain the partnership to guarantee uninterrupted supply of 
certain required goods and services. Flagship solutions may however re-
place the products of partners, thus undermining existing synergies, and 
this risk is not addressed by the idealistic theory. Although some theorists 
quote structural inertia (including the embeddedness in social networks) as 
a reason for not entering new markets and leaving them to partner compa-
nies (Mitchell 1989: 211), the empirical evidence counters these claims. 
While the flagship firm relies on vertical partnerships, the relations can be 
disturbed by inhouse technology development and substitution: the flagship 
can both maintain the entire ecosystem, and deliberately destroy businesses 
of individual partners.  
Negative aspects of asymmetrical partnerships are emphasized by the re-
source-based perspective on strategic alliances and the learning race meta-
phor: the stronger player tends to learn from a partner, gradually acquiring 
necessary intangible resources and building internal competencies, which 
make the partner contributions redundant. In a direct contrast to the coop-
erative postulates of flagship theory, the view emphasizes the competitive 
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character of alliances, with ongoing implicit bargaining among partners, in-
evitably leading to the demise of the weaker firm (Inkpen and Beamish 
1997). 
Interestingly, the strategies of NTT DoCoMo and Microsoft presented in 
the previous chapters could not be explained using any of these theories. 
These companies were not learning from their partners to substitute them, 
but rather experimented with new concepts in parallel to the cooperation 
processes. There were no learning races, characterized by transfers of in-
tangible resources from smaller partners and their appropriation against the 
interest of complementors. The dynamics could rather be described as “de-
velopment races”, with the chain leader adopting a novel approach to mar-
kets, previously penetrated by his partners, but also guiding the partners 
through the disruptive changes, and offering them new business opportuni-
ties. 
High-tech marketing literature is mostly concerned with the strategies of 
value chain leaders, ignoring the challenges which complementors may 
face in their partnerships with these dominant companies. Partners are 
needed to strengthen and legitimize a new product, but later should be sub-
stituted by own development of the focal company, which is advised to 
“design out” the partners (Moore 1998: 86). These recommendations do not 
represent the nature of many high-tech partnerships, lasting throughout en-
tire technology lifecycles, as companies tend to maintain partner ecosys-
tems even for mature products. Partners engage also in recurring ties, find-
ing new cooperation topics - when a specific niche is closing, firms tend to 
look for new ways of adding value to existing customers or related markets. 
Successful niche players stay in synergistic relations with value chain lead-
ers even when their current products are endangered by substitution - 
trusted partners may be offered new business opportunities, as long as they 
are innovative and constantly think about adding value to the leaders’ 
technologies. 
5.1.2 Complementor strategies 
The discussion of complementor strategies should start with a more general 
reflection about the nature of relations with their stronger partners. Tech-
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nology platform leadership does not imply that a particular firm adopts also 
a strategy of the high-tech value chain leader. The company may actually 
be dependent on another, more powerful player, exerting unidirectional in-
fluence over its strategy, or may not attach much importance to comple-
mentary partnerships, preferring to substitute solutions of potential partners 
by internal development. Both scenarios are dangerous for the niche play-
ers – in the former case, they would certainly derive more benefits from 
aligning their strategies directly with the chain leader, whereas in the latter 
scenario, they should rather consider competing against the firm. 
Cisco Systems certainly has mastered the partnership management, but 
does not really use the skills to support value chain complementors. Niche 
players can work with Cisco either as distributors and service providers for 
Cisco products, or as potential acquisition targets. As opposed to compa-
nies like Microsoft or NTT DoCoMo, Cisco does not maintain long-term 
partnerships with complementors, focusing on internal development and 
acquisitions to fill any gaps in own product portfolio – at Cisco, the “com-
pany policy is to «eat our young»” (Chaudhuri and Tabrizi 1999: 126)11. 
Such companies can be characterized as dominators, who “consume” the 
businesses of other players, pursuing “stand-alone strategies”, closed to 
third-party complementors (Iansiti and Levien 2004: 69). Domination, in-
volving own supply of all complementary products, was the key element of 
IBM’s strategy in the past and contributed to its failure when Apple and 
later Microsoft established alternative, more open ecosystems (Iansiti and 
Levien 2004: 75). In the case of Cisco, the preference of internalization is 
however linked to the nature of its products, located mostly in the infra-
structure segment of the high-tech value chain, where standardization of 
networking components and their technical parameters are key to gaining 
market share. This differs from software or telecommunications services, 
where the real added value comes from solving particular business prob-
lems. 
                                           
11 At the same time, Cisco partners with a small number of key players such as Micro-
soft, Intel, HP or Motorola, presenting these horizontal alliances as strategic, with the 
focus on joint development of new technology standards. 
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Niche players need therefore to understand, with whom they partner or 
intend to partner – as the brief discussion demonstrated, the stronger part-
ner may turn out not to possess enough power to enforce standards and of-
fer its complementor a sustainable position within the high-tech value 
chain, or may even pursue a strategy contradictory to the cooperation-based 
value chain approach. 
The various perspectives on alliances with technology leaders, discussed 
above, present an overwhelmingly static view of the alliance, even though 
some looked at changing roles within a relation. They ignore possible 
changes of markets and technologies – resources important at one point of 
time may lose their appeal later, when new challenges arise, and a dynamic 
view of alliances should emphasize the evolution of partner co-dependence 
and their technologies. In long-term relationships, future initiatives are 
likely to extend beyond the present cooperation. The synergistic relations 
can be actively managed, so that complementors are aligned with the flag-
ship strategy at all times, even when their short-term interests are endan-
gered. 
In addition, the focus of previously discussed perspectives is on single-
product companies or single-market partnerships – while the actual alli-
ances are more complex, as companies tend to work in parallel on multiple 
projects, and are embedded in networks, where individual decisions may 
affect other related businesses. Industrial economics introduced the notion 
of multimarket competition, where firms simultaneously compete in several 
markets, and may respond to aggressive moves by retaliation in another 
area than the initiating action (Jayachandran et al. 1999). Partners partici-
pate in various high-tech value chains and develop dependencies on multi-
ple levels, so that sometimes they affect the business of another company 
by seemingly unrelated decisions. The economic concept of tacit collusion 
describes implicit processes of communication among competitors, who 
know the limits of own activities and learn from experiences, when and 
how the other player could retaliate. In value chain alliances, partners 
“dance” with each other and learn, which moves are acceptable, and which 
are not. At the same time, theorists of multimarket competition suggest that 
innovative companies would not withhold technological breakthroughs due 
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to the tacit collusion, constraining only repetitive and relatively predictable 
activities such as the use of marketing techniques (Jayachandran et al. 
1999: 51), so a complementary relationship does not discourage companies 
from introducing radical innovations. 
Third important restriction of the previously reviewed theories is the na-
ture of relationships between the flagship and its partners. The niche play-
ers deliberately limit their strategies, giving up certain business opportuni-
ties, but receive something in return – ideally both from the flagship (as the 
complementor adds more value to its platform), and from end customers 
(who enjoy more benefits from an integrated value chain). There is nothing 
wrong per se in being co-dependent – as long as he continues adding value 
to the chain leader, the complementor will benefit from his status. 
Niche players pursue nevertheless their own independent strategies, 
which tend to be aligned (but not identical) with the chain leader’s strategy. 
It makes sense for them to work with a strong partner, who offers access to 
its installed base and technology platform, as well as other incentives. 
Niche players are also willing to keep up with the technological change in-
duced by the chain leader, who may substitute their existing solutions, but 
at the same time offer opportunities to innovate and develop new technolo-
gies. Effective partnership with a specific value chain leader results from 
added value and innovativeness of the complementor. As potential custom-
ers need to know about the existence of the complementary products in 
question and relations between complementor and chain leader, so the 
niche player needs to build own brand and continuously reassure the mar-
ket by confirming close links to the flagship – it cannot simply rely on the 
stronger partner to promote its business. 
Sources of competitive advantages of niche players make the focal com-
pany attractive to both its corporate partner and customers, and guarantee 
that partnerships would last even when some decisions of the value chain 
leader undermine the complementor’s position. Generalist companies may 
overwhelm once specialist segments, transforming profitable niches into 
mainstream products (Porter 1985: 21). This scenario could be observed in 
the case of Microsoft, entering markets which used to be independent com-
plementary niches, and bundling technically inferior products with popular 
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packages to destroy competitors (Cusumano 2004: 59). The source of com-
petitive advantage for a niche player would therefore not be a specific 
product but core competencies, capabilities and underlying technologies, 
which could be embodied in new products once a specific niche closes. 
Specialist companies do not vanish when their traditional segments become 
unprofitable, but adjust their strategies to the observed market changes. Le-
gal measures protecting intellectual property are not effective, as they can 
only limit direct imitation, not substitution by superior technologies – while 
chain leaders may introduce superior, improved technologies to replace ex-
isting solutions. The technological lead of a niche player can therefore be 
sustained only if the firm can innovate as fast as other players (Porter 1985: 
182-183). 
In spite of possible synergies, some complementors opt not to maintain 
close relations with value chain leaders. They may have ambitious plans to 
take the chain leader’s role themselves (not always realistic, and leading to 
risky and costly competitive battles) and fears that they would be exploited 
in a learning race by stronger partners, or may even be too proud to accept 
the dishonor of an asymmetrical alliance (as in the case of many companies 
relying on Windows architecture but deliberately declining to work with 
Microsoft). Model strategy for value chain complementors suggests how-
ever that partnering with a chain leader offers important synergies, while 
other scenarios could only yield sub-optimal results. 
There are also examples of companies, distancing themselves from pre-
vious value chain partners – the most frequently quoted one is Netscape, 
once an excellent complementor of Windows platform, which started posi-
tioning its web browser as a potential independent technology platform, ca-
pable of running web-based applications in ways independent from operat-
ing systems. Not surprisingly, the strategy infuriated the challenged chain 
leader Microsoft, who literally destroyed Netscape’s business (Cusumano 
2004: 78) - the clash was however not inevitable, if only Netscape had re-
stricted its ambitions and stayed within the confines of a complementor’s 
strategy. 
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5.2 Patterns of substitution and innovation 
5.2.1 Substitution case studies 
Introduction of own products by the value chain leader means disruptions 
in his value chain – as the cases of NTT DoCoMo and Microsoft demon-
strated, the new products substitute but not imitate the offerings of com-
plementors. Niche players, so far focused on adding value to the technol-
ogy platform, may feel abandoned by the platform extension, which 
reduces their future revenues. On the other hand, the change stimulates 
their innovativeness, so that they can abandon the commoditized areas and 
look for new value-adding applications. The substitution patterns for tech-
nology partnerships will be demonstrated using examples of eight comple-
mentary product categories, substituted, substituted by Microsoft. 
5.2.2 TCP/IP protocol 
The networking protocol was initially developed in 1978 for ARPANET, 
predecessor of the Internet network. In the middle of the 1990s, it reached 
the mature stage of technology lifecycle as an open standard, nevertheless 
continuously competing with other (mainly proprietary) alternatives. Major 
operating systems started offering support for TCP/IP, but in 1994 only 
about 6% of computers were using the network standard (Callaway 1994). 
Even though the protocol was widely supported, its use was complicated: it 
required a time-consuming individual configuration of every computer, and 
this issue was addressed by specialized software from companies such as 
FTP Software or Ipswitch, offering dedicated applications for Windows 
environment. Microsoft decided to embed the protocol in Windows – the 
solution was superior to other commercially available software, as the new 
32-bit drivers were given high priority in accessing system resources, so 
the data transfer speed was improved, not affected by other applications 
(Horwitt 1994). Even though TCP/IP drivers in Windows undermined the 
business of several companies, analysts were emphasizing positive effects 
of Microsoft’s decision on the diffusion of TCP/IP, development of related 
products by specialist companies, and sales of high-end TCP/IP solutions 
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(Mohan 1995a). Reacting to the commoditization of TCP/IP software, all 
of the specialist companies moved in the high-tech value chain from infra-
structure software towards value-added solutions: groupware and web 
servers (FTP Software), personal FTP and network monitoring (Ipswitch), 
Internet messaging and network security (Process Software), and PC-to-
Unix connectivity (Net Manage). In parallel, they were actively working 
with other value chains – the underlying technology for TCP/IP was ported 
to many platforms, so they were able to reuse their existing components for 
Unix, Mac or IBM AS/400. Microsoft’s decision destroyed nevertheless 
core businesses of these companies, and no further cooperation was offered 
to them by the chain leader. 
5.2.3 Clustering 
Making Windows a highly available server environment was key to the en-
terprise-wide diffusion of the operating system. The concept of building 
computer clusters, in which one machine can instantly take over the work-
load when another one fails to assure continuous operations (failover), and 
processing tasks can be distributed across several machines (load balanc-
ing) was first introduced by Tandem Computers in 1975, and later become 
wide-spread for Unix platforms. As Windows NT was gaining popularity 
among business users, several companies released their own dedicated 
clustering solutions. These companies included Digital, NCR, Tandem, 
Data General and Compaq, all focused on high-end hardware and IT ser-
vices, regarding Windows clustering modules as a way to stimulate hard-
ware and service sales. Although Microsoft desperately needed clustering 
functionality, multiple available solutions were not compatible, and there-
fore not supported by standard business applications, as their developers 
were required to prepare different versions depending on the clustering 
variant. For hardware and services companies, proprietary clustering soft- 
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 ware was not a significant source of competitive advantage, diffusion of the 
technology was inhibited by the lack of standards, and maintaining own 
software in line with Windows development was costly. Microsoft 
launched a standardization initiative with over 60 hardware partners (in-
cluding the key clustering vendors), introduced a common specification for 
third-party developers of “cluster-aware” applications, and later worked on 
a module code-named Wolfpack, which in 1998, after many delays became 
Microsoft’s standard product for NT failover clustering. Later the same 
year, Microsoft acquired a small specialist company Valence Research and 
used its software Convoy to offer NT Load Balancing Service, so that the 
native Windows clustering functionality substituted all of the partner solu-
tions. The standardized module was offered at a lower cost than previously 
available solutions. It did not depend on any particular hardware and net-
work configuration (so increasing competition among vendors), but at the 
same time it “expanded the pie”, and created strategic benefits for all in-
volved parties (Jap 1999), making NT a credible platform for enterprise-
wide applications and thus boosting the sales of Windows machines and re-
lated services. An implementation of a cluster-based system means at least 
double sales of servers for a given configuration. Incumbents, traditionally 
offering clustering solutions, were deprived of proprietary solutions, but on 
the other hand they were able to focus on their core domains (hardware and 
services) – therefore, all of the affected companies decided to focus and 
add value to Microsoft’s solutions, engaging in multiple subsequent Win-
dows-related initiatives. 
5.2.4 Antivirus software 
Protection against viruses was available since the 1988 release of first 
commercial antivirus products by Dr. Solomon. Microsoft DOS included a 
dedicated antivirus utility, but when releasing Windows, Microsoft decided 
to leave the space for third-party vendors (maintenance of antivirus soft-
ware was costly, as it required regular updates and tracking of new vi-
ruses). Initially, viruses were transmitted through files saved on floppy 
disks, but Internet quickly became a new transmission channel. Antivirus 
software was also undergoing gradual commoditization – in 1996, Syman-
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tec experimented with offering a free web-based virus scanner, and the 
move was followed by other vendors such as Panda Software. Antivirus 
companies moved beyond basic virus detection and removal, offering so-
phisticated server-based protection and integrated security solutions. Basic 
functionality remained nevertheless critical for individual computers, and 
over the years, companies like Symantec or McAfee Associates were sell-
ing subscription services for PC virus scanners, while other players were 
offering similar functionality for free from their websites. Meanwhile, Mi-
crosoft’s image was badly damaged by numerous flaws in Windows, ex-
ploited by attackers and viruses. The company acquired in 2003 specialist 
anti-virus technology from GeCAD Software, and in the following two 
years took over also anti-spyware software vendor Giant Company and 
spam-detection software maker Sybari Software. The functionality was al-
ready commoditized, while repeating security was important for Windows 
users – so the year 2005 marked Microsoft’s entry in the security market 
with a release of own software for individual users. The company started 
competing against existing complementors, but they had over 10 years to 
harvest the market, still charging very high rates for basic subscription ser-
vices. After Microsoft’s move, companies like Symantec and McAfee As-
sociates continued working on high-end security solutions, trying to offer 
better protection for corporate customers – McAfee focused on encryption 
and software vulnerabilities, while Symantec started merger discussions 
with storage specialist Veritas Software. 
5.2.5 OLAP 
Online analytical processing (OLAP) was a term coined by a company Ar-
bor, which in 1992 offered “analysis server”, speeding up database queries 
by restructuring the analyzed data into multi-dimensional tables. OLAP be-
came soon an important business solution for extracting and analyzing data 
from other systems. In 1994, Arbor released its first OLAP toolkit for Win-
dows, using MS Office as the user interface for a proprietary Arbor data-
base, and soon multiple competitors entered the market, including three 
Windows complementors: Micro Strategy, Comshare and Seagate. They 
launched standardization efforts, which revealed the existence of multiple 
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incompatible approaches. In 1997, Microsoft released its own specification 
for Universal OLAP Data Access, intended to guarantee interoperability of 
various OLAP applications and databases. Two years later, Microsoft SQL 
Server had an own OLAP component, substituting solutions from comple-
mentors, and offering several new features, such as “write-back” function-
ality (supporting what-if scenario analysis) and “member properties” (for 
managing distributed queries), offered at a much lower price than other al-
ternatives. Meanwhile, specialist OLAP companies moved towards value-
added solutions – many of them developed pre-configured analytical appli-
cations for specific vertical markets and business reporting tools, extending 
beyond technical toolkits. Seagate (later spun off as Crystal Decisions) was 
able to continue complementing Microsoft platform with its reporting en-
gine Crystal Reports, integrated among others with Outlook and Microsoft 
CRM. Other vendors decided to switch to alternative value chains - Arbor 
struck a distribution deal with IBM, Micro Strategy added in 2002 support 
for Unix and Linux (earlier, the company was surprisingly loyal to Micro-
soft, as its DSS Server was available only for Windows platform (Hall 
2002)), Comshare started in 1997 supporting multiple databases including 
Oracle. 
5.2.6 Push software 
Push or broadcasting software was developed to facilitate information 
transfer across corporate networks by actively pushing new important items 
to individual computers instead of expecting the users to visit specific web-
sites. With the low Internet transfer rates and the lack of dominant designs 
for web-based applications, push initially seemed to be a promising type of 
solution. Even though nowadays the technology is long forgotten, elements 
of the concept are used in media streaming and mobile phone messaging, 
and in the second half of the 1990s, many large companies were working 
on the push software. Specialist firms PointCast, BackWeb, Tibco Software 
and Data Channel had their own, incompatible broadcasting solutions for 
corporate Intranets, while the web browsing market leader Netscape in-
tended to use similar mechanisms in delivering Internet pages to individual 
users. Microsoft, at that time actively fighting the browser war against Net-
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scape, took interest in the market and allied in 1996 with the largest spe-
cialist PointCast to define the push standard CFC (Channel Definition 
Format), supported by Microsoft Internet Explorer: commoditization of the 
client-side would facilitate wider diffusion of the technology, allowing spe-
cialist firms to focus either on push server development, or on content de-
livery, without worrying about the technicalities of information reception. 
Microsoft partnered with numerous content providers, delivering custom-
ized news channels for IE 4.0 users, and helped establish the dominant 
technology design, working closely also with PointCast competitors to as-
sure interoperability of various platforms. Although the standardization un-
dermined sales opportunities for client software, push vendors focused on 
specialist applications of the technology. BackWeb worked on pushing 
antivirus updated with McAfee, solutions for customer service departments 
and BackWeb Sales Accelerator for delivering market intelligence updates 
to mobile sales force. Tibco used its middleware to integrate with key busi-
ness systems such as SAP, Baan, Peoplesoft and Clarify, automating push 
for specific information, e.g. sales orders, later transforming this into an all-
purpose application integration platform. PointCast switched to corporate 
solutions, and in 1999 was acquired by Launchpad Technology, which 
wanted to integrate PointCast server with its e-commerce software. Even 
though none of the broadcasting companies was ultimately successful in 
this field, the entry of Microsoft with the standard client interface could ac-
tually have been helpful for the diffusion of their push-based solutions. 
5.2.7 ERP 
Enterprise Resources Planning is a common name for a group of business 
solutions, automating physical and financial flows in an enterprise, and 
could be traced back to first systems by the German SAP, released in 1973. 
At the end of the century, the ERP market was already mature, and key 
vendors were moving towards related areas such as Customer Relationship 
Management and Supply Chain Management, exploring opportunities in 
small and medium enterprise segments, for which traditional ERP systems 
were too complex and expensive. Microsoft traditionally partnered in the 
market with SAP, providing joint solutions for NT platform, but there were 
166      5 Complementors 
 
also numerous other complementors, actively promoting Windows-based 
systems, including Peoplesoft, J.D.Edwards, Baan, Great Plains Software 
and Navision. Microsoft decided to enter the mature market and commodi-
tize ERP, addressing particularly the yet unexplored segment of SMEs. In 
December 2000, it acquired Great Plains Software, SME market leader in 
the U.S., and in 2002 bought Navision, one of the key European players. 
These acquisitions were unique in Microsoft’s history, as the company en-
tered an entirely new software domain, relying only on skills of the newly 
acquired divisions. This move was also unexpected for its long-term part-
ners such as SAP, who nevertheless were assured by Microsoft that the 
products would target smaller customers, offering limited performance and 
functionality compared with the fully-featured ERP systems. The comple-
mentors tried to fortify their positions in several ways: by moving in the 
value chain (pre-configured vertical solutions for specific industries, supply 
chain and customer relationship management, online delivery of software 
as service), extending product portfolio (among others new solutions for 
SMEs, directly competing with Microsoft products), and working closely 
with other chain leaders (for example SAP started offering versions for 
Linux and Microsoft’s database competitor Sybase, later introducing also 
own web application platform NetWeaver, directly threatening Micro-
soft .Net platform). Microsoft’s strategy was interpreted by ERP vendors as 
targeting their future revenue streams, and they all tried to retaliate, while 
surprisingly also attempting to maintain cooperation and benefit from Mi-
crosoft’s partnership as long as such opportunities existed. The entry in the 
ERP domain was not a simple extension of Microsoft’s platform, but ven-
turing into a completely new market, only vaguely related to its existing 
product and competence portfolios, enabled by two unannounced acquisi-
tions. 
5.2.8 Document management 
Archiving, locating and retrieving documents were functions of another 
key business solution for Windows platform. The idea of computer-based 
document management came from Xerox, soon disposing however of most 
of the related capabilities and spinning off numerous companies, which 
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soon became important players in the emerging market. Document scan-
ning, storage and search solutions were available for Windows users in the 
1990s, and many vendors integrated them closely with Microsoft applica-
tions such as Office, Exchange and Outlook, using SQL Server to store 
document properties. Key complementors included Documentum, FileNet, 
Open Text (offering solutions for multiple platforms) as well as Compaq, 
Eastman and Xerox (supporting only Windows). Their product architec-
tures and features were incommensurable, with various combinations of 
document storage, search and retrieval, workflow, workgroup collaboration 
and even portal functionality. The differences in approaches were particu-
larly visible when the concept of knowledge management gained on popu-
larity and every company tried to offer its own vision for how software 
could help manage enterprise knowledge. Facing the knowledge manage-
ment hype, Microsoft initially started actively promoting partner products, 
but in 1999 announced plans to develop an own “knowledge workplace” 
solution. Finally released in 2001, SharePoint Portal Server was a low-level 
document management system, combining basic features of a corporate 
portal and a simple workflow, seamlessly integrated with Microsoft Office. 
Vendors of high-end document management systems had no reasons to re-
gard SharePoint as their competitor – it was designed for sharing depart-
mental documents, not capable of managing enterprise-wide document ar-
chives. On the other hand, it incorporated many innovative concepts and 
offered an astonishing ease-of-use, making document management tasks as 
easy as using Microsoft Office. Since the first announcements in 1999, Mi-
crosoft had been encouraging partners to add value to the upcoming sys-
tem, offering previews, releasing early components and integration kits. 
Documentum and FileNet released integrated client interfaces, enabling us-
ers to access their document repositories from SharePoint, while Eastman 
and Compaq gave up the development of own products, focusing on dedi-
cated service offerings. When Microsoft launched the second version of 
SharePoint, it already was a powerful, scalable platform for large organiza-
tions, based on the user-friendly concepts elaborated initially and compet-
ing directly with its former complementors. SharePoint licenses were sig-
nificantly cheaper than alternative products, making document 
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management a commodity. Specialist companies decided to compete with 
SharePoint, focusing on extensions to the core document management 
functionality, for example solutions streamlining insurance claim process-
ing, storing records in accordance with government standards, or managing 
digital media assets. 
5.2.9 Digital media authoring 
The use of computers for digital media authoring started with high-end so-
lutions for movie and record studios, but was brought in the 1990s to indi-
vidual users of personal computers, as the machines became more powerful 
and dedicated media capture hardware cheaper. One of Microsoft’s strate-
gic initiatives was focused on the use of computer for home entertainment 
purposes. It started with setting standards for digital media files, and later 
benefited from the availability of broadband Internet, enabling online me-
dia streaming. The field of Windows-based digital media is very compre-
hensive, and Microsoft over the years fought several standard battles 
against companies such as Real Networks and Apple. The present analysis 
of complementor substitution pattern focuses on an area, where Microsoft 
was not competing but closely working with other companies and promot-
ing their products – the domain of home media authoring. As digital cam-
corders and other devices converting analog media to digital formats be-
came accessible to individual consumers, there were also multiple 
incompatible applications, allowing users to edit and store the media files 
on Windows PCs. In 1998, Microsoft and a group of video editing special-
ist firms defined Advanced Authoring Format, facilitating exchange of ed-
itable audio and video data among various editing tools. This standardiza-
tion was an important step towards the commoditization of basic, low-end 
media authoring functionality among non-professional computer users. The 
second step was Microsoft’s decision to release its new application Win-
dows Movie Maker and bundle it with Windows Me (2000) and XP (2001), 
making it freely available for every user of these Windows versions. Win-
dows Movie Maker did not include sophisticated editing features available 
from other complementors, but was able to satisfy most requirements of 
home users, with a wide support for various cameras and a spectacular ease 
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of use. All of Microsoft’s complementors decided to tighten their links to 
Microsoft, focusing on other domains – such as high-end professional sys-
tems for newsrooms, broadcasters and record companies (Avid, Matrox, 
Adobe Systems, Sonic Foundry), or integrated hardware and software bun-
dles for home users (Pinnacle Systems). 
5.2.10 Discussion 
Even though the eight substitution cases present different initial conditions 
and reactions of complementors, more general mechanisms could be identi-
fied. Microsoft was entering new technological areas to either standardize 
emerging technologies, or commoditize the basic functionality of mature or 
declining ones. Standardization could be observed in the cases of clustering 
and push software, where it enabled interoperability of various solutions, 
attracting more customers and letting individual complementors focus their 
strategies instead of building complete platforms from scratch. Commoditi-
zation occurred in the cases of TCP/IP, antivirus, OLAP, document man-
agement, digital media editing and partly also ERP solutions, following dif-
ferent patterns for infrastructure-level software and business solutions. 
Infrastructure is prone to become a commodity as soon as a technical stan-
dard it supports diffuses – nowadays, most hardware vendors bundle dedi-
cated software packages for free, and any competitive advantage resulting 
from the control over specific software cannot be long-lasting, except for 
explicit patent protection and economic effects of scale. Business solutions 
can in turn be commoditized by bundling and radical price reductions, 
which make previously specialist software available to mass market 
through multiple sales channels. 
Microsoft’s moves were undermining some revenue streams of partners, 
but in most cases they clearly were expecting this to happen sooner or later, 
observing the growing commoditization of their domains, and carefully 
planning next strategic steps. Microsoft was usually willing to continue co-
operation, asking partners to continue complementing its products – but 
complementors were not always interested in this, especially if they were 
not able to add much value to newly released software, or decided that they 
were strong enough to free themselves from the dependence. In the com-
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moditization scenario, niche players working with a value chain leader had 
reasonable amount of time to harvest their niches before the stronger part-
ner entered the area – they were benefiting from economic rents until the 
margins radically decreased. As it was observed in the analyzed cases, 
smaller partners were not prematurely giving up their niches based on an-
nouncements made by Microsoft, instead slowly phasing out and redirect-
ing their strategies. The literature on pre-emptive announcements empha-
sizes their role in attracting customers and deterring competitors 
(Robertson et al. 1995; Wu et al. 2004), but they are also instrumental in 
signaling partners the need to re-examine their own technology strategies. 
Only Microsoft’s entry in an entirely new domain – ERP market – was not 
announced to the affected partners, who indeed reacted to this move by re-
taliation. 
The patterns of substitution are similar to the mechanism of disruptive 
innovations, with Microsoft initially entering the market with a low-end 
product and keeping partners loyal until the product functionality and per-
formance surpass the parameters of their offerings. At that time, partners 
can make strategic decisions about their future cooperation with the value 
chain leader. Technology management literature mentions sailing ship ef-
fect (Howells 2002), where the introduction of a technological innovation 
induces significant improvements to older technologies, as incumbents try 
to defend their positions. The substitution patterns involving high-tech 
value chain leaders are sources of innovation among complementors, mak-
ing them re-evaluate existing strategies and directing their interests towards 
new technological domains, especially if the substitution is pre-announced. 
The technological substitution inevitably accompanies high-tech value 
chain partnerships, but as opposed to the traditional model of disruptive in-
novations, the innovating company (chain leader) and incumbents (com-
plementors) do not always compete, often jointly passing the transition pe-
riod. Even though certain high-tech niches are closing, related niches 
emerge, and entry costs are relatively low for specialist companies, which 
could re-use their capabilities and core technologies. 
Management researchers interpret this phenomenon as a consequence of 
market development processes, where niches are gradually absorbed by ex-
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panding all-purpose platforms. Although small firms tend to excel in spe-
cialized, narrowly-defined market segments, as soon as concerned product 
categories become popular among mass-market customers, large generalist 
firms can better address the demand (Romanelli 1989: 376). Although the 
technology platform extension comes at the expense of niche players, it ac-
tually improves the “ecosystem’s overall health” (Iansiti and Levien 2004: 
77), and could benefit even the affected complementors, providing that 
they learn how to balance existing skills and technologies to keep up with 
the changes. Organizational decline is an important source of innovation, 
particularly when the causes of this decline are stable and foreseeable 
(Mone et al. 1998: 124), as in the case of the phased entry into a new do-
main by the value chain leader, who discusses the intended strategic direc-
tions with partners to prepare them for the transition. Explicit pre-emptive 
announcements benefit the complementors, as otherwise they might fail to 
anticipate the upcoming decline of their segments. On the other hand, the 
reactions of complementors and choices of corrective strategic actions may 
also deepen the crisis (Weitzel and Jonsson 1989: 97), so value chain leader 
should counter these threats by not only announcing his intentions, but also 
offering new opportunities for existing partners. 
The impact of substitution on a complementor depends on the value 
chain segment where the company operates. Segments closer to the end 
customer (including software and services) offer many differentiation pos-
sibilities and are based on socially constructed technologies, so firms can 
easily adjust their strategies to stay aligned with the chain leader. Lower 
segments of the chain are in turn focused on cost efficiencies and technical 
performance, so the substitution can pose serious threats to the concerned 
companies. They can reduce the risk by offering solutions to business re-
quirements, not only bare infrastructure or components (this could be done 
either by entering other chain segments, or by engineering demand for own 
products: stimulating development of other segments, as Intel did for its 
processors by boosting the development of multimedia applications). 
The bigger the distance within the value chain between two partners, the 
less likely the substitution: diverse chain segments require distinctive capa-
bilities and experiences, while complementors operating in the same seg-
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ment as the chain leader are most susceptible to substitution. Complemen-
tors operating in an area where the chain leader enters, have four strategic 
options: 
• focus and complement the chain leader – by finding new applications, 
adding value to the leader’s solution, and moving with him towards new 
markets; 
• do nothing – with inevitable competition against the stronger partner, 
which can be justified if own installed base is strong and loyal; 
• change position within the same value chain – for example software pro-
viders may work on vertical applications, adding business logic and other 
content elements, and emphasizing the service delivery; 
• move to another value chain – where the existing technology could be re-
used after some modifications, but without radical changes to the under-
lying skill base, and the company decides to join a value chain competing 
against its previous partners. 
Scenario 1: focus and complement
Scenario 2: do nothing
Scenario 3: move within the value chain
Scenario 4: move to another value chain
 
Fig. 17. 4 scenarios for a complementor substituted by a value chain leader 
Each of the scenarios requires acquisition of new skills and thus involves 
additional costs – even in the “do nothing” scenario, the company has to 
improve own sales, marketing and service capabilities to maintain and 
grow its own user base independently. 
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Stronger companies may also choose to work with several value chains, 
or diversify business by pursuing several options at once – this however 
means parallel development and support of products based on multiple 
technology platforms, thus requiring diverse knowledge bases, complex 
testing procedures and needs to regularly adjust to changes of all the sup-
ported platforms. Staying loyal to the existing partner – either by focus and 
complementing his new products, or by moving to news positions within 
the same value chain – means access to a more limited, narrowly-defined 
market, but also better chances to penetrate it and benefit from an estab-
lished relationship with the chain leader, motivated to promote the business 
of his loyal partner. Strategic management literature recommends smaller 
niche players to disinvest instead of defending their focus areas, when ag-
gressive new entrants have superior resources and lower return-on-
investment targets (Porter 1985: 512). Although the postulate to give up ex-
isting product domains and look for new opportunities within the same 
value chain may seem cruel and unjust for small niche players, the follow-
ing section will discuss the benefits of this scenario, presenting examples of 
specific partnerships evolving over time. 
5.3 Evolution of cooperation 
5.3.1 The case of Symantec 
High-tech marketing bestseller „Inside the tornado” offered recommenda-
tions for transforming own business from a niche positions to mass-market 
presence by gradually expanding product and customer bases, approaching 
new niches in a way resembling pushing balls through a bowling alley 
(bowling alley model) and finally, once the installed base is strong and 
product portfolio diversified, radically changing the marketing approach to 
come “inside the tornado” (Moore 1998). Although not every company 
may really aspire for the mass-market leadership (and thus reach the final 
stage of the market development cycle), these recommendations emphasize 
the evolutionary nature of niche strategies. As previous remarks about the 
substitution and commoditization patterns indicated, complementors need 
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to transform their businesses, reacting to changes in the market, often di-
rectly caused by value chain leaders. Returning to the ecological analogy, 
presented earlier in this chapter, ecosystems regularly create new niches, 
but degrade the older ones, “reduced diversity at one level can lead to the 
creation of a stable foundation that enables greater and more meaningful 
diversity at other, sometimes higher, levels” (Iansiti and Levien 2004: 73). 
Strategies of complementors could benefit from the dynamics, as any ex-
pansion of a technological platform means not only destruction of existing 
niches, but also creation of new opportunities for innovation. The benefits 
of this perspective will be presented in the following analysis of relations 
between Microsoft and its partner Symantec. 
Symantec was an important complementor of Microsoft since the early 
1990s, and one of the largest PC software companies, selling developer 
tools, utility and antivirus software. Symantec’s product portfolio was 
changing over time in response to market trends, platform technology de-
velopment and Microsoft’s moves, as consecutive versions of Windows 
and other programs offered functionality, previously available from the 
complementor. 
The partnership was clearly difficult for both parties, which at times were 
making decisions harming their reciprocal businesses, yet were still relying 
on each other. In the middle of the 1990s, Symantec was focused on soft-
ware development tools, Norton utility package, and contact manager Act, 
predecessor of future groupware solutions, in all these areas working only 
with DOS-Windows and Macintosh operating systems. Windows 95 bun-
dled numerous utilities, which before had been offered by third-party ven-
dors including Symantec - but the system launch offered Symantec an op-
portunity to introduce new generation Norton tools, complementing the 
standard Windows functions: Norton Utilities with Disk Doctor, System 
Doctor, Space Wizard (helping locate and remove no longer needed files 
on disk drives) and Speed Disk (optimizing disk’s read and write opera-
tions), Norton Navigator (managing files and FTP transfer), Norton Anti-
virus, and Norton Desktop Administrator (helping system administrators 
migrate multiple PCs to Windows). The popularity of Windows 95 boosted 
Symantec’s sales, even though the company had to give up past sources of 
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revenue (for DOS, Norton Commander was the most popular way of 
browsing and managing files, replaced by Windows’ comparable native 
functionality. 
Microsoft worked with Symantec on dedicated developer tools for the 
new operating system, encouraged the company to offer utilities for NT 
platform, and to commit to support also Windows CE devices. Microsoft 
was however also close with Symantec’s direct competitors.  The company 
offered royalty-free access to Windows source code to antivirus specialist 
McAfee Associates and licensed McAfee’s technologies to include them in 
own Internet server. It cross-licensed tools, agreeing on joint projects with 
development tool vendor Rational, and strengthened relations with Com-
puter Associates, which was competing against Symantec in multiple areas. 
Microsoft decided later to purchase Computer Associates’ InocuLAN anti-
virus product to use it internally, ignoring Symantec’s long track of records 
in comparable solutions for Microsoft platform. Similarly, Symantec en-
tered several domains, which were potentially harmful to Microsoft: inte-
grated its Act with Lotus Notes and Palm, released Java development envi-
ronment and HTML editor, and outlined plans for own videoconferencing 
solution. All these small steps and decisions were disturbing the partner-
ship; moreover Windows 98 included even more bundled functionality, 
previously available at an additional price from Symantec, among others 
backup and recovery tools. At the same time, Symantec modified its strat-
egy, disposing of networking applications and software development tool 
businesses, and consequently focusing on software, which could add value 
to Microsoft products: antivirus, desktop faxing and specialist utilities. Mi-
crosoft rewarded the efforts by licensing entry-level version of Symantec 
WinFax and bundling it with Outlook, what helped increase WinFax’s in-
stalled base and encourage customers to upgrade to the full, paid edition. 
In 2000, Microsoft started acknowledging the significance of antivirus 
protection for its products and services, but apart from Symantec, it worked 
with its competitors (McAfee, NetScreen, Trend Micro and Iron Port), re-
leased own Internet Security and Acceleration (ISA) server for protecting 
corporate networks, and finally entered in the desktop security domain by 
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acquisitions and product releases, substituting many of Symantec’s prod-
ucts. 
The moves could trigger competitive responses from Symantec, and there 
were many other cases, when both companies had different views about the 
market (including contradictory proposals to the U.S. Senate on how to 
fight the wide-spread problem of spam e-mails, or choices of embedded 
systems for security appliances), but the company instead accepted the in-
evitable commoditization of certain product domains, focusing on value-
added solutions and not damaging its relations with Microsoft. Symantec 
released an own security solution as an add-on to ISA (even through the 
technology could also be packaged as ISA’s competitor), enriched product 
portfolio by anti-spam software, and initiated merger discussions with stor-
age application specialist Veritas Software. 
The overview of 10 years of cooperation suggests that the smaller partner 
was many times forced to align his product portfolio with the expanding 
Microsoft’s platform, giving up previously key areas. At the same time, 
Symantec never really abandoned Microsoft’s value chain, realizing the co-
dependence and need to work with this technology as the dominant com-
puter operating system. Despite many missteps, the relationship benefited 
from cumulative trust building and maintained closeness, which in the fig-
ure 18 is represented by the physical distance between the two companies 
at a certain time. Graphical divergence vectors represent situations, when 
one company intentionally makes a decision negatively affecting its part-
ner, or when several seemingly harmless actions jointly have a similar ef-
fect. The latter case refers also to situations, in which Microsoft was not 
clearly signaling real intentions, thus confusing partners. For example, it li-
censed Java from Sun Microsystems, later deciding to promote own 
ActiveX standard for web applets instead – in the meantime, Symantec 
worked on dedicated Java developer tools and maintained them for the fol-
lowing four years. Similarly, Symantec’s investments in personal firewall 
or anti-spyware technologies seemed initially instrumental in promoting 
Windows and its security, but as soon as Microsoft unveiled plans for re-
leasing own counterparts, the companies clashed in the concerned areas. 
Paul Watzlawick, theorist of interpersonal communication, stated that “one 
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cannot not communicate” – even unintentional statements or actions, seem-
ingly not influencing the communication process (or partnership in the case 
discussed here), will nevertheless be perceived, interpreted and acted upon 
by the other party (Craig 1998). Within the broad context of strategies and 
technology development, effects of initially unrelated actions can accumu-
late and change the relationship. The previously described mechanism of 
tacit collusion is not perfect, and corporate strategies cannot be ideally 
aligned without open communication about plans and intentions justifying 
certain decisions. While in most areas these plans were discussed in detail 
with partners such as Symantec, some elements caused confusion and con-
flicts. 
The partnership between Symantec and Microsoft demonstrates also limi-
tations of the traditional analytical framework for dyadic alliances, where 
researchers focus on the timing and number of recurring ties, ignoring their 
qualitative characteristics. The trust in interorganizational relations builds 
up over time, and focus of the joint cooperation evolves. The extent of pos-
sible evolution is best demonstrated by Symantec’s product portfolio: start-
ing with developer tools and contact manager software, later focusing on 
PC utilities, antivirus software, and finally offering integrated enterprise 
security and storage solutions. Every partnership is embedded in historical 
and technological context - effects of single decisions on the relationship 
cannot be understood without this background, moreover even a single de-
cision negatively affecting the partner will not necessarily undermine an ef-
fective partnership. 
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Symantec  Microsoft 
 
Jointly developed MFC developer tools 
 
1994 
Non-disclosure agreements (NT, OLE) 
Jointly developed MFC developer tools 
 
Norton Utilities, Antivirus, Desktop Admin 
Developer tools for OLE and 32-bit API 
Norton pcAnywhere for Windows 95 
Espresso – Java development tool 
 
 
1995 
Royalty-free Windows code for McAfee 
Windows 95 
 
 
Licensing Java from Sun 
Norton Antivirus Scanner free on the website 
Norton File Manager for NT 3.51 
Norton Tools for NT 
Act for Lotus Notes 
Symantec Café – Java development tool 
Act 3.0 for Windows integrated with Word 
pcAnywhere 32 
Expose server management software for NT 
Commitment to Windows CE 
Norton Utilities 2.0 for Windows 95 
Plans for videoconferencing in pcAnywhere 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1996 
Acquisition of Vermeer (Front Page) 
Licensing of antivirus tech from McAfee 
Windows NT 4.0 
Exchange server 
Licensing and development with Rational 
 
 
Tightening integration NT-CA Unicenter 
Windows CE 
 
ActiveX promoted as format for web applets 
Disposal of networking unit to HP 
Norton Safe on the Web – protecting ActiveX 
Norton Antivirus 4 with heuristic technology 
Visual Page for Windows – HTML editor 
 
1997 
 
 
CA InocuLAN purchased for internal use 
Norton System Works for Windows 95/98 
WinFax bundled with Outlook 98 
Act 4.0– support for e-mail and Palm OS 
Visual Café for Java 3.0 
1998 
 
Windows 98 with backup and recovery tools 
WinFax bundled with Outlook 98 
Former CEO testifies for MS in antitrust suit 
Visual Page discontinued 
Norton Antivirus, Utilities, CleenSweep 2000 
Visual Café for Java 4.0 
Act and Visual Café sold 
 
 
1999 
 
Promotion of broadband Internet 
Windows 2000 with remote networking 
Investment in Inprise, joint development 
Antivirus solutions for Palm OS 
Norton tools for Windows ME 
2000 Hotmail virus scanning provided by McAfee 
Web Security – gateway filtering system 
Symantec Firewall/VPN appliance 
 
2001 
 Internet Security and Acceleration Server 
Windows XP 
Gold Certified Program for Security Partners 
Enterprise Firewall./VPN software 
Internet Security 2003 (Antivirus, Firewall) 
Symantec Antivirus for Microsoft ISA 
 
2002 
 
Purchase of NetScreen for internal use 
 
iForce Intrusion Detection appliance with 
Sun 
Proposal to US Senate for addressing spam 
pcAnywhere 11.0 
Acquisition of ON Technology (remote mgt) 
Joining Cisco Network Admission Control 
 
 
 
2003 
Acquisition of RAV Antivirus 
Proposal to US Senate for addressing spam 
 
Joining Microsoft Network Access Protection 
 
Acquisition of BrightMail (anti-spam) 
 
 
 
Plans to merge with Veritas Software 
 
 
 
 
2004 
Network Access Protection initiative 
Windows Marketplace 
Work with IronPort on Hotmail spam filter 
Windows XP Service Pack2 with firewall 
NAP-NAC program integration with Cisco 
Hotmail virus scanning from Trend Micro 
Acquisition of Giant (anti-spyware) 
 
Fig. 18. Relations between Symantec and Microsoft, 1994-1999 – substitution, com-
plementing and cumulative trust building 
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5.3.2 Synchronized strategies of partners 
The metaphor of learning race assumes that partners have precisely defined 
objectives and development roadmaps, and the most successful company 
can learn faster to substitute the other party. The case demonstrated how-
ever, that technological alliances between high-tech value chain leaders and 
their complementors could rather be interpreted as two evolving and syn-
chronized paths, representing the diversification of both firms’ products. 
The model of bowling alley is used to describe the sequence of events, in 
which a niche player gradually extends his product and target market, mov-
ing from the initial niche to other, related segments, by capitalizing on ex-
isting capabilities and product components (Moore 1998: 38-39). While 
consequently maintaining its niche character, the company goes through a 
“bowling alley”, diversifying into new niches until it has a sufficient in-
stalled base to consider approaching mainstream customers. 
The limitation of the bowling alley model is however the existence of the 
value chain leader, who may in parallel extend own technological platform 
to capture additional customer segments and undermine his complemen-
tor’s strengths. The complementor certainly has to go through his own 
bowling alley to maintain technological lead and generate revenues from 
new customers, but he also needs to sacrifice some of the segments, which 
he used to harvest in the past, and which become captured by the expand-
ing platform of the value chain leader. These segments do no longer offer 
new revenue opportunities for the complementor – while the future growth 
source lies in the ongoing cooperation with the stronger partner, so that 
both companies can move towards new applications and markets. Partner-
ship-based technology roadmapping and strategic plans of complementors 
should take into consideration the interests and intentions of the value chain 
leader. While this attitude may seem over-submissive, it presents a very ef-
fective way of exploring future opportunities and maintaining close links 
with the technology platform leader. 
The level of synchronization between partners’ bowling alleys corre-
sponds to the intimacy of the partnership, but also indicated potential con-
flict areas. Incidental collisions in the bowling alleys change product 
strategies – usually the smaller company gives up some of existing cus-
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tomer segments and applications, and this implicit agreement over strategic 
directions resembles the tacit collusion described by economists (Jaya-
chandran et al. 1999: 51; Martin 2002: 294, 327). The process could also be 
presented as a metaphorical dance, where one partner leads, and the other 
one agrees to be led – without the arrangement, wrong steps, different 
rhythms and struggles for control would turn the dancing into a particularly 
unpleasant experience. As every dance, the cooperation may however end, 
if partners decide to terminate it – from that moment on, strategies no 
longer have to be synchronized. This perspective differs from the concept 
of partner attachment (Inkpen and Beamish 1997: 194-195), emotional 
linkages and loyalty, developing over time. 
Core capabilities, converted in successful products, may turn into core ri-
gidities, becoming dysfunctional and inhibiting future developments if the 
concerned companies do not innovate (Leonard-Barton 1992). Particularly 
firms in the dynamically changing high-tech market have to go through 
constant change and renewal processes - partnering with an “aggressive” 
value chain leader additionally stimulates the innovativeness by substitu-
tion and commoditization of older product generations, accompanied by the 
creation of attractive new opportunities. Former Symantec’s chairman 
Gordon Eubanks, testifying at Microsoft’s antitrust trial in 1999, said that 
in the software industry, “you either have to be aggressively looking to-
ward the future or the future will overtake you. You don’t have time to rest 
on your laurels and rake in the gold” (Wasserman 1999b). Six years later, 
when Microsoft entered the antivirus market and analysts interpreted this as 
an upcoming war with the partners, Symantec’s CEO John Thomson ex-
plained to investors that: “we applaud Microsoft’s security initiatives. They 
are very necessary but, in my opinion, not sufficient for large enterprises. 
They don’t offer a cross-platform heterogeneous solution and genetically 
they may be incapable of doing so. That’s why Symantec and other pur-
pose-built security companies will always be a better alternative” (Syman-
tec 2005b). 
In other context, he added that: “I think anyone in the software business 
is inevitably going to compete with Microsoft because Microsoft has such a 
large footprint in the industry. And for those of us who support the Win-
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dows environment, in the infrastructure space, you’re going to end up com-
peting with Microsoft. That’s inevitable. It is inevitable based upon the in-
terest that we have to innovate around the Windows environment, and it is 
inevitable based upon the revenue growth, appetite, and interest that Micro-
soft has. And so them as a competitor and partner is not something that 
anyone in the industry should find to be unique or different” (Symantec 
2005a).  
The words are in a surprising congruence with opinions of Microsoft’s 
Bill Gates, who in an interview with CNET News.com in March 2005 ex-
plained: “The history of Windows is that we do something in the platform 
and then there are some things missing that sell in high volume as add-ons. 
If a broad set of people want the thing, then in some future version (we add 
it). We're very clear; we show people, we tell them and then we build it in 
the system. People used to buy TCP/IP stacks. People used to buy basic 
backup software. People used to buy fonts. At least nominally, people paid 
for browsers... When you come into the world of software you know that if 
you are up at a higher level and you have something superimportant, it's 
going to move down, down, down and eventually be part of every copy of 
the operating system if it is something superimportant. Security is a very 
broad topic. There are so many different pieces of security, which creates 
immense opportunity for people like Symantec - if they keep innovating. 
There will be some things that they do that will move into the platform. 
We're very open with those guys. We talk to them every day, massively... 
We will get the benefit of the platform getting better and those partners 
continuing to add value” (Fried 2005). 
The discussion reveals also that complementors should be pro-active – 
they cannot always rely on value chain leaders and expect them to promote 
and sell specialist products. Despite their reliance on stronger partners, 
niche players need to excel both in product development and marketing. 
Product innovations are needed to continuously extend capabilities and 
technology, so that new niches could be addressed, protecting the compa-
nies from being simply substituted by chain leaders. Marketing efforts help 
approach target customers – even though there was an obvious fit between 
Windows platform and Symantec’s products, Microsoft had also other 
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complementing alternatives. Symantec was always competing against other 
Microsoft’s partners, so it had to stay close to customers, promote products 
and establish appropriate distribution channels (e.g. by building relations 
with OEMs, shipping the software with every sold computer). Niche play-
ers need to think, how to promote their value propositions across the entire 
high-tech value chain, combining them with products of the chain leader 
and companies from other segments. As previously demonstrated for 
DoCoMo’s trusted partners, they were in constant competition, forced to 
innovate and promote own offerings, as the value chain leader was inten-
tionally maintaining relations with several comparable companies. Niche 
players need to add value to the business of the value chain leader and his 
end customers, but also make all other involved parties realize the value of 
complementary offering. 
 6 Contractors 
6.1 Service orientation in the high-tech value 
chain 
6.1.1 Service as product alternative 
The present chapter concerns the last strategic role in the high-tech value 
chain: contractors or service providers. Such companies maintain no con-
tacts with end customers, working for other chain participants, who use 
their manufacturing capacities or programming skills in own product de-
velopment processes. Recent developments proved that contractors from 
India or Taiwan were able to capitalize on operational efficiencies and 
partner linkages, gradually establishing strong competence bases, own 
products and brands, and in some cases even turning against their previous 
corporate sponsors. Established electronics and software vendors rely heav-
ily on external contractors, exposing themselves to potential threats of ver-
tical integration, which potentially could be more disruptive than the substi-
tution patterns in relations between chain leaders and their complementors. 
The distinction between tangible products (such as hardware), informa-
tion goods (software, content including business knowledge, reference 
models, processes or data structures) and accompanying services has not 
always been obvious in the history of the industry – in the 1950s, IBM was 
offering bundled solutions, including software, maintenance and training 
services in the initial price of hardware, and only the decision of anti-trust 
authorities forced the company to abandon the bundling practices and offer 
opportunities for other players (Attewell 1992: 11-12). Similarly, early pat-
terns of I.C.T. use by client organizations involved working with external 
data processing bureaus, owning mainframes with necessary software solu-
tions, and delivering transaction processing services (Attewell 1992: 9-10) 
– ownership of technical infrastructure has not always been regarded as es-
sential, what explains the current popularity of outsourcing. The entire IT 
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services and software industry emerged from custom software development 
and “recycling”, where generic, standardized software platforms were tai-
lored to the requirements of individual client organizations (Attewell 1992: 
12). 
The historical context helps understand why nowadays all high-tech 
product businesses involve also service elements – from after-sales support 
to implementation, maintenance and product modifications. Software com-
panies supplement their solutions by services, including ongoing technical 
support and product updates, purchased by customers on an annual basis, 
forming recurring revenues. A recent analysis of revenue structures for ma-
jor enterprise software vendors revealed that the share of service revenues 
increased dramatically in the recent years, exceeding the product revenue 
levels (Cusumano 2004: 37-42). Another tendency is the growing diversifi-
cation of product platforms, eliminating the needs for external services – 
developers of standard systems supplement them with modules, addressing 
the requirements of specific narrowly-defined groups of customers (includ-
ing vertical solutions of ERP vendors, described in the previous chapter, 
developed to cope with the growing commoditization of the underlying 
platforms), or helping speed-up the implementation process (by offering 
recommended methods, toolsets and pre-configured modules – e.g. ASAP 
methodology from SAP, facilitating the implementation of its product, or 
comparable Fast Forward methodology from Oracle). The distinction be-
tween product and service is blurring, as customers look for complex solu-
tions, not simply off-the-shelf products. This view of industrial purchasing 
is prevalent in modern marketing, following the whole product model, 
where service functions as a natural “product augmentation”, desired by 
customers (Levitt 1980: 85-88), and has earlier been presented as the basis 
for the high-tech value chain. 
The following discussion will however focus on a broader understanding 
of the term “service”, presenting it as a possible strategic orientation for 
participants of high-tech value chains. Companies may decide to act as 
“servants”, working as contractors of other vendors, having no or only lim-
ited contact with end users. In this perspective, every segment of the value 
chain can function as a service: software code written specifically for an-
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other company, hardware assembled based on orders from other vendors, 
chips manufactured as specified by their designers. In the recent years, en-
tire national industries have experienced stunning growth rates thanks to 
the adoption of service orientation, with the most prominent examples of 
Indian software developers and Taiwanese electronics manufacturers. The 
strategy can be as profitable as the pursuit of the two other strategic orien-
tations in the high-tech value chain, but has its distinctive rules, not always 
realized by players. Moreover, successful service providers can gradually 
move towards niche player or even chain leader positions, if they consider 
it appropriate, benefiting from the competencies built at a relatively low 
cost and risk. 
High-tech firms use multiple sales models, while specific models are par-
ticularly well-suited for particular value chain positions: 
• direct sales - the ideal model for a value chain leader, maintaining close 
contacts with users, and thus managing the entire platform (by recom-
mending appropriate add-ons and guiding the customers through techno-
logical changes) and its installed base (inducing lock-ins and customer 
loyalty, and controlling contacts between niche players and platform us-
ers); 
• indirect sales – the model matches the strategies of value chain comple-
mentors, who can tap into chain leader’s installed base and reduce chan-
nel conflicts, receiving signals from their stronger partner or own dis-
tributors about possible overlaps in technology roadmaps or platform 
changes; 
• subcontracting or technology licensing - correspond to the role of con-
tractor, doing his work for another value chain player. 
The models fit precisely into the recommended strategies of value chain 
players – but the actual sales processes may differ from the model situa-
tions. For example, Microsoft decided to reduce possible channel conflicts 
and let partners distribute software and maintain contacts with end custom-
ers (with the exception of key customers, where Microsoft keeps the prim-
ing role). 
Interestingly, even companies offering packaged products can adopt the 
service orientation through technology licensing – a good example is the 
186      6 Contractors 
 
British software developer Picsel Technologies, provider of a specialist 
document viewer for mobile phones and portable computers. Picsel was 
disadvantaged due to its relative late entry into an already crowded market 
– but the company decided to adopt the service orientation, targeting other 
high-tech value chain players instead of end users. The company licensed 
its technology to electronics firms, including Motorola, NEC, Sharp and 
Sony, as well as telecom operators NTT Docomo and China Unicom, who 
embedded Picsel Browser in their devices, establishing its installed base 
and allowing Picsel to focus on core development, not large scale market-
ing, usually costly for a small software startup. 
Another example of service orientation is offered by strategies of compa-
nies, developing mobile phone chipsets. Qualcomm is an aspiring value 
chain leader, trying to build compelling value propositions around its chips 
with complementary infrastructure and software platform BREW, ARM 
prefers the position of a complementor, working closely with software ven-
dors and electronics companies (being the processor of choice for mobile 
phones from Nokia, LG, Philips, Samsung and Sony-Ericsson), while Re-
nesas Technology and Yozan were pursuing a more service-oriented strat-
egy, relying on contracts for custom chipset development from NTT 
DoCoMo12. Customization is the underlying principle of service orientation 
– contractors usually offer tailored solutions for specific partners based on 
underlying technology platforms and components, optimizing costs and 
benefiting from experience effects. 
Similarly, also hardware manufacturers may decide not to use their own 
brands and rely instead on orders from other firms. Handset makers work-
ing with NTT DoCoMo benefited from regular orders placed by the tele-
com operator and distribution of phones through his retail network. Tai-
wanese firms dominate the global consumer high-tech market, but their 
products are sold under the brands of leading Western and Japanese elec-
tronics companies, who rely on them to design, develop and manufacture 
the devices. Many of the firms were established hardware product vendors 
(at least in their local markets), but reoriented their strategies witnessing 
                                           
12 Yozan exited the semiconductor business in 2002, becoming an Internet Service Pro-
vider. 
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commoditization of products, decreasing margins and needs for substantial 
investments to build brands in consumer markets. Similarly for Japanese 
electronics companies, the opportunity to work with DoCoMo and benefit-
ing from repeating handset orders during the economic recession was at-
tractive even if they were not able to actively promote their brands and con-
trol all aspects of the end customer experience. 
For companies using contractors, the externalization can be particularly 
useful to deal with mature or declining technologies, as it helps reduce 
costs and risks of maintaining them (Roberts and Liu 2001: 28-30). The 
cooperation can take several forms, ranging from a scenario where the fo-
cal company provides detailed technical specification, through a contrac-
tor’s involvement in the design of components, up to the cases, where the 
contractor is responsible for the entire problem solving process related to a 
product’s component or an assigned project (Sobrero and Roberts 2002: 
170). 
Japanese supply chains in automobile sector were traditionally based on 
close involvement of suppliers in the design process of the final product, 
and DoCoMo’s case presented a parallel from the telecommunications and 
electronics sectors. American organizations followed a different route, ini-
tially relocating relatively simple assembly operations to neighboring low 
wage countries such as Mexico, Puerto Rico or the Philippines, driven by 
the need to reduce cost of the concerned processes (Amoribieta et al. 2001: 
130). Later Taiwan and China emerged as important supply markets, and in 
2003, all forms of contract manufacturing represented about 17% of 
world’s total electronics production (Electronics Weekly 2004). 
The scope of externalization was gradually extended to encompass not 
only manufacturing operations, driven by cost advantages resulting from 
effects of scale and relatively lower salaries, but also knowledge-based re-
search and development activities. While the relocation of corporate R&D 
centers to countries with abundant and skilled labor force became an im-
portant element of internationalizations strategies already in the 1980s (Pis-
ano 1990), the idea to spin off the knowledge-intensive tasks is relatively 
novel. It is certainly more risky than the relocation of production, as 
knowledge and innovation are critical sources of competitive advantage. 
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While transaction cost theory helps explain the economic rationale behind 
R&D outsourcing, its impact on organizational knowledge bases is more 
problematic, especially when the ownership of new knowledge, generated 
based on a specific contract, is discussed (Pisano 1990: 159-160): not eve-
rything can be protected by intellectual property rights, and contractors can 
benefit from knowledge spillovers, gaining experiences, which could en-
able them to work on similar problems with other clients. 
Empirical studies indicate that R&D outsourcing is increasingly used to 
solve the problems of R&D budget reductions and to increase the time-to-
market in new product development processes - surprisingly also for essen-
tial technologies (Kimzey and Kurokawa 2002), what could make the com-
panies critically dependent on their subcontractors. 
6.1.2 Example of contact manufacturing 
The increasing use of outsourcing transforms supply chains and changes 
the ownership of intellectual property rights. In electronics manufacturing, 
service providers are “becoming not just the screwdrivers and soldering 
irons behind the high-tech economy, but the brains as well” (Shankland 
2000). Intellectual property used to be an important differentiator for 
OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers – large electronics companies), 
selling branded, in-house developed products – but the IP is nowadays mi-
grating to component suppliers and contractors, while OEMs loose abilities 
to differentiate themselves from competitors, face decreasing margins and 
are attacked by newcomers, as the entry barriers to electronics markets are 
particularly low: any company can rely on a service partner for product de-
velopment and manufacturing. Contract manufacturers from the 1980s 
were operating in low wage countries and working for dedicated clients-
partners. These companies gradually transformed into Electronic Manufac-
turing Services (EMS) firms, offering additional specialist services, opera-
tional efficiencies and technological flexibility. They were working with 
multiple clients, focusing on economies of scale and volume pricing. Major 
OEMs adapted their business models to the opportunity by reducing own 
manufacturing capacity and relying on external manufacturers, who in turn 
were willingly taking over their clients’ plants and opening factories close 
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to key markets. Table 11 lists the largest EMS firms in 2000, presenting 
their dependence on small groups of corporate clients, as well as relatively 
low percentages of production capacities in low wage countries. These in-
efficiencies made the EMS providers vulnerable to attacks from new Asian 
competitors. 
 
 Solectron 
Flextro-
nics 
Celestica SCI 
Systems 
Sanmina 
Jabil 
Circuit 
revenues 
2000 (mln 
USD) 
16,999 11,224 9,752 9,151 4,538 3,998 
% of reve-
nues from 
10 largest 
customers 
66% 62% 86% >70% 49% 75% 
customers 
accounting 
for over 
10% of 
revenues 
Ericsson 
(13%), 
Nortel 
Networks 
(12%) 
Ericsson 
(26%) 
Sun  
Micro-
systems 
(20%), 
IBM 
(20%), 
Lucent 
Technolo-
gies (10%) 
HP (10%), 
Dell 
(10%), 
Nortel 
Networks 
(10%), 
Echostar 
Commu-
nications 
(10%) 
NA 
Cisco 
(23%), 
Dell 
(13%) 
capacity in 
low cost 
locations 
(China, 
Mexico, 
Eastern 
Europe) 
15% 30% 13% 21% 8% 28% 
Table 11. The largest EMS firms, 2000. Data source: Fleck and Craig 2001: 54-56 
At the turn of centuries, a new group of knowledge-based service provid-
ers emerged – Original Design Manufacturers (ODMs), mostly located on 
the small island of Taiwan. They are focused on R&D management, not 
manufacturing efficiencies, offering OEMs ready-to-reuse products and 
product reference designs. In 2004, about 80% of all laptop computers sold 
worldwide were actually manufactured by Taiwanese companies (Wendin 
et al. 2004: 7), but an average computer user is not familiar with the names 
of even the largest ODMs, as their products are branded by well-known 
electronics companies. When Dell shifted in 2001 its orders for computers 
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from the American EMS Jabil Circuit to Taiwanese ODMs Compal and 
Quanta, other Western firms followed the trend and traditional EMS com-
panies ended up with unused manufacturing capacities in expensive loca-
tions and financial troubles, as their revenues were strongly dependent on 
relations with individual large clients. The largest EMS players experi-
enced low or negative profits in the years 2001-2002 (Wendin et al. 2004: 
10-11), and decided to supplement their business portfolios by own ODM 
divisions. ODMs are in turn able to prosper due to a different market ap-
proach: although they work like EMS firms exclusively with OEMs and are 
dependent on large orders, they can capitalize on economies of scale by 
working with several clients on similar products: generic technological de-
sign of a product is customized and offered in multiple versions, with 
slightly different industrial designs and functionalities. As a result, the 
same base technology, developed by an ODM, is used in seemingly differ-
ent products from several competing OEMs. 
Apple
Compaq
Dell
Fujitsu
Gateway
HP
IBM
NEC
Sony
Toshiba
Arima
Asustek
Compal
First International Computer
Hon Hai
Inventec
Quanta
Wistron
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Fig. 19. Network of relationships between laptop computer vendors and ODMs. Data 
sources: Werner Heuser, Laptop and Notebook Manufacturer-OEM Relation Matrix, 
http://tuxmobil.org/laptop_oem.html, updated with information from multiple other 
sources in February 2005 
ODMs are additionally able to improve product designs through relations 
with both component suppliers (Taiwan is the global leader in component 
design and manufacturing) and EMS firms (ODMs usually work with 
trusted contract manufacturers in mainland China). As a result, they can op-
timize cost, size and technical parameters such as energy consumption – 
and practically manage the entire supply chain, leaving to OEMs only the 
branding and sales of goods, designed, manufactured and delivered to 
them. A manager in a large electronics company can simply meet an ODM 
representative, go through a catalogue of industrial and functional designs, 
select any model he wishes, negotiate commercial terms and wait for the 
delivery of the packaged product with his company’s logo imprinted to as-
signed distribution centers. The convenience comes at a price: ODMs grow 
in power, and OEMs are increasingly dependent on them, reducing own 
R&D activities and relying on third-party IPRs. 
Offshore development and manufacturing of high-tech products is an ob-
vious scenario for all electronics hardware vendors. The cooperation pat-
terns are still heavily dependent on individual transactions, for example 
laptop manufacturers are frequently rotated for subsequent product lines, as 
the technology behind a laptop computer is commoditized, and cost re-
mains the major decision factor. Table 12 lists EMS and ODM partners of 
Apple Computer for various product categories – for specialist offerings, 
key to Apple’s strategy, such as the portable digital music player iPod, 
partnership patterns are more stable. Recently, product designs offered by 
ODMs include not only low-end mature technologies, but also newest elec-
tronics gadgets, as the companies understand that innovation is key to es-
tablishing long-term relations with specific high-tech partners and main-
taining high profit margins. 
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Product group Model Contractor 
Aspire 1300 QUANTA Computer 
eMac Hon Hai Precision Ind. 
Asusalpha Computer. 
iBook 
ASUSTeK Computer 
iMac QUANTA Computer 
Mac mini Foxconn Electronics 
Asusalpha Computer 
ASUSTeK Computer 
Compal Electronics 
Hon Hai Precision Ind. 
Powerbook 
QUANTA Computer 
Notebook com-
puters 
Power Mac Hon Hai Precision Ind. 
iMac Hon Hai Precision Ind. 
Desktop computers 
Mac G5 Hon Hai Precision Ind. 
AirPort Express 
(networking) 
Hon Hai Precision Ind. 
Ability Enterprise Abico 
Computer periph-
erals Isight (digital 
camera) ViewQuest Technologies 
Hon Hai Precision Ind. 
iPod 
Inventec Appliance 
iPod Mini Inventec Appliance 
iPod Photo Inventec Appliance 
iPod Shuffle ASUSTeK Computer 
Portable music 
players 
iPod U2 Inventec Appliance 
Table 12. List of contractors, designing and manufacturing Apple’s products. Data 
source: Taiwan High Tech Research, Apple’s OEM-ODM relationships, January 25, 
2005, http://www.emsnow.com/npps/story.cfm?ID=9270 
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Nokia
Motorola
NEC
Siemens
Sony-Ericsson
Alcatel
Philips
Panasonic
LG Electronics
Arima
Asustek
BenQ
Compal
HTC
Lite-On
Quanta
Microcell
Chi Mei
 
Fig. 20. Network of relationships between mobile phones vendors and ODMs. Data 
sources: iSuppli handset supply analysis, September 2004, 
http://www.emsnow.com/npps/story.cfm?ID=6903, updated from multiple other sources 
in February 2005 
Microsoft was actively using ODMs to promote its operating system for 
portable devices such as PocketPCs, smart phones and smart displays. 
Microsoft was not able to convince major brands to use Windows CE in 
their appliances. Companies were afraid of the monopoly threat, and 
preferred to keep their options open by working with several platforms – 
but the development of advanced products would require substantial 
investment, which could not be recouped without strategic commitments. 
Telecom operators turned out to be a similar deadlock, focusing on 
telecommunications standards and leaving the decision about handset 
design to hardware companies. Microsoft discovered however that major 
electronics companies were sourcing their products from Taiwanese ODMs 
– an alliance with ODMs, providing reference designs and product 
customization services, could therefore be more effective than individual 
co-option of the major brand makers. In the middle of the 1990s, Microsoft 
and Intel were jointly developing reference designs for new generation 
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oping reference designs for new generation products, which were subse-
quently shared with companies such as Dell, HP or Compaq, using them to 
manufacture final products. Several years later, Microsoft spotted impor-
tant shifts in the hardware industry, and decided to work with ODMs in-
stead: the company was ready to invest to train and support selected Tai-
wanese and Korean companies, which were subsequently preparing 
multiple product designs for new devices, and actively selling their con-
cepts to major brands. Importantly, the activities formed their core busi-
ness, so Microsoft did not need to worry about their motivation to cooper-
ate on product development and promotion among largest electronics and 
telecom companies, as long as there were no threats from alternative tech-
nology platform makers. 
Taiwanese ODMs turned out to be excellent allies for Microsoft - highly 
popular smart phones, launched in the recent years and branded by Orange, 
mmO2 and T-Mobile, were developed and manufactured by the most im-
portant Taiwanese partner of Microsoft, HTC. Cost of developing such 
high-end products is substantial, and every telecom operator or hardware 
maker may only sell limited quantities in his market – but HTC was able to 
achieve synergies and economies of scale, customizing the designs for spe-
cific clients, while still benefiting from the same initial R&D investment. 
Partners of ODMs can quickly offer new specialized products even in small 
series, diversifying at low cost and risk. Nokia remained the last major 
phone maker not using ODMs, but even this mobile giant finally decided to 
place its first order with BenQ in 2004. BenQ crowned its strategic trans-
formation with a surprising acquisition of Siemens’ mobile phone arm to 
become one of the leading global handset manufacturers. Meanwhile, 
ODMs gained substantial experiences and strong bargaining positions – 
nowadays, NTC works also closely with Microsoft’s direct competitor in 
the mobile phone market Palm, and BenQ releases own branded products, 
competing with its previous clients. 
6.1.3 Example of contract software development 
Changes in the software industry parallel the above described tendencies in 
the electronics market. Major software vendors outsource certain develop-
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ment activities to foreign specialist firms, starting with relatively simple 
tasks such as product testing, but quickly moving towards even core devel-
opment areas. Contract software developers (nowadays also referred to as 
offshore developers, as they tend to be located abroad) belong to a wider 
category of IT service companies, encompassing other also types of busi-
nesses such as: 
• IT consulting companies - providing advice and delivering projects to 
corporate customers; 
• system integrators - focused on custom development to integrate various 
technologies for specific customers; 
• vertically integrated IT services organizations - which offer complex so-
lutions including own hardware and software; 
• IT outsourcers - divided into:  
− companies specializing in managed services -  technical administration 
of customer’s IT infrastructure; 
− Application Service Providers (ASPs) -  supplementing the manage-
ment of clients’ infrastructure by own offering, e.g. standard e-mail, 
document archiving or accounting systems, attracting small and me-
dium size organizations; 
− Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) firms – taking over entire busi-
ness processes such as customer service or payroll processing. 
The typology remains problematic, with many overlaps and confusing 
terminology – for example, the term “system integrators”, which once used 
to be applied to specialized firms actually integrating diverse, incompatible 
technologies for customers, nowadays tends to denote all types of IT ser-
vices organizations, implementing technology solutions for their clients. 
Boundaries are also blurring between consulting companies and outsourc-
ers, as managed services and BPO seem to be natural successors of previ-
ous implementation services, requiring similar skills and technologies. Ad-
ditionally, vertically integrated IT services organizations such as IBM, HP 
or Fujitsu, are no longer selling proprietary solutions only, trying rather to 
earn money from a wide variety of technology platforms. 
Alternatively, IT services companies could also be divided into several 
groups depending on their focus on distinctive stages of the process of or-
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ganizational innovation with IT, described by Ramiller and Swanson 
(2003: 8-9)13: 
• development phase – firms providing services to developers of high-tech 
solutions, helping them build products for end customers, and selling ser-
vices such as custom development; 
• comprehension and adoption phases – companies selling to end custom-
ers complex systems, end-to-end value chain solutions, through costly 
and time-consuming sales processes requiring them to offer visions and 
business reasons to adopt the innovation; 
• implementation phase – providers of consultancy and technical services, 
dedicated to a specific technology platform already selected by the cus-
tomer, benefiting from the sales job done usually by another party; 
• assimilation phase – companies helping customers effectively use the 
implemented technologies through customization, development of add-on 
modules, training, or support services; 
• phase of everyday use – firms providing outsourcing services to optimize 
maintenance costs of implemented platforms. 
Each of the phases calls for distinctive sales approaches, differing in 
marketing techniques and types of sales arguments. Surprisingly, the under-
lying technology-related capabilities are common for all types of compa-
nies – knowledge of a specific technology platform can be embedded in 
various services, ranging from the implementation of the platform for end 
user organizations to the development of connector modules for vendors of 
other systems, enabling integration with the platform. Financially stronger 
companies can focus on the comprehension and adoption phases, working 
with customers to convince them to purchase complex solutions – while 
smaller players are able to successfully sell their services by focusing on 
other phases of the IT innovation process. 
The development phase is particularly attractive for startups: the target 
customer group is precisely defined as other companies in the same value 
chain (both chain leader and complementors), sharing similar specialist 
                                           
13 The original Ramiller and Swanson’s (2003) process of organizational innovation 
with IT does not include the phases of system development and everyday use. 
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terminology, knowing the technologies and understanding the challenges of 
specific development tasks. Small companies initially working as con-
tracted developers for other high-tech companies, can later offer services to 
end customers, in a way similar to Indian offshore software firms, which 
made subsequent steps towards infrastructure management, custom com-
ponent development for non-technology clients, and later fully fledged im-
plementation services or even offering packaged software products. Just 
like ODMs, the offshore developers were able to establish competence 
bases, strong brands and customer contacts to pose threats to some of their 
former clients. 
Ambitious small companies can start their business by offering specialist 
services to other high-tech firms, reducing the need for initial marketing 
investments, and later becoming self-sufficient at a much lower cost and 
risk than in other scenarios. There are many parallel developments in off-
shore software development and contract electronics manufacturing. In 
both cases, contractors emerged by working for major market players and 
focusing on close relations, efficient operations, low costs and flexibility. 
These companies were maturing, establishing competence bases and gain-
ing more bargaining power, as the partners were increasing reliance on 
their capabilities – and finally the sources of added value and intellectual 
property shifted to the contractors. 
Similar dynamics may govern the strategies of companies in various 
segments of the high-tech value chain. Among component makers, there 
are numerous service-oriented firms, including chip foundries (manufactur-
ing semiconductors, based on specifications and orders from other compa-
nies) and fabeless IC designers (counterparts of ODMs, focused on R&D 
of new chip prototypes). Telecommunications providers work with contrac-
tors, outsourcing specialized network services such as location-based offer-
ings to third-parties. Innovative startups may act as Virtual Network Opera-
tors, who use network infrastructure of another company to offer own 
services (although the name VNO is usually associated with firms entering 
into agreements with existing telecom operators, the successful IP teleph-
ony firm Skype adopted the VNO approach without formally allying with 
infrastructure owners, by simply integrating its technology with existing 
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Internet and fixed telephony networks). Large Internet or telecom firms can 
also act as bandwidth brokers, using infrastructure of their partners in some 
regions – American broadband Internet providers in the late 1990s were of-
fering unified web access services on national or state levels by using lines 
owned and maintained by multiple local companies; similarly, in scarcely 
populated areas mobile phone providers may agree to jointly share the 
same base stations. Finally, content providers aggregate content from mul-
tiple suppliers, who work for them, and business knowledge offered by ma-
jor consultancies is often based on inputs from subcontracted third-parties, 
helping with data collection, analysis, or other specialist skills. 
Infra-
structure  
EMS,
ODMs 
Components
chip foundries,
fabeless IC
designers
Software  
contract  
developers 
(including  
offshore)   
Services 
BPOs,
VNOs,   
ASPs
Content   
suppliers of 
content,
aggregators
Devices  
EMS,     
ODMs
 
Fig. 21. Types of contractor companies in the high-tech value chain 
6.2 Strategy of a contractor 
6.2.1 Value disciplines 
Every element of the high-tech value chain can be provided as a service. 
The service orientation requires focal companies to offer something attrac-
tive for potential partners to facilitate their make-or-buy decisions. This dif-
fers from the strategies of complementors, who focus on positioning, pro-
moting and selling products to end customers (even if they use indirect 
sales model, the “packaging” of technological products needs to be cus-
tomer-centric). Service-oriented firms need to realize potential sources of 
competitive advantages, which could guarantee repetitiveness of sales to 
specific clients and high project retention rates, instead of facing the same 
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uncertainty in every new bid. Only such continuity would allow them to 
build competencies and benefit from the experience curve effects14. 
Treacy and Wiersema (1993) offered a useful framework to analyze 
sources of competitive advantage, dubbed value disciplines. They argued 
that emerging market leaders are able to outperform rivals by redefining the 
notion of value for the customer, raising his expectations and matching 
them with own offerings (Treacy and Wiersema 1993: 84). Three funda-
mental identified orientations or value disciplines were: operational excel-
lence, customer intimacy and product leadership (Treacy and Wiersema 
1993: 92). Operational excellence means focus on price and convenience 
for the customer (not merely cost leadership), and is rooted in the assump-
tion that excellent operations should meet and even exceed customer de-
mands, among others through the widest selection of mass-customized 
goods (Pine II et al. 1993), direct no-hassle sales, as well as reduction of in-
termediaries and other costs through channel integration. Customer inti-
macy focuses on profound understanding of needs, detailed market seg-
mentation and flexibility in customizing own offering to address specific 
requirements better than other players. Finally, product leadership equals 
continuous innovation in product development. The value disciplines are 
not exclusive and some companies may excel in more than one of them at 
the same time – as the further discussion of the Indian offshore software 
developers will demonstrate, they were broadening the scope of activities 
to address new markets by focusing on additional value disciplines.  
The options available for service providers within the high-tech value 
chain include therefore: 
• focus on a unique technology subset, product or component types (prod-
uct leadership or innovation), 
• close alliance with one strong partner, who could guarantee continuous 
orders (customer intimacy), 
• competition through superior processes, resulting in quality, cost savings 
and flexibility in offered services (operational excellence). 
                                           
14 This corresponds to the popular concept of relationship marketing, interpreting an or-
ganization as a “servant” of customers, and proposing to re-define its domain a ser-
vice business (Grönroos 1996: 9). 
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Each of these three options can lead to competitive advantage over other 
players – product companies transforming into contractors in the high-tech 
value chain would probably try to use their existing competences to claim 
innovativeness, while newcomers might initially prefer not to invest in any 
specific technology, focusing on operational excellence (including superior 
project management skills for software companies or quality control and 
high-availability for manufacturers). Trusted relationship with a larger 
partner is also a good starting point, and such an embedded relation often 
emerges from earlier personal contacts of the firm’s founder. The following 
discussion of the strategies of Indian IT services companies and Taiwanese 
ODMs will help explain the scenarios. 
Repetitiveness of transactions helps build competence bases and optimize 
costs, enabling firms to extend the scope of business by pursuing additional 
value disciplines and thus strengthening their competitiveness. It was the 
case of the largest Indian IT services firms, which started their international 
operations as low-cost contractors of American companies, later growing 
and offering a wide-range of services (ranging from contracted software 
development, through electronics design to IT implementation projects for 
end-user organizations). The ongoing revenue stream from major custom-
ers helped them also improve the internal processes – the Indians became 
obsessed with project quality, launching internal initiatives, adapting im-
plementation methodologies, developing internal quality control systems 
and applying for various relevant certifications - this determination could 
only be compared with Japanese automobile manufacturers. They were also 
committed to knowledge and innovation management, maintaining R&D 
expenditures on levels relatively high for service companies, documenting 
customer references, actively collecting lessons learned in projects and 
preparing packaged service offerings, with reusable components and brand 
names, positioned as unique and difficult to imitate. 
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Table 13. Revenues of the largest international and Indian IT services companies. Fi-
nancial data in thousands USD. Financial and employment data from: corporate annual 
reports, from the most recent reports as of March 2005. Market share data from Gartner 
Dataquest, February 2005. (*) Gartner’s estimate. (**) own estimate for market share 
calculated as proportion between IT service revenues and global IT services market 
value, indicated by Gartner. Gartner’s market share calculations deviate from calcula-
tions based on the actual corporate revenues. Foreign exchange rates used: 1$=106¥, 
1$=0.74 €, 1$ = 43.4 Rps 
Nowadays, after several years of continuous growth, the Indian firms 
successfully compete against their Western counterparts, while maintaining 
cost advantages of the offshore location. Table 13 compares the largest In-
dian IT services organizations and their foreign competitors – an important 
difference between these two groups is the scope of offered services, as the 
global organizations derive most of their revenues from customer imple-
mentation projects and recently also outsourcing, while the Indians con-
tinue working as subcontractors for other high-tech companies in parallel to 
projects for non-technology end-customer organizations. 
6.2.2 Customer intimacy 
Customer intimacy will be discussed as the first value discipline, as the 
embedded relations were the initial sources of first foreign contracts for 
Infosys and its local competitors. The intimacy enabled offshore companies 
to establish new revenue streams and pursue close, long-term ties with key 
clients or partners, guaranteeing business stability and growth. The rela-
tions were developed on multiple levels, involving numerous part-time 
marketers, technical employees having contacts with clients and influenc-
ing their experiences, who were not formally parts of the traditionally de-
fined sales or marketing personnel (Gummesson 1991: 60), so that the en-
tire organization was guided by the same customer-centric principles. The 
intimacy and trust are built over time through ongoing interactions, positive 
project experiences and mutual understanding, so that first confidence-
building contacts can be followed by large projects and subsequent syner-
gistic embedded ties (Rajkumar and Mani 2001: 71). 
The example of Infosys demonstrates impressive customer retention rates 
and substantial percentage of repeat business revenue, while the business 
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growth and transformation from an offshore contractor to a generalist IT 
services organization helped reduce the dependency on several largest cus-
tomers by diversifying the project portfolio. In 1998, Infosys’ annual report 
stated that “the most valuable intangible asset of Infosys is its customer 
base. Marqué customers or image-enhancing customers contributed around 
46% of revenue thid year. They reduce our marketing cost” (Infosys An-
nual Report 1998: 129). The dependence on large, well-known customers 
helped establish image of a reliable and skilled service provider, attracting 
other customers more effectively than by costly marketing campaigns. 
Through initial projects as contract software developer, Infosys was able to 
establish its brand name and target similar opportunities, but its ambitious 
growth plans called for access to broader market, moving from the subcon-
tractor position towards an independent “full-service provider” (Infosys 
Annual Report 1999: 152). In the late 1990s, Infosys used specialist Year 
2000 and Euro conversion projects to attract customers from outside the 
technology sector. These opportunities were used to deepen relations with 
clients, who afterwards were also buying other services (Infosys Annual 
Report 1999: 37), so that the company’s customer base became diversified, 
reducing dependence on only a few large contracts (Infosys Annual Report 
1999: 196). Subsequently, Infosys launched a brand awareness initiative 
with public relations activities and promotional events (Infosys Annual Re-
port 2000: 33), gradually imitating the marketing strategies of leading IT 
services firms. As the number of active clients, geographical locations and 
projects increased rapidly, Infosys integrated various internal systems 
around customer-centric processes with a Six Sigma initiative and an own 
customer relationship management software (Infosys Annual Report 2003: 
112). 
 
204      6 Contractors 
 
 
 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 
active 
clients 
115 194 273 293 345 393 
new 
clients 
39 99 122 116 92 119 
% customer 
retention 
81.7% 82.6% 77.8% 64.8% 86.3% 79.4% 
% repeat business 
revenue 
90.0% 87.0% 85.0% 88.0% 92.0% 93.0% 
% sales from 5 
largest customers 
28.0% 30.2% 26.0% 24.1% 23.4% 22.6% 
% sales from 10 
largest customers 
44.0% 45.7% 39.2% 39.4% 37.3% 36.0% 
Table 14. Infosys sales metrics. Customer retention defined as the number of clients in 
the current year who were also active clients in the previous year. Repeat business reve-
nue defined as revenue in the current year from customers who contributed to the reve-
nue also in the previous year. Data source: Infosys annual reports 
An interesting factor is the physical location of service provider: facing 
the recent popularity of offshore outsourcing, how can partners in a value 
chain manage their relations, especially if they are located in different ge-
ographies, cultures and time zones? Outsourcing literature warns of various 
risks arising, when projects require high levels of interaction (Amoribieta et 
al. 2001: 134), but in fact most projects implemented by the Indian firms 
were based on such a model. The communication was enabled by Internet 
technologies supporting remote work, and frequent visits to customer sites. 
Infosys annual reports document substantial increases in the number of 
U.S. visas of its employees, as well as the growing importance of onsite 
work, accounting for over half of the revenues, but only one third of the ac-
tual working time of consultants. 
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 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 
% revenue 
onsite 
41.30% 48.50% 51.50% 50.80% 54.70% 53.00% 
% revenue 
offshore 
59.70% 51.50% 48.50% 49.20% 45.30% 47.00% 
% person-month 
onsite 
25.00% 32.50% 34.00% 30.70% 33.70% 31.60% 
% person-month 
offshore 
75.00% 67.50% 66.00% 69.30% 66.30% 68.40% 
onsite work 
productivity 
(% person-month 
/% revenue) 
0.61 0.67 0.66 0.60 0.62 0.60 
offshore work 
productivity 
(% person-month 
/% revenue) 
1.26 1.31 1.36 1.41 1.46 1.46 
offshore/ onsite 
work productivity 
ratio 
207.54% 195.59% 206.12% 233.07% 237.56% 244.09% 
U.S. visa holders 425 963 1382 2027 NA NA 
sales and 
marketing offices 
17 20 25 28 30 31 
sales and  
marketing 
employees abroad 
29 48 84 143 280 275 
support and 
development 
(“customer prox-
imity”) centers 
abroad 
0 3 8 8 10 14 
Table 15. Infosys onsite and offshore projects metrics. Data sources: Infosys annual re-
ports 
Indian offshore software developers worked out a relationship and pro-
ject management model with account managers, working in the customer’s 
country, maintaining everyday contacts onsite, and offshore account man-
agers located in India, responsible for coordination issues between project 
delivery teams, onshore account managers and customers (Rajkumar and 
Mani 2001: 65). This explains the growth in the number of sales and mar-
keting personnel working in foreign subsidiaries of Infosys, establishment 
of new sales offices in key locations close to specific customers, as well as 
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opening of several customer proximity centers in the U.S., Canada and the 
U.K., providing onsite support to the largest clients, once the relations were 
developed to a level when such a closeness of contacts could not be 
avoided. Interestingly, Infosys’ offshore model is nowadays imitated by the 
most large Western IT services firms, which maintain account and project 
management teams in home countries, while sending as much development 
work as possible offshore in order to reduce the actual programming or 
other specialist technical tasks done in the expensive locations. 
Transformation from contract developers to independent IT services or-
ganizations was costly for the Indian firms so customers intimacy in their 
largest projects meant geographical proximity, even for companies classi-
fied as offshore specialists. Knowledge can easily “travel” across borders, 
so innovative conceptual tasks, generating the highest added value, can still 
be performed in corporate centers, whereas project execution involves also 
substantial amounts of technical or administrative work, delivered onsite or 
offshore depending on the project nature and financial limitations. 
6.2.3 Operational excellence 
Lower cost is an important argument when making make-or-buy decisions 
– but operational excellence does not only refer to relative cost advantages 
of low-wage countries, but also to process efficiencies and the quality of 
outputs. The value discipline proved critical for the success of Indian off-
shore firms – they were able to maintain the lead over competitors from 
countries such as China or Russia, capable of offering the respective ser-
vices at even lower prices. The gradual rise in salaries of local IT profes-
sionals, accompanied by the appreciation of the rupee, gradually eroded the 
Indian low cost advantage, and the average margins of the largest Indian 
offshore firms dropped from 40% to 25% (Jayashankar 2004)15, but the op-
                                           
15 According to the consulting company McKinsey, Indian rates for the most expensive, 
advanced IT services were in 2000 40-60% lower than those in the United States 
(Amoribieta and Bhaumik 2001: 131). Infosys’ own annual report quoted other esti-
mations according to which the average annual wage for software professionals in In-
dia was approximately 15% of the corresponding U.S. rate in 1999 (Infosys Annual 
Report 2000: 138). Morgan Stanley reports average hourly rates for IT services and 
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erational excellence allowed major companies to position themselves as 
competing with global IT service providers rather than other offshore play-
ers. 
Already in 2002, Infosys’ annual report indicated the new direct competi-
tors: EDS, Accenture, KPMG Consulting (now: BearingPoint), IBM and 
CSC (Infosys Annual Report 2002: 164). In order to compete with the larg-
est market players, known for their professionalism and quality, Infosys 
had to achieve impressive results in its core domain, IT project manage-
ment. Operational excellence, or rather its tangible proofs, such as refer-
ences, procedures or certificates, promise customers better control and risk 
management, facilitating externalization decisions already justified by dif-
ferences in costs. 
Practical skills of a contract software developer, related to the value dis-
cipline, involve for example the ability to correctly estimate the required 
project efforts and project costs (Rajkumar, Mani 2001: 67), which is es-
sential both for projects based on fixed prices (underestimation reduces 
profit margins or even renders projects unprofitable), as well as time-and-
material (customers may feel deceived if the actual level of expenditures 
does not match the earlier forecasts of the contractor). Unrealistic bidding 
promises, dubbed “the winner’s curse” (Kern et al. 2002) can put the firm’s 
reputation and even liquidity at risk, particularly for large, long-term con-
tracts. 
Indian software developers were pioneers in organization-wide quality 
initiatives based on Capability Maturity Model (CMM). CMM was devel-
oped by Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie Mellon University and 
sponsored by U.S. Air Force as a benchmark for best practices in software 
development area, used to evaluate potential suppliers. CMM defines five 
levels of process maturity, with the highest level 5 describing the “excel-
lent” organizations, where continuous process improvement led to more 
transparency, risk reduction and better project control. The compliance 
with CMM recommendations proved not only to reduce the number of bugs 
in the final software products, but also to radically increase productivity of 
                                                                                                                             
consulting in 2003 as: $111 globally and $25 for offshore locations (Gerhardy and 
Mahon 2004: 30). 
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programmers (Anthes, Vijayan 2001). The model became particularly 
popular when Indian offshore firms started approaching U.S. customers, 
emphasizing their superior project management skills confirmed by the up-
per CMM levels and outperforming most of American competitors. 
 
Country 
CMM Level 4 
organizations 
* IT services 
organizations 
CMM Level 5 
organizations 
* IT services 
organizations 
United States 24 11 (46%) 29 10 (34%) 
Canada 1 0 (0%) 1 0 (0%) 
Western Europe 1 0 0%) 1 1 (100%) 
Central and Eastern 
Europe 
1 1 (100%) 2 0 (0%) 
Japan 2 2 (100%) 1 1 (100%) 
South Korea 2 2 (100%) 0 0 (0%) 
India 61 56 (92%) 93 86 (92%) 
South-East Asia 1 1 (100%) 3 1 (33%) 
Latin America 2 2 (100%) 1 1 (10%) 
Total 96 77 (80%) 132 101 (76%) 
Table 16. Companies which have publicly announced their maturity levels after CMM 
appraisals. All information as of April 17, 2003. Data source: SEI Published Level 4/5 
Organizations, http://seir.sei.cmu.edu/pml  
Operational excellence is certainly important for any organization, con-
stituting a long-lasting competitive advantage, and Indian offshore devel-
opers followed the earlier quality obsession of Japanese automobile manu-
facturers. For organizations pursuing the contractor orientation in the high-
tech value chain, the issue of quality is additionally important for market-
ing reasons: proofs of quality are helpful in establishing relations with other 
partners in the value chain. Artifacts related to the process excellence, in-
cluding certificates, diplomas, “branded” project management or software 
development methodologies, or impressive development and training facili-
ties contribute to an image of a modern, innovative organization, create an 
organizational façade (Nystrom, Starbuck 1984). The artifacts can function 
as proxies, heuristics for decision makers, particularly important in the case 
of organizations providing services (intangible by definition), contractors 
who cannot be adequately evaluated before contracted project are actually 
completed.  
Software Engineering Institute registered altogether 3360 CMM 
appraisals between 1987 and June 2004 (SEI 2004: 14), and Indian firms 
dominate the group of level 4 and level 5 compliant companies. Marketing 
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the group of level 4 and level 5 compliant companies. Marketing theories 
emphasize that selling intangible goods involves the exchange of promises, 
making customer impressions a critical factor in the successful sales proc-
ess (Levitt 1981: 96-97). Service organizations were using the information 
about appraisals in marketing materials to attract partners, customers and 
investors, as CMM and its extensions CMMI and PCMM were important 
tangible evidence of their quality, and the appraisal plans were also defin-
ing contents of internal change management programs. 
 
Award / initiative Appraisal Details 
ISO 9001 Yes 
Generic quality system certification, defined by the In-
ternational Organization for Standardization 
TickIT Yes 
Specialized certification building on ISO 9001, address-
ing specific quality issues in IT firms, supported mainly 
by the U.K. software industry 
CMM 
(Capability Matur-
ity Model) 
Yes 
Model based on recommended best practices in software 
development and project management, appraisal for Lev-
els 2-5, defined by Software Engineering Institute, Car-
negie Mellon University 
CMMI (Capability 
Maturity Model In-
tegration) 
Yes 
Revised version of CMM, appraisal for Levels 2-5, de-
fined by Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon 
University 
PCMM (People 
Capability Maturity 
Model) 
Yes 
Counterpart of CMMI in the area of human resources de-
velopment, appraisal for Levels 2-5, defined by Software 
Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University 
Malcolm Baldridge 
National 
Quality Award 
Yes 
(only U.S.) 
National award for outstanding organizations based on 
seven key management areas, established by the U.S. 
Congress (award not certification – only several nomi-
nees per year) 
Six Sigma No 
Quality management and continuous improvement meth-
odology (numerous consulting companies offer their own 
“certificates” in the area, and Motorola had registered 
and trademarked the phrase :Six Sigma”) 
U.S. GAAP No 
U.S. financial reporting standards (help evaluate financial 
performance of potential offshore partners by their West-
ern clients) 
Table 17. Initiatives and awards confirming operational excellence, popular among In-
dian offshore software developers 
6.2.4 Innovation 
Having established streams of recurring revenues from key projects, the In-
dian firms were able to mimic their competitors by pursuing multiple alli-
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ances with leaders and complementors of various value chains, and build-
ing broad competence bases to implement projects for diverse technology 
platforms. In the late 1990s, Infosys started offering implementation ser-
vices for packaged applications, and later used the close partnerships with 
selected vendors of enterprise solutions (including PeopleSoft, Siebel, JD 
Edwards and Manugistics) to bundle the systems with own, unique offer-
ings for these platforms (Infosys Annual Report 2003: 111). The idea to 
balance partnerships and customer projects to establish proprietary, 
branded products and services, guided the strategies of offshore developers 
for many years. While still largely dependent only on a few large clients, 
Infosys stated that it “intends to convert a project opportunity into a prod-
uct opportunity. Infosys is essentially a software services company. How-
ever, Infosys expects to create branded services, which will contribute sub-
stantial revenues. Thus, branded services and products are together 
expected to contribute 35% to 40% of the total revenues in near future” 
(Infosys Annual Report 1998: 142). These branded services accounted 
barely for 8% of revenues in 1997 (Infosys Annual Report 1998: 140), but 
they gained on importance in the following years, and finally only a small 
percentage of sales concerned non-branded, subcontracted projects such as 
custom software development, migration, testing and engineering services. 
Infosys’ parallel entry into the IT outsourcing domain was not a logical ex-
tension of previous contracted software development – managed services 
and business process outsourcing require unique skills, dedicated infra-
structure, and even a distinctive business model. 
Interestingly, Infosys’ local competitor Wipro was initially not successful 
in the transition from customer intimacy to product leadership and innova-
tion. The company continued to rely on subcontract development and engi-
neering projects, accounting for about 70% of its revenues in 1999 (Shekar 
1999), what prevented it from growing as fast as Infosys. Another Wipro’s 
decision, interpreted later as a strategic mistake, was the avoidance of Year 
2000 projects. The company believed that such projects require familiarity 
with obsolete technologies used in legacy systems, which would not be 
useful for other purposes in the future. This actually was true, but Infosys 
used these projects to establish relations with new large clients, and Wipro 
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did not explore this opportunity (Jayashankar 2004) 16. Nevertheless, re-
maining merely a contractor of other high-tech firms can still be very prof-
itable. For example, testing services play a critical role in the software de-
velopment process: in the year 2003-2004, the value of software testing 
market in India alone was about $200 million, demand for the services was 
far from being saturated, and leading offshore companies were dramatically 
increasing their dedicated departments – Wipro’s testing unit grew from 
300 people in 2002 to 1,700 in 2004 (Prasad 2004). 
Innovativeness of Indian firms was directly linked to specific technology 
platforms and strategic partners – figures 22 and 23 present partnership 
networks of four major Indian firms, and analogous tendencies among ma-
jor Western IT services providers. First partnerships with technology ven-
dors were established from the initiative of the Indians, often resulting from 
software development contracts, but later potential technology partners 
from abroad were actively seeking cooperation opportunities with the off-
shore companies.  
Successful strategies of contractors involve the element of innovation and 
knowledge development. Due to the intangible nature of services, compa-
nies can only promote their capabilities through published measures of 
knowledge resources, patents, publications or conference participation. 
Patents are primarily intended to prevent others from copying certain prod-
ucts – however, they can also indicate innovativeness and thus function as 
marketing tools, particularly in knowledge-intensive relations with other 
high-tech companies. IT service providers can claim patents for business 
methods from the project management domain, as well as for technology 
related inventions. Indian offshore firms use patents only in limited ways, 
but instead are very active in publishing papers in international magazines 
and attending international conferences. These activities are intended to 
match the levels achieved by their largest global competitors, inheriting ex-
tensive patent pools from their hardware-related businesses. 
 
                                           
16 Nowadays, Wipro matches the diversified portfolio of IT services offered by other 
firms such as Infosys, while still deriving significant revenues from product engineer-
ing and contract software development services. 
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Company 
R&D expendi-
ture (,000 USD) 
2003/2004 
R&D expendi-
ture as % of 
revenues 
Number of aca-
demic papers 
1995-2004 
Number of U.S. 
patents 
1976-2004 
EDS NA NA 42 10 
HP 3,506,000 4.39% 253 13,206 
Accenture NA NA 28 105 
CSC NA NA 24 5 
CapGemini NA NA 1 0 
Unisys 294,300 0.51% 68 1,724 
BearingPoint NA NA 1 2 
Tata CS 6,923 0.42% 39 2 
Wipro 5,346 0.40% 13 1 
Infosys 10,262 0.94% 44 0 
Satyam 670 0.11% 27 2 
Table 18. Competence-related metrics of Western and Indian IT services companies. 
Data sources: financial data from corporate annual reports (most recent reports available 
in February 2005; exchange rate from March 31, 2004: 1 USD = 43.40Rs); published 
academic papers retrieved from Elsevier Compendex/Engineering Village, February 22, 
2005, searches based on author affiliations; patent information retrieved from USPTO, 
February 22, 2005, searches based on assignee names 
The limited use of patents in software and IT services sector contrasts 
with the patenting activities of ODM companies. They are aggressively 
patenting both underlying technology components, as well as industrial de-
signs of devices and business methods, related e.g. to internal communica-
tion within supply chain, inventory control or cash flow management. Pat-
enting in electronics is particularly important as U.S. patent holders could 
block import of assembled products (Nowotarski 2003), thus undermining 
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the business of foreign contractors. Academic publishing is in turn less im-
portant for ODMs, offering tangible products, not knowledge transferred 
through service projects. 
 
Company 
Number of academic 
papers 1995-2004 
Number of U.S. 
patents 1976-2004 
Solectron 17 12 
Flextronics 37 8 
Celestica 38 15 
SCI Systems 1 53 
E
M
S
 f
ir
m
s 
Jabil Circuit 1 11 
Arima Computer 1 11 
ASUSTeK Computer 1 61 
AU Optronics 0 142 
BenQ Corporation 3 210 
Chi Mei Optoelectronics 1 57 
Compal Electronics 0 160 
HTC 0 1 
Inventec 1 203 
Lite-On Technology / GVC 7 59 
Quanta Computer 1 100 
O
D
M
 f
ir
m
s 
Wistron Corporation 0 45 
Table 19. Competence-related metrics of EMS and ODM firms. Data sources: pub-
lished academic papers retrieved from Elsevier Compendex/Engineering Village, Feb-
ruary 24, 2005, searches based on author affiliations; patent information retrieved from 
USPTO, February 24, 2005, searches based on assignee names. 
Expenditures related to competence building extend beyond the R&D 
figures documented in financial reports, as new knowledge is created by 
learning in practice: through project delivery, training and networking. 
Experiences with using a specific technology for multiple different 
contracted projects help develop flexibility in reconfiguring and using its 
components in innovative ways (Henderson and Clark 1990), while this 
opportunity is usually not available to traditional product companies. Table 
20 presents selected Infosys competence metrics, showing the continuous 
growth in knowledge resource (measured as the education index of all 
employees), annual spending on books and periodicals, professional 
membership, seminars and internally used software. With the international 
growth of Infosys and the diversification of its businesses, the employee 
cost per capita almost tripled within several years. The scale of 
competence-related expenditures also confirms once again that the 
company did not regard lower labor costs as the source of its competitive 
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costs as the source of its competitive advantages, focusing instead on 
knowledge development and innovation. 
 
 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 
R&D expenditures 981 823 1711 1486 1444 4454 
R&D as % of revenues 1.91% 0.89% 0.87% 0.57% 0.40% 0.94% 
Expenditure on books 
and periodicals 
77 77 169 114 142 151 
Expenditure on profes-
sional membership and 
seminars 
NA NA 217 220 355 357 
Cost of software for 
internal use or service 
delivery 
1665 1938 3756 4361 6774 8088 
Number of employees 3766 5389 9831 10738 15356 25634 
% of development 
employees 
75.78% 79.64% 77.72% 87.59% 91.18% 93.06% 
Average age of 
employees 
26.14 26.14 25.67 26.60 26.60 26.00 
Employee education 
index 
10731 15544 28725 31385 44972 74057 
Employee education 
per capita 
2.85 2.88 2.92 2.92 2.93 2.89 
Employee cost 16506 33456 71778 111787 167712 245096 
Employee cost per 
capita 
4.38 6.21 7.30 10.41 10.92 9.56 
Table 20. Competence-related metrics of Infosys. Financial information in lakhs Rps 
(100,000 Rps). Employee education index calculated as aggregate measure of highest 
education levels completed by every employee (1: primary education, 2: secondary edu-
cation, 3: tertiary education). Data sources: Infosys annual reports 
Delivery of knowledge-based projects poses significant challenges in the 
area of intellectual property management: in theory, known-how generated 
through contracted R&D work is preserved by the client, but at the same 
time it is also inextricably linked with the knowledge created in other pro-
jects by the same contractor, so it is difficult to definitely agree who owns 
what (Pisano 1990: 159-160). In such situations, the contractor can derive 
significant benefits from the work by re-using components prepared once 
for a specific customer (a practice potentially infringing IPRs and non-
disclosure agreements), or the tacit knowledge of employees, delegating 
them to similar projects. Officially, Infosys claimed not to retain IPRs for 
project deliverables, but in some cases the company tried to license its pro-
prietary technologies instead of simply transferring their ownership to cli-
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ents (Infosys Annual Report 1999: 158). While regularly accounting for 
R&D expenditures in annual reports, Infosys was also indicating, how the 
investments contributed to the establishment of branded offerings and 
methodologies, including e.g. proprietary requirement modeling methods 
and tools InFlux (Infosys Annual Report 2004: 25). 
The tensions between the roles of contractor and complementor signalize 
the transformation of Infosys, becoming a self-sufficient organization 
working with end customers, not only other value chain participants. 
Treacy and Wiersema’s (1993) framework adequately describes the chal-
lenges of service organizations, and the suggestion that the most competi-
tive players try to excel in all three “value disciplines” seems to be relevant 
for the discussed example of IT services, as well as for EMS companies 
and other types of organizations, pursuing service-oriented strategies in the 
high-tech value chain. 
6.3 Discussion 
Contractors play important roles in high-tech value chains, and high-tech 
companies increasingly rely on service providers, ranging from contract 
semiconductor and hardware manufacturers to offshore software develop-
ers. The strategy of contractors is primarily dynamic, as opposed to other 
value chain actors, who focus on maintaining their existing positions in 
mutual relations and adopting to the changing environment. Service-
oriented firms have an implicit goal of transforming into independent com-
panies, which could control customer bases broader than several close cli-
ents-partners. They can accomplish this by focusing on knowledge creation 
and competence management, which help them shift from the initial stage 
of customer intimacy to operational excellence and innovation. Intimate re-
lations with key partners enable them to move from basic assembly or de-
velopment tasks towards knowledge-intensive projects, involving concept 
development and research. Contract manufacturers are becoming ODMs, 
with portfolios of patents and industrial designs, capable of offering ready-
to-reuse products, and earning higher margins thanks to their increased 
bargaining power. Offshore software developers are turning into generalist 
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IT services companies, competing against established players, and capital-
izing on the in-depth knowledge of certain technologies, reusable compo-
nents developed for other projects, and relations with end customers in key 
markets. These transformations were carefully planned and operationalized 
through organizational competence building and process improvement pro-
grams, increased R&D investment, and marketing activities involving 
brand management and product-like packaging of intangible skills. 
product
business
(?)
first
contracted
projects
complex
projects
custom
end-to-end
solutions
branded
products
and services
reliance on other value
chain participants
independencecompetence building
customer intimacy innovationoperational excellence
 
Fig. 24. Process of strategic transformation of contractor companies 
Companies presented above as model examples of contractors are nowa-
days becoming complementors, niche players in the high-tech value chain. 
Infosys aggressively markets proprietary software solutions, including its 
highly successful Finacle banking solution, which nowadays is supported 
as industry standard even by large firms such as HP and Accenture. BenQ, 
an experienced ODM, started using own brand for high-end mobile phones, 
troubling its relations with Motorola, which decided to switch orders to 
Compal, another ODM contractor, not having similar ambitions and thus 
potentially more loyal. However, BenQ’s own-brand sales accounted in 
2004 for about 40% of the company’s revenues (Wang 2004), and finally 
both its offended partner Motorola and the market leader Nokia decided to 
place new handset orders with the ODM. 
Strategic skills help contractors lock in their partners – they start the 
business with a significant help of a strong partner, who is later abandoned, 
positioned as a competitor or forced to accept new, inconvenient commer-
cial conditions. The scenario of self-created competition is best evidenced 
by the history of IBM PC, using processors produced by Intel and an oper-
ating system from a small contract developer Microsoft. Within several 
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years, the entire computing industry was transformed, when these two 
companies started offering their products to additional partners, competing 
with IBM. IBM carelessly deprived itself of important competencies in the 
subcontracted areas in order to shorten time-to-market, and ultimately lost 
control over the future of its core technology. Dependence on third-party 
intellectual property can be dangerous for high-tech companies. Not sur-
prisingly, NTT DoCoMo decided to establish closer relations with selected 
handset, semiconductor and software providers, investing in their projects 
in return for partly owning their mobile technologies – the moves were in-
tended to reduce potential risks of third-party reliance, which once under-
mined the position of IBM. 
The growing importance of contractors in high-tech value chains facili-
tates also the emergence of virtual organizations, controlling merely brands 
and managerial skills, and relying on specialized suppliers in all other ar-
eas, particularly for technology development. Large software projects, 
primed by established IT services companies, are to often implemented and 
supported by smaller subcontracted services firms, using software and 
hardware delivered by other firms, so that only project management comes 
from the main company. A challenger of Apple in the portable digital me-
dia market, Virgin Electronics, employs only 10 people, and relies on 
ODMs to produce top-end gadgets, competing with iPods (Langberg 2004). 
Skype Technologies came out of nowhere to quickly emerge as the leading 
global telecom operator, not owning any traditional telecommunications in-
frastructure but using a sophisticated software solution to balance the pub-
licly available Internet and fixed telephony platforms in all countries. 
Contracted service providers form an important and frequently over-
looked group of companies, with strategies based on rules different from 
those followed by chain leaders and complementors. They offer impressive 
partnership opportunities for other value chain participants, but at the same 
time present serious strategic threats as potential competitors of established 
players. 
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7 Open source movement 
7.1 Overview 
7.1.1 Origins of the open source movement 
The relevance of the high-tech value chain model and three generic strate-
gies, outlined in previous chapters, could be challenged by critics, pointing 
to recent market developments, particularly the growing popularity of the 
open source movement. The idea that computer software could be free and 
available without copyright restrictions is not new, but in the recent years it 
became actively supported by major industry players. The present chapter 
will analyze the impact of this phenomenon on value chain strategies to 
verify, if open source has the potential to radically change the operations 
for high-tech companies and establish a new underlying industry logic. 
In the 1950s, software source code was freely distributed without any li-
censing restrictions by users of IBM and DEC computers. Code of Unix 
was also initially available for free, until AT&T decided to restrict the 
availability of the system. Antitrust decisions forced companies to unbun-
dle hardware and software layers and standardize them, leading to code 
closing and software commercialization. Turning previously widely avail-
able components into proprietary packages was disappointing for many 
programmers. Richard Stallman founded in 1985 the Free Software Foun-
dation, focused on promoting software freely available to all interested par-
ties for non-commercial purposes, based on the concept of copyleft (the op-
posite of copyright, with everybody entitled to use the intellectual property 
without restrictions). The model evolved later into open source movement, 
focused on the public access to the source code of applications and ability 
to collectively improve them, with a unique licensing scheme defined by 
the General Public License (GPL). GPL enabled everybody to freely use, 
distribute and modify the concerned software, requiring however to release 
the modified code. GPL did not prohibit charging fees for distributed soft-
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ware - in the pre-Internet era, distribution involved costs of media, re-
cording and distribution. Importantly, any software developed from a GPL-
licensed code must also be released under GPL, constituting the “viral” na-
ture of the licensing scheme, criticized by some commercial developers. 
Prominent early open source projects were Apache web server and 
Sendmail e-mail program, but the real popularity came with the develop-
ment of Linux, free version of Unix. The initially chaotic, but later well-
organized development work Linux involved thousands of programmers 
worldwide, attracting the attention of market analysts and companies. In 
1998 Eric Raymond wrote the movement's manifesto, “The Cathedral and 
the Bazaar” (Raymond 2000a), introducing a dichotomy between anarchic, 
community-driven development efforts and formalized practices of estab-
lished software companies. Later the same year, Raymond published on its 
website a copy of an internal document (later referred to as “Halloween 
memo”), written by Microsoft employees, analyzing the threats, which the 
open source model posed to Microsoft's own products (Microsoft 1998), 
and admitting that some community projects achieved quality compared 
with commercial solutions. 
The success of open source encouraged the professionalization of pro-
jects – they became managed with widely-accepted development method-
ologies, and often associated with commercial start-up companies. In 1999, 
open source company Red Hat Software, developing an own version of 
Linux, entered the stock exchange, and was quickly followed by several 
other players. In parallel, established I.C.T. companies were adopting some 
elements of the open source movement. Netscape decided to open the 
source code of its web browser based on a new form of license, called Net-
scape Public License (NPL): any changes to the software had to be docu-
mented on the Internet and freely available, while Netscape as the founding 
organization was allowed to incorporate the code from third-parties in its 
own versions of products. Apple Computer, HP, SGI and IBM publicly re-
leased code of numerous solutions, attempting to form independent com-
munities around the respective projects and benefit from the collective 
development model. Major companies started investing in the open source -  
IBM founded a project called Eclipse, focused on the creation of open 
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source development tools, and contributed to Eclipse over $40M worth 
source code of own products, and the move was followed by BEA Systems 
and Computer Associates. Sun Microsystems acquired a German company 
StarDivision, releasing its software package as OpenOffice, an open source 
competitor of Sun's major enemy's product Microsoft Office. 
The nature of licenses and development of open source products created 
two-tier software architectures, with componentized common platforms 
(source trees), available freely and maintained by the developer commu-
nity, and final packaged applications (full distributions), released by non-
profit communities or commercial organizations (Henkel 2003: 14). Nowa-
days, most Linux implementations consist of the underlying system kernel, 
graphical user interface (with options including GNOME and KDE), and 
thousands of open and proprietary packages, all available to end users in 
the form of Linux distributions such as Debian, Red Hat, Mandrake or 
SuSE. The mechanism of creating final products, based on open source 
components, resembles the semi-walled gardens of NTT DoCoMo and Mi-
crosoft: companies use standardized, publicly available components, add-
ing new features which could potentially attract and lock-in customers. 
Linux is nowadays perceived as a reliable competitor of Microsoft Win-
dows and Unix, supported by major I.C.T. companies, and many estab-
lished commercial products have open source alternatives. 
7.1.2 Ideologies, myths and reality 
The model of open source is surrounded by many myths – its characteris-
tics, particularly the commercial aspects, are frequently misunderstood, 
with people still thinking of it as of community-driven projects not pack-
aged, commercial products. The commercialization of open source means 
actually that the software is distributed and priced like other commercial 
products – even though there still are free or low cost options, they do not 
always offer all the features of solutions from the best known open source 
vendors. These companies are still committed to the principles of open 
source and GPL licensing schemes, but some of them disclose the source 
code only to customers, who actually pay for the products, thus actively 
protecting own intellectual property and undermining the ideals of open 
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source movement. At the same time, open source offers egalitarian ideol-
ogy, emphasizing the freedom of access to intellectual goods, and strength-
ening the sense of community among developers, who voluntarily contrib-
ute to non-commercial software projects, sharing their knowledge and 
source code. Its popularity is also linked to an anti-globalist atmosphere of 
the 1990s, and the popular “Microsoft-bashing” attitude of IT specialists. 
Uncontrolled knowledge spillovers, enabled by open source software li-
cences, turn any contribution into a public good (von Hippel and von 
Krogh 2003: 213). Similar knowledge spillovers in the case of commercial 
companies would mean that their proprietary technologies and skills could 
easily be imitated at low cost by other players, disadvantaging the pioneers. 
Traditional systems of economic distribution are subject to the dilemma of 
collective action, characterized as the tragedy of commons (Hardin 1968), 
where free riders exploit shared, scarce resources without contributing any-
thing in return, and reducing the resources’ availability for other members 
of a particular group or society. In the community-driven open source 
movement, the dilemma seems to be overcome (von Hippel and von Krogh 
2003) – free riders are encouraged to use the collectively developed prod-
ucts, even without feeding back their own developments or technical ad-
vice, as their interest stimulates the diffusion of products and increases the 
probability of detecting and reporting flaws to further improve the soft-
ware. The intangible nature of information goods with no variable costs 
(Shapiro and Varian 1999: 21) and extremely low costs of web-based soft-
ware distribution changes the underlying economic rationale for collective 
action: distributed goods are not scarce, and the system is anti-rival (Weber 
2004: 154). Open source community is presented as gift culture, where so-
cial relations do not need to be regulated by the possession or exchange of 
resources (Raymond 2000b; Bergquist and Ljungberg 2001: 308). 
Open source movement is presented as a unique user-only innovation 
system (Lakhani and von Hippel 2000), based on mutual support and par-
ticipative design. This resembles the notion of prosumption, put forward by 
Alvin Toffler in his vision of the postindustrial society: prosumers blur the 
boundaries between consumers and producers, being able to specify and 
satisfy own requirements (Toffler 1990). Strategic management literature 
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refers to the phenomenon as value co-production, ongoing interactions be-
tween producers and customers, jointly innovating, developing and deliver-
ing products and services (Ramirez 1999). 
The widely-cited article “The Cathedral and the Bazaar” (Raymond 
2000a) used the two metaphors to differentiate between hierarchically 
structured software development processes by large commercial companies 
and community-driven, chaotic, but more innovative open source practices. 
Bazaar is not based on detailed plans, but structured by community dynam-
ics, offering opportunities to assimilate good ideas from others and incor-
porate them in the software code. Open source projects are presented as 
typical examples of the effectiveness of virtual organizations, with distrib-
uted work, ad hoc collaboration, high flexibility (Gallivan 2001), and 
unique coordination mechanisms of communities of creation, not present in 
traditional markets or hierarchies (Sawhney and Prandelli 2000). Character-
istics of the projects are unfortunately often generalized by academic and 
popular publications, and not necessarily matching the status quo. Open 
source involves both spontaneous communities and institutionalized forms 
of cooperation. The movement offers also revenue opportunities for com-
mercial organizations, and this explains why projects became professional-
ized, and current developments differ from the initial directions. 
Companies using open source components in own products are not re-
quired to reveal all proprietary information - empirical research confirms 
different levels of involvement and patterns of revealing among firms, with 
small firms usually revealing more, expecting also more in return from the 
community, and large firms restricting their contributions thanks to their 
greater self-sufficiency (Henkel 2004: 2)17. The community-driven devel-
opment offers many opportunities for “parasites”, firms bundling freely 
available components and selling them to end customers, there also is sub-
stantial demand for commercial services related to the free software prod-
                                           
17 Open source licenses such as GPL and relevant copyright regulations distinguish be-
tween derivative work (modifying the original open source code and thus being sub-
ject to the same revealing requirements as the code) and linked programs (interacting 
with the open source software through published interfaces not code). Authors of 
linked programs may keep them proprietary without infringing on the GPL, if the free 
components are not embedded in their products, but installed on the same computer. 
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ucts. Similarly, the analogy of gift culture is flawed, as it does not take into 
account other, non-financial interdependencies between givers and receiv-
ers, for example implicit obligations (Bergquist and Ljungberg 2001: 313). 
Gifts in form of releasing open source code of proprietary products or 
sponsoring the community can also be a way of showing own status (Ber-
gquist and Ljungberg 2001: 313), as usually such sponsorship decisions are 
linked to the marketing strategies and regarded as investments. 
Open source projects are not as egalitarian as their earlier characteriza-
tion would suggest – decision making processes are usually structured, with 
only a small group of authorized developers deciding about the inclusion of 
certain code in official product releases (von Krogh et al. 2003: 1225). Ma-
jor software development projects are stable, as opposed to the idealistic 
model of virtual organization - some people are even involved on a full-
time basis thanks to commercial project sponsors. Linux development is 
not a chaotic bazaar, but a structured process of problem solving and deci-
sion making, with conflicts of interests and hierarchies of gatekeepers 
(Weber 2004: 63-64). Similarly, the development of Mozilla browser is di-
vided into distinctive modules, with decision making responsibility for 
each of them delegated to an experienced individual, appointed by the 
Mozilla Foundation (Mockus et al. 2002: 332), and decisions about the 
content of new product releases and future development directions of 
Apache web server are based on e-mail voting by members of a small co-
ordinating group (Fielding 1999: 42-43). Mature open source projects are 
thus not governed by invisible hand, neither are they self-organizing sys-
tems (Weber 2004: 82) – they rather function around established institu-
tions: licensing schemes (promoting and restricting certain actions), tech-
nologies (particularly Internet as a communication medium, supporting 
remote work) and existing architectures of software products (Weber 2004: 
83-88), with procedures, structures and designs matching the traditional 
software development practices. Many projects are managed by a central 
organization (non-profit foundation, as in the case of Mozilla browser or 
Apache web server - or commercial company, e.g. MySQL AB or IBM-
driven Eclipse project), and some are conducted entirely by commercial 
companies, developing software internally and releasing its code to general 
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public (Henkel 2003: 2-3). The most important of them were initiated by 
commercial companies' decisions to open proprietary source code (Lerner 
and Tirole 2001: 824), and empirical findings demonstrated that in 2002, 
14% of the most mature open source projects were maintained by revenue-
earning firms (Krishnamurthy 2002: 8). 
The architectural metaphors of cathedral and bazaar were criticized for 
their simplifications and modified with the concept of public library, listing 
components for public use without modifications, representing stabilization 
of the constantly changing bazaars - as with certain core elements of Linux 
and other open source projects, which nowadays function as open standards 
and should not be modified in order to maintain compatibility among de-
rived products (Krechmer 2002: 1053). Typical characteristics of a bazaar 
are: limited availability of information, due to which people either engage 
in a long-term search for the best opportunities or stick to one preferred 
supplier, and bargaining for the lowest price (Geertz 1978) - both suggest a 
rather unfortunate use of the metaphor to describe the open source commu-
nity. Moreover, one of the first public replies to Raymond's (2000a) article 
indicated potential corruptions of the idealistic community process: com-
mercial companies may use ideologies and “religions” to change their ca-
thedrals and promote own products within the open source community 
(Turner 1998). Indeed, established firms learned to use customer communi-
ties in software development processes, effectively combining the cathe-
dral and bazaar models (Chan and Lee 2004: 2). Microsoft's early reaction 
to the success of open source software was its focus on building developer 
community, offering opportunities to interact and influence development 
plans (Microsoft 1998), later also sharing code of Windows system with se-
lected, most experienced developers (but not allowing them to make modi-
fications or use the code in own solutions) (Fried 2003). IBM adopted open 
source-alike processes across 100 major internally conducted software de-
velopment projects and 2,000 developers: proprietary source code (not dis-
closed to general public) alongside detailed development plans, require-
ments and bug information is shared by employees working on various 
products, thus stimulating active reuse and eliminating situations, when 
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people developing separate products “reinvent the wheel” instead of bene-
fiting from solutions already worked out by their colleagues (Taft 2005). 
7.1.3 Motives for participation 
The literature was constantly seeking explanations of the voluntary partici-
pation of developers in non-paid open source projects – reasons range from 
emotional (including pleasure and enjoyment of the work itself), direct 
needs for specific software or its improvement, expected reciprocity 
(thanks to the specialization of development work, one could rely on other 
people to offer similar inputs to other parts of the project), to possible ef-
fects on reputation (Lakhani and von Hippel 2003: 3, 11), constituting a 
mixture of altruism and incentive-driven behavior. 
In the development projects of many products intended for enterprise not 
individual use, lead actors are commercial organizations, with minor roles 
played by hobbyist developers. It was demonstrated in the literature using 
the case of embedded Linux: dedicated system version for non-computing 
electronics devices such as VCRs, mobile phones or machine controls 
(Henkel 2004: 6). Interestingly, even for the Linux kernel, major open 
source project attracting hobbyists, the largest number of code contribu-
tions over years was coming from developers, whose e-mail addresses were 
ending with “.com”, standing form commercial organizations (Weber 2004: 
72), suggesting that at least some of them were contributing code, devel-
oped as part of their product strategies. Similarly, the role of commercial 
companies as providers of necessary complementary goods is often under-
estimated (von Hippel and von Krogh 2003: 214), while the support of es-
tablished semiconductor, hardware and services companies facilitates the 
development and diffusion of open source solutions, combining them with 
other value chain segments to offer end-to-end solutions. IBM invested ap-
proximately $1 billion in open source community in 2001, and confirmed 
having nearly recouped the entire investment during the same year from the 
sales of open source-based solutions (Shankland 2002). Two years later, 
HP's revenues from Linux-related products and services for 2003 reached 
the level of $2.5 billion (Shankland 2004a). 
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I.C.T. companies promoting open source software are not dependent on 
pricing and licensing policies of powerful partners (Rossi and Bonaccorsi 
2005: 9), while corporate absorptive capacity can be enhanced through the 
incorporation of the open source experience base  (Lerner and Tirole 2001: 
284), so that smaller firms can benefit from the collective R&D activities at 
a low cost (Rossi and Bonaccorsi 2005: 9). Finally, collaboration with de-
veloper communities helps preempt the development of alternative stan-
dards by competitors (Lerner and Tirole 2001: 824), and freely distributed 
software innovations tend to diffuse at much faster paces than those em-
bedded in commercial products (Harhoff et al. 2003: 1757). 
7.2 Business models and open source 
7.2.1 Open source start-ups 
Researchers identified numerous revenue sources for open source compa-
nies – their common element is the protection of own intellectual property, 
radically different from the unrestricted freedom and copyleft ideologies. 
Some firms even use patents to protect their own development – the best 
known example is FSMLabs, developer of embedded RTLinux, which pat-
ented a generic technical method, demanding royalties from other embed-
ded Linux developers (Henkel 2003: 6). Open source companies usually 
supplement publicly available software with proprietary extensions or other 
assets (e.g. brand name, dedicated hardware and services) (Henkel 2004: 
4). Empirical evidence counters the common assumptions that open source 
is free and open – companies involved in projects often adopt selective re-
vealing (Henkel 2004: 17), as far as the licensing conditions allow, or learn 
from the GPL-protected software and later redesign own products to re-
place the open code with entirely proprietary programs (Henkel 2004: 9). 
As one of open source analysts noted in 2001, “the ideological purity of 
open-source software business is being diluted by a new era of pragmatism 
as start-ups adjust to the economic slump” (Shankland 2001b). 
Open source companies strive for differentiation, using both technical 
and marketing arguments – numerous commercial Linux distributions are 
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rooted in the same kernel code, but differ in the graphical interface design, 
include additional proprietary applications, and are positioned for specific 
groups of customers. The use of marketing is paralleled by management 
methods, typical for established firms, including partnerships and acquisi-
tions. Many start-ups actively pursue commercial relations with large I.C.T. 
companies, using them as sales channels or customers for their services - 
this resembles strategies of contractors in the high-tech value chain. In the 
first annual report after its successful IPO, Red Hat Software emphasized 
the importance of strategic relationships with key vendors “to increase the 
market acceptance of open source technologies” (Red Hat 10K Form, 2000: 
4). Companies like Intel, Sun Microsystems, SAP and even Microsoft 18 
were contracting open source specialist to develop specific software, who 
integrated proprietary solutions with popular open source standards. Wit-
nessing the growing popularity of Linux as a server platform, major U.S. 
hardware companies decided to offer dedicated technical support services, 
initially channeling the support calls to subcontracted partners, such as the 
once best known Linux services company Linuxcare. In many cases gov-
ernments turned out to be important customers and supporters – for exam-
ple, the German government sponsored the development of Kroupware, a 
Linux-based alternative for Microsoft groupware client (Shankland 2003), 
the French Ministry of Defense funded a 7M EUR project to improve 
Linux security by Mandrake Software (Shankland 2004b), and the govern-
ments of Japan, South Korea and China were holding talks about a unified 
open source platform development. Finally, the strongest open source com-
panies were able to acquire, invest or partner with other open source play-
ers. 
 
                                           
18 Microsoft contracted in 1999 an open source developer firm Active State Tool Corpo-
ration to improve the popular open version of Perl programming language for Win-
dows (Shankland 1999), even though Microsoft was opposing by that time the com-
munity. 
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Marketing and technology 
alliances 
Contract development Technical support services 
1999 Red Hat Software – 
Compaq 
1999 Red Hat Software – 
SAP 
1999 Fujitsu - Caldera 
1999 Red Hat Software – 
Oracle 
1999 Red Hat Software – 
Computer Associates 
1999 Caldera – IBM 
1999 SuSE – IBM 
1999 MandrakeSoft – IBM 
2001 Covalent Technologies 
– Compaq 
2002 Red Hat Software – 
IBM 
2003 MySQL AB – SAP 
2003 Red Flag Software – 
IBM 
2003 SuSE – Veritas Soft-
ware 
2003 SuSE – Sun Microsys-
tems 
2003 Red Flag Software – 
Dell 
1999 Intel contracts Sygnus 
to develop Linux tools sup-
porting Pentium MMX 
1999 Microsoft contracts Ac-
tiveState Tool Corporation to 
improve programming lan-
guage Perl for Windows 
2000 Sun Microsystems con-
tracts Linuxcare to port 
Linux to its T3 storage sys-
tem 
2001 HP, Network Appli-
ance, Maxtor, Tricord and 
SGI contract Linuxcare to 
port Linux to their storage 
products 
2003 SAP contracts MySQL 
AB to maintain SAP data-
base product 
2004 Nokia contracts 
Mozilla Foundation to de-
velop Minimo web browser 
for embedded devices 
1999 HP offers Linux sup-
port services from Red Hat 
Software 
1999 Dell offers Linux sup-
port services from Linuxcare 
and Turbolinux 
1999 Compaq offers Linux 
support services from Red 
Hat Software 
Table 21. Examples of alliances, contracted development and technical support services 
involving commercial and open source companies 
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Minority shareholding IPOs 
August 1999 Red Hat Software 
December 1999 VA Linux Systems 
December 1999 Androver.Net 
March 2000 Caldera 
July 2001 Mandrakesoft 
 
 
Suspended IPO plans 
due to the market downturn: 
1998 Intel and Net-
scape Communica-
tions invest in Red 
Hat Software 
1999 Intel invests in 
VA Linux Systems 
1999 SAP, Compaq, 
IBM, Novell, Oracle 
and Dell invest in 
Red Hat Software 
1999 Intel invests in 
Turbolinux 
1999 Motorola in-
vests in Lineo 
1999 Intel invests in 
SuSE 
1999 Sun Microsys-
tems, Dell, Oracle 
and Motorola invest 
in Linuxcare 
1999 Adobe Systems 
and Texas Instru-
ments invest in Cova-
lent Technologies 
2000 Intel, Motorola 
and Turbolinux invest 
in Lynx Real-Time-
Systems (later: 
LynuxWorks) 
2000 VA Linux Sys-
tems and Progress 
Software invest in 
MySQL AB 
2000 Intel invests in 
MontaVista Software 
2002 IBM, Sony, To-
shiba, Yamaha, Pana-
sonic and NEC invest 
in MontaVista Soft-
ware 
2003 Intel invests in 
Jabber 
2004 Oracle invests in 
Miracle Linux 
2004 Intel invests in 
JBoss 
2004 NTT DoCoMo 
invests in MontaVista 
Software 
Lineo 
Linuxcare 
LinuxOne 
LynuxWorks 
Turbolinux 
Table 22. Examples of corporate investment in open source companies and their IPOs 
Successful open source companies do not differ significantly from other 
high-tech firms, mainly due to the use of dual licensing. A company releas-
ing own products as open source, is also able to offer the same software 
with another, commercial license to customers interested in premium ser-
vice or specific proprietary extensions. Customers paying for commercial 
licenses of the same software, which other users can use under GPL, may 
for example be allowed to modify the source code without revealing the 
modifications to the community, and the additional protection of intellec-
tual property may be essential for some user organizations (Dahlander 
2004: 16). The strategy is described as loss leadership, as potential losses 
from giving away software help gain market share and later establish de-
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mand for the paid product version (OpenSource.org 2005). The split helps 
maintain low development costs by establishing developer community 
around the product (Pal and Madanmohan 2002: 12), while proprietary, 
complementary elements differentiate the commercial offering. The idea of 
bundling open source and proprietary components were fiercely opposed 
by the activists in the 1990s19, but became a standard practice when most 
established software companies started releasing Linux versions of their 
commercial packages, often as free software, but provided without source 
code.  
Firms offering products based mainly on third-party components can use 
proprietary modifications to add value to commoditized technology plat-
forms: multiple commercial Linux distributions resemble nowadays tradi-
tional semi-walled gardens, established by companies like NTT DoCoMo 
or Microsoft, and the source code for known Linux distributions such as 
Red Hat or Turbolinux is actually available to paying customers only. The 
revenue models are however diverse, and some companies pursue exactly 
opposite scenarios - Swedish database company MySQL AB releases even 
the source code of technologies, which it acquires from commercial 
sources, e.g. expensive database clustering technology purchased from 
Ericsson (Weiss 2003). Table 23 summarizes revenue models of selected 
popular open source companies, varying in sources of revenue (software 
platform, software add-ins, support and professional services such as im-
plementation, migration from other technologies, design of dedicated ap-
plications and specialized training), approaches to open source community 
and code sharing patterns. 
 
                                           
19 Yggdrasil Computing was one of first companies publicly criticized for commercializ-
ing open source by offering packaged Linux kernel with a commercial graphical user 
interface tool Motif (Weber 2004: 107). 
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There are cases of open source companies, which decided to close their 
source code, moving to entirely proprietary solutions. Licensing schemes 
allowed them to stop releasing code for new product versions, but the pre-
viously released code remained public and usually was later maintained by 
non-profit developer communities. One of the first such cases was SSH 
Communications Security, developer of popular data encryption tools, 
which in 1995 switched to commercial licensing mode, restricting the use 
of SSH trademark and later even suing the open source community for re-
ferring to it in the free OpenSSH project (Weber 2004: 178). Once an open 
source icon, evidencing the commercial viability of the movement's ideol-
ogy, Red Hat Software decided to restrict access to its source code in 2003, 
focusing on high-end customers and spinning off an independent, free 
Linux project Fedora (Legard 2003). As Red Hat Enterprise Linux was still 
strongly based on third-party components released under GPL20, many non-
profit and commercial organizations were able to clone the new Red Hat 
releases, offering most of the functionality – but Red Hat threatened the 
most visible clone, CentOS, with a trademark infringement suit. CentOS 
website was informing that the offered system is a Red Hat's clone - in 
March 2005, Red Hat Enterprise Linux was priced at $2,499 per server, 
while CentOS was charging only $12 for every download of the system, 
which could legally be installed on multiple computers (Shankland 2005)). 
This demonstrates the competitive nature of open source environment: even 
freely available technology platforms are often developed by two or more 
competing communities (e.g. alternative Linux graphical user interfaces 
GNOME and KDE), software projects may split into competing versions 
(through code base forking, when a group of developers opposes product 
development directions and decides to use the existing code for an own, po-
tentially incompatible project (Weber 2004: 64)), and companies commer-
cializing open source software fight legal battles, competing on product 
features and brands, or even headhunting key developers of competitors. 
                                           
20 In 1999, only about 13% of Red Hat Linux code lines were developed by Red Hat 
(Red Hat 424B1 Form, 1999: 6). 
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Project name Type Support availability 
Asianux 
http://www.asianux.com 
commercial 
(free underlying distribu-
tion for packaged products 
by Miracle Linux, Red Flag 
Software and Haansoft) 
paid support for packaged Linux 
versions purchased from the devel-
oping companies 
Debian 
http://www.debian.org 
community no formal support options, but a list 
of 599 consultants in 54 countries 
available on the website 
Fedora 
http://fedora.redhat.com 
community 
(hosted on Red Hat Soft-
ware servers and derived 
from original Red Hat 
Linux's code but not main-
tained by the company) 
no formal support options 
Gentoo 
http://www.gentoo.org 
community no formal support options 
Knoppix 
http://www.knopper.net 
community no formal support options 
Mandriva (Mandrake) 
http://www.mandriva.com 
commercial 
(free full version of product 
published several weeks af-
ter its commercial release) 
paid support for commercial version 
purchased from Mandriva 
Slackware 
http://www.slackware.com 
community no formal support options, but a list 
of 9 technical support organizations 
in 5 countries available on the web-
site 
Ubuntu 
http://www.ubuntulinux.org 
community 
(sponsored by Cannonical 
Ltd) 
paid support from Canonical Ltd, 
available to all users of the free 
Ununtu distribution 
Xandros 
http://www.xandros.com 
commercial 
(free version with restricted 
functionality available only 
through P2P network, not 
as Internet download) 
paid support only for packaged 
Linux version purchased from Xan-
dros 
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Table 24. Major free Linux distributions, 200521 
 
1999  VA Linux Systems criticized for using 'LNUX' ticker in its IPO and using open source 
developer lists to send e-mail invitations to buy its shares 
2000  Caldera takes over a key Turbolinux developer 
2001  Red Hat Software embeds ProgreSQL database in its Linux distribution, bypassing 
PostgreSQL vendor Great Bridge which closes its operations 
2002  MontaVista Software accuses Lineo (later: Embedix) of having illegally copied its 
source code 
2002  SSH Communications threatens OpenSSH developers with trademark infringement 
lawsuit 
2003  SCO Group (formerly: Caldera) accuses Linux developers of having illegally copied 
code lines of Unix, owned by SCO, sues IBM and sends letter to corporate Linux users ask-
ing for licensing fees 
2003  JBoss accuses Apache Software Foundation of having illegally copied its source code 
2004  Red Hat Software threatens to sue Red Hat Linux-clone maker CentOS for trademark-
infringing use of Red Hat's brand name 
Table 25. Examples of conflicts among open source companies 
Market for commercial open source software represents most of standard 
software market characteristics. Facing the high-tech industry depression in 
2001, Turbolinux' CEO Ly-Huong Pham suggested that “the development 
model of open-source software is wonderful. But let's not confuse a devel-
opment model with a business model. Basic business principles were for-
gotten by some” (Shankland 2001b). Red Hat Software is a very good ex-
ample of this disillusionment, especially as it was the first publicly listed 
open source company. Its initial focus on implementation services accom-
panying Linux version was later replaced by software license sales to the 
largest enterprise customers. Looking for new revenue streams, it was often 
forced to abandon previous solution partners – for example, Oracle played 
                                           
21 The website www.linux.org listed in April 2005 altogether 396 free Linux distribu-
tions, most developed by hobbyists and offered for download without any profes-
sional support. Only 352 distributions were classified as still actively maintained. 
Many Linux versions were derived from other projects, sometimes changes con-
cerned only repackaging some components – 47 distributions were based on Debian, 
41 on Red Hat (previous freely available code), 25 on Slackware and 7 on Mandrake, 
there were also 30 embedded Linux distributions, with architecture different from the 
system designed for personal computers (www.linux.org/dist/list.html). Other web-
sites listing the most popular free Linux distributions include: www.distrowatch.com 
and www.linuxISO.org 
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an important role in Red Hat’s offering as a provider of a scalable enter-
prise-class database, but was substituted by an open source alternative 
PostgreSQL. Interestingly, Red Hat surpassed the intermediary, Post-
greSQL specialist firm Great Bridge, and simply used the freely available 
database source code – Great Bridge management decided to liquidate the 
firm, seeing no possibilities to compete with the powerful open source 
company (Shankland 2001a). 
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Fig. 25. Sales and profits of Red Hat Software, 1999-2004. Financial data in thousands 
USD. Data sources: corporate annual reports 
 
34.80%
45.23%
55.71% 53.95% 53.11%
66.07%
33.93%
46.89%46.05%
43.33%
32.21%
24.80%
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Subscription %
Services %
 
Fig. 26. Software subscription and services sales of Red Hat Software, 1999-2004. Data 
sources: corporate annual reports 
240      7 Open source movement 
 
Another important open source firm, Linuxcare, specializing in technical 
services for Linux and other open source platforms, was a desired partner 
of the largest IT companies such as Dell, subcontracting Linuxcare to 
provide support for their own customers, but the largest IT services 
companies soon established own Linux expertise centers. IBM might be the 
most active commercial supporter of the open source community, but its 
strategy was directly targeting Red Hat Software and Linuxcare as main 
competitors in the area of enterprise services. Dramatically losing its 
market share under attack from past partners, Linuxcare unsuccessfully 
tried to merge with a Linux vendor Turbolinux, and in 2002 switched the 
business model to software sales, focusing on data consolidation software 
Levanta, complementing IBM mainframe platform. 
Open source companies face the same challenges as commercial software 
companies, and their strategies and partnership patterns are surprisingly 
similar even when an open source code forms the basis of offered products. 
In many cases, heavy reliance on third-party components, available freely 
on the Internet, additionally motivates open source start-ups to pursue ac-
tively alliances with key established players. 
7.2.2 Involvement of established companies 
In the late 1990s, the largest established high-tech companies joined the 
open source efforts, adding credibility, but also irreversibly changing their 
directions. This dynamics can be explained through an analogy with other 
collective developments, where interests of altruistic individuals and self-
interested companies clash. Research on management fashions offers valu-
able insights into this phenomenon (Klincewicz 2005). Management fash-
ions are short-lasting swings in popularity of certain management concepts, 
such as business process reengineering or knowledge management, and 
sales of related solutions: management books, consulting services, or soft-
ware systems. Fashions establish commercial opportunities: initial con-
cepts, proposed by management bestsellers, are quickly turned into buzz-
words and sales arguments by consulting or IT services companies, which 
hitchhike on the fashion bandwagon, and later can even hijack a particular 
management fashion by distorting the initial messages, and adjusting them 
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to own products (Klincewicz 2005). This professionalization and commer-
cialization of management concepts is an example of a more general 
mechanism of hitchhiking on and hijacking of collective movements, ob-
served also in the case of the open source community. 
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Fig. 27. Popularity of open source in English-language periodicals. Data sources: an-
nual article counts based on “open source” search in EBSCO Business Source Corpo-
rate (business academic: peer-reviewed articles, business practitioner: remaining arti-
cles), CNET News.com (IT practitioner) and Compendex (technical academic), queries 
from April 12, 2005 
Figure 27 presents changes in the popularity of open source, based on the 
annual counts of articles, referring to the model in academic and practitio-
ner journals. The dramatic growth in 1999 was correlated with decisions of 
major I.C.T. companies about involvement in the community by opening 
source code of previously proprietary products or supporting the Linux 
platform. They decided to join the bandwagon as soon as they've spotted 
new revenue opportunities, and were able to capitalize on own proprietary 
technology base, products, patents, and of course financial resources, which 
privileged them over previously described open source start-ups. Their ap-
proaches and justifications for involvement can be divided into four broad 
types: 
• sales of products and services complementary to the open source soft-
ware; 
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• widget frosting - hardware makers allying with independent developers to 
support new devices in the open source software; 
• sell it, free it - when source code is opened and handed over to the open 
source  community, which continues the development and maintenance 
efforts; 
• hijacking – when a company capitalizes on the open source movement, 
using it for purposes different from the community member expectations. 
Each approach has its distinctive economic and strategic rationale. The 
most obvious orientation, sales of complementary goods, is rooted in the 
high-tech value chain model, where commoditization of a particular value 
chain segment offers commercial opportunities for companies from other 
segments, delivering complex solutions for end customers. Hardware com-
panies spotted the commercial opportunity early on – DEC was the first es-
tablished company supporting Linux development, already in 1994 encour-
aging the community to port the new system to its 64-bit Alpha processor 
(Weber 2004: 105-106). Interestingly, when in 2000 Microsoft decided to 
stop supporting Alpha in next Windows releases, Compaq (having in the 
meantime acquired DEC) was still able to sell the platform running the 
newest Linux versions. Intel was similarly involved in the open source 
community, actively investing in start-up companies, sponsoring develop-
ment projects and releasing own toolkits to make sure all newly released 
Intel-based computer architectures can be supported by Linux developers. 
Widget frosting (OpenSource.org 2005) is a particularly attractive solu-
tion for semiconductor and hardware companies, which need dedicated 
drivers and software for their devices. Under the proprietary software re-
gime, they internally develop them, shipping with the physical products 
and releasing on support websites at no additional charge – the software 
development and maintenance constitute costs not profits. Open source de-
velopment could significantly reduce these expenditures, and this explains 
why consumer electronics companies willingly use embedded Linux com-
ponents. The scenario resembles the earlier described situation, when large 
server vendors welcomed Microsoft's initiative to substitute their clustering 
software solutions with a standardized, Windows-based alternative – even 
though the new product was reducing software sales of these companies 
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and potential revenues from proprietary services, they no longer needed to 
cover substantial costs of technology development and maintenance in an 
area, what was only an enabler for the hardware sales. 
Similar cost concerns may motivate companies to open source code of 
products, which have reached mature or decline stage in their product life-
cycles. Model characterized as sell it, free it (Weber 2004: 196) recom-
mends to free such ageing technologies in order to reduce maintenance 
costs, while still being able to maintain the installed base and potentially 
use community-develop enhancements in own proprietary platforms. The 
code opening may also spell a renaissance of the product, when open 
source developers discover new product uses or redesign its architecture – 
the releasing company usually reserves itself the rights to incorporate new 
developments into the commercial product, so the code opening may also 
positively influence future product revenues and market penetration. More-
over, opening code of obsolete or non-key technologies does not endanger 
the owner's competitive position – companies participating in open source 
tend to reveal more generic code, while protecting critical components 
from competitors and imitators (Henkel 2004: 15-16). The first significant 
code opening was made by Netscape Communications for its web browser, 
which had lost the battle of standards against Microsoft, and had already 
been distributed for free. Apple's decision to open source code of its operat-
ing system turned out not to be as courageous as initially thought, as the 
company revealed only the underlying software layer, not useful for other 
projects, and more importantly based on another open source project 
FreeBSD (West 2003: 1272). Even the most active “code opener” IBM is 
sharing only code and patents for underlying generic technologies, main-
taining proprietary control over its real sources of revenue: technologies re-
lated to mainframe computers, databases and business applications (Lohr 
2005). The source code opening symbolizes an open dialog with the devel-
oper community and customers – this explains, why even Microsoft de-
cided to offer code preview to selected third-parties under its “shared 
source” program. 
 
244      7 Open source movement 
 
 
Release of commercial 
products for Linux platform 
Opening of source code 
1998 Corel – WordPerfect suite 
1998 Oracle – Oracle8 database 
1999 Lotus IBM – Lotus Domino 
1999 SAP – SAP R/3 
1999 Computer Associates – 
Unicenter TNG, Ingres database 
2000 Novell – NDS eDirectory 
2000 HP – main server product 
lines 
2002 Veritas Software – storage 
solutions 
 
Release of free products for 
Linux platform 
1998 InterBase Software (In-
prise/Borland) - database  
1998 Corel – developer tools and 
WordPerfect suite 
1998 Informix – database 
1998 Sybase – database 
1998 IBM – DB2 database 
1999 Sun Microsystems – 
StarOffice 
2000 Corel – Photo Paint 
1998 Netscape Communications – Netscape Communi-
cator web browser 
1999 Apple Computer – parts of Mac OS X operating 
system 
1999 SGI – XFS file system and other technologies 
1999 HP – e-speak web services platform 
1999 IBM – JFS file system and other technologies 
2000 Apple Computer – QuickTime multimedia stream-
ing software 
2000 Sun Microsystems – NetBeans, OpenOffice 
(StarOffice) 
2000 Nokia – mobile web browser 
2001 IBM – Eclipse development tools, developerWorks 
web services tools 
2001 HP – Cooltown interconnecting peripherals tech-
nology 
2001 Sun Microsystems – Grid engine for distributed 
computing 
2001 Microsoft - Shared Source program initiated: pre-
view of product code for selected developers and cus-
tomers (code cannot be re-used) 
2002 Symbian – mobile operating system (code cannot 
be re-used) 
2002 RealNetwork – Helix multimedia streaming client 
2003 Bitstream – free fonts for Linux 
2004 Novell – YAST for installing and configuring 
Linux 
2004 Microsoft – several Windows developer tools 
2004 BEA Systems – Beehive 
2004 Computer Associates – Ingres database 
2005 Sun Microsystems – Solaris 10 operating system 
Table 26. Examples of commercial, free and open software releases by established 
commercial companies active in the open source community 
The fourth option is hijacking: the open source movement could be ex-
ploited for own purposes by arriving commercial vendors. They are wel-
come by the community for bringing the feature gifts, specialized code, de-
veloped outside of the open source projects (von Krogh et al. 2003: 1233-
1234), releasing free low-end products for open source (without revealing 
their source code), and offering complementary products and services. The 
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participation may however be rooted in strategic considerations other than 
the interest in selling complementary goods or reducing software develop-
ment costs. Hijacking the collective movement may help establish own 
dominant position, better targeting key competitors with not only commer-
cial but also ideological “weapons”. IBM's involvement in the Linux world 
was feared by Microsoft already in the “Halloween memo” (Microsoft 
1998) – IBM, which used to be a symbol of a closed, proprietary platform, 
restricting collaboration opportunities for third-parties to benefit from 
cover all segments of the value chain with own offering, is nowadays pub-
licly praised as the main open source supporter. There is no radically new 
industry logic behind IBM's involvement – the company managed to estab-
lished an own semi-walled garden, switching to Linux as a community-
supported platform and supplementing it with proprietary extensions to 
keep customers locked-in. In 2000, IBM decided to standardize all hard-
ware lines with Linux and to phase out own Unix clone AIX, even though 
by that time, AIX offered more advanced features than Linux. The com-
moditization of operating system software was a useful way to make the 
IBM-driven value chain cost competitive, compared with alternatives from 
Microsoft or other Unix vendors. Further open source commitments, in-
cluding the handover of the $40M worth source code of developer tools to 
the non-profit Eclipse Foundation in 2001, were both enhancing the corpo-
rate image, as well as reducing internal maintenance costs of non-core 
components. IBM was later able to reuse Eclipse-derived code in commer-
cial products, especially after it acquired a specialist programmer tool com-
pany Rational, and to promote web services standards through the commu-
nity. Finally, the open source involvement supported IBM's business 
transformation – over several years, the company disposed of non-core 
hardware operations and gave away developer software to focus on large 
enterprise customers, keeping strict control over key technologies (main-
frame hardware, databases and business applications) and growing its in-
ternal IT service competences. IBM wasn't the only company, which made 
open source key to its strategy, as two other Microsoft's arch-enemies fol-
lowed the lead, Corel invested in Linux as the underlying platform for all 
its products in 1999, but later abandoned the plans due to financial prob-
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lems. Novell acquired in 2003 two Linux companies Ximian and SuSE, and 
revitalized its networking competences in the new technological 
environment, becoming the leading Linux vendor. The text is not intended 
as a criticism of the above-mentioned companies for being hypocritical or 
instrumental in their exploitation of the open source movement – it rather 
reminds of the usefulness of value chain analysis in strategies of estab-
lished high-tech companies. While supporting the open source movement, 
IBM pursued its own value chain leader strategy, establishing a semi-
walled garden just like other companies described earlier in this book, en-
riching its commercial solutions with publicly available software. Technol-
ogy platforms evolved from entirely proprietary, vertically integrated sys-
tems like IBS S/360 through multi-layered solutions including Microsoft 
Windows towards open standards, not sponsored by any single company 
(West 2003: 1280) – but the openness concerns only one segment of the 
value chain, operating system software, and still offers commercial oppor-
tunities for complementors, able to appropriate profits from the Linux-
related value chain. 
7.3 Discussion 
The chapter described the early emergence of open source start-up compa-
nies, which started putting price tags on free components, developing pro-
prietary product extensions or closing previously public source code. The 
open source community is nowadays professionalized and does no longer 
resemble the metaphorical chaotic bazaar. Participants adopted software 
development practices of the initially criticized cathedrals, no longer op-
posing the use of proprietary components, promoting competition between 
projects, distinguishing their own ones by brand names, and putting an in-
creased emphasis on the strategic alliances with commercial vendors of 
hardware, software systems and providers of IT services. Critical for the di-
rection of changes was however the participation of established commercial 
firms, which hitchhiked on the open source hype and later managed to hi-
jack the community of developers and users, melting non-proprietary open 
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source software with own, protected technologies, deriving substantial 
revenues from the newly established market. 
The movement did not establish new underlying industry logic, merely 
modifying the previous arrangements, quickly assimilated by major high-
tech companies. The important difference between proprietary and open 
source software businesses is related to the property rights protection 
mechanisms, not in corporate strategies. Open software is free in ways 
analogous to "free speech" (unrestricted) but not necessarily to "free beer" 
(costing nothing) (Weber 2004: 5), and even if the software is actually 
available at no cost, hidden costs may arise in other segments of the value 
chain, justifying the interests of established high-tech companies, capitaliz-
ing on complementary products and services. While the use of open source 
software in many cases reduces the overall costs of deploying I.C.T. solu-
tions, it does not radically differ from the logic of the high-tech value 
chain. One chain segment becomes commoditized - but the focus of corpo-
rate strategies shifts to neighboring segments, which still offer opportuni-
ties for chain leaders, complementors and contractors. 
A model of shared ownership of intellectual property and commoditiza-
tion is possible also for other value chain segments. It seems particularly 
interesting for open content projects, community-driven development of 
public knowledge - an excellent example is Wikipedia, a web-based ency-
clopedia with entries created and extended by Internet users. Even in the 
semiconductor and hardware segments, similar opportunities exist - Sun 
experimented in 1999 with loosening IPR control by making publicly 
available the basic designs for chip architectures Sparc and PicoJava 
(Crothers 1999), but the company guaranteed itself rights to conduct com-
patibility tests and charge royalties for every commercial shipment based 
on the designs. The open source model is easy to adopt for information 
goods, which are not scarce and could be distributed at low costs thanks to 
new technologies such as the Internet - but would not be feasible for physi-
cal, tangible products, characterized by relatively high variable costs. 
Moreover, the model can be applied to other industries and domains - 
“open science” concerns situations, when companies make their scientific 
discoveries publicly available (Lerner, Tirole 2001: 1999), establishing 
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shared knowledge platforms on which everybody can build proprietary so-
lutions. Paybacks from a mutual IP disclosure among competitors are dem-
onstrated by cross-licensing agreements or initiatives such as the earlier de-
scribed establishment of a shared patent pool by Japanese electronics 
companies, working on 3G phones for NTT DoCoMo. Such arrangements 
are not intended to privilege any party, and generally lower entry barriers to 
the market, boosting technology diffusion – however, interested companies 
always find ways to differentiate themselves by proprietary extensions, 
brand names or complementary technologies. 
Weber in his seminal analysis of the open source movement claims that 
the control over the source code was the source of competitive advantage in 
the traditional business model, which changed with the advent of the open 
source (Weber 2004: 192). The above presented analysis suggests that not 
the control of code is key to the success, but rather the control of comple-
mentary products and partner relations, translating itself into the ability to 
offer end-to-end solutions and a compelling vision for customers. The con-
cluding section should also contain a more general remark concerning the 
dynamics of the high-tech industry: IBM used to be a symbol of proprietary 
architecture, disliked by most players and clients, and this image faded in 
the recent years, so that now the company is perceived as the main open 
source supporter, no longer mentioning the proprietary character of tech-
nologies, which still remain its key sources of revenue. Maybe a time will 
come, when the name Microsoft would stand at the forefront of another 
community-driven movement, symbolizing openness and fairness? Open 
source does not bring revolutionary industry changes, neither is it a passing 
fad – but its impact is merely restricted to the regulation of intellectual 
property rights to use information goods. 
 
  
8 Implications for corporate strategies and 
government policies 
The book presented an overview of the underlying business logic, specific 
for the high-tech industry. It focused in particular on the importance of stra-
tegic alliances in establishing the value for customers. The proposed model 
of high-tech value chain is a novel way of analyzing technology markets 
and interorganizational partnerships, resulting from the technical features 
of Information and Communication Technologies and defining the industry 
structure. Complementary alliances among companies from various value 
chain segments stimulate innovation and diffusion of new technologies. 
According to the model, the importance of specific chain segments depends 
on creative strategies of involved companies – semiconductor, software or 
content firms may equally succeed in building end-to-end solutions for end 
customers and assembling a partnership network around their underlying 
technologies.  
The analytical framework helps also identify three distinctive strategic 
positions, available for high-tech industry participants. These value chain 
roles are linked to strategic intents, objectives, as well as political and part-
nering skills. The typology offers new ways of interpreting own company's 
industry position and designing corporate strategies, revealing hidden and 
sometimes counterintuitive aspects of the business. Table 27 summarizes 
the three strategic value chain orientations – by structuring the roles in alli-
ance network, partners benefit from synergies and specialization effects. 
 
 
Table 27. Three alternative orientations in the high-tech value chain.  
Used symbols: (***) significant, (**) medium, (*) insignificant, (-) non-existent 
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 Value chain leader Complementor Contractor 
Deliverables technological platform products services 
Customers mass market product niche(s) competence niche(s) 
Sources of 
competitive 
advantage 
installed base 
end-to-end solution 
with complementary 
products from partners 
installed base 
unique technologies and 
products, focus 
relations with value chain 
leader 
seamless integration with 
technological platform 
unique skills 
operational excellence 
relations with other value 
chain companies 
cost advantages 
flexibility 
Strategic 
objectives 
maintaining leading 
position in the value 
chain 
maintaining stable 
relations with value chain 
leader 
extending the scope of 
services, gaining 
independence with own 
branded products 
Partners all value chain 
segments 
close segments in the 
value chain 
paying clients from a 
selected segment 
Dynamics of 
strategy 
incentives and 
deterrents ("divide et 
impera”) 
substitution and 
innovation patterns 
("partner dance”) 
partner dependence and 
betrayal ("Eve 
Harrington”) 
Scope of 
technologies 
and skills 
generalist specialist specialist 
Sales model direct/indirect sales to 
end customers 
direct/indirect sales to end 
customers 
services for partners-
clients 
Risk and 
investment 
*** ** * 
Technological 
dependence on 
other parties 
* *** * 
Financial 
dependence on 
other parties 
- * *** 
Ownership of 
IPRs 
*** ** - 
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High-tech value chain leaders bridge various chain segments, assembling 
complete solutions and supporting businesses of partners. The strategy dif-
fers from previously discussed platform leadership (focused merely on 
promoting own underlying technologies), involves foresight and responsi-
bility. Not many software companies get as deeply involved in their value 
chains as Microsoft, partnering closely with semiconductor, hardware and 
telecommunications companies. NTT DoCoMo case demonstrated in turn 
the role of an insightful value chain leader in establishing new technology 
markets by pursuing cooperation with software and content providers, who 
themselves would probably be too small to gain critical mass for their in-
novative offerings. Thanks to chain leaders, alliance networks are stream-
lined around specific value propositions, and diverse industry segments 
converge to form solutions, addressing customer problems. The companies 
need to be skilled politicians, using “stick and carrot” to keep other partners 
motivated. 
Complementors are important partners, valued by the chain leader as 
long as they focus and complement their technological solutions. The book 
discussed the dynamics of substitution and innovation, demonstrating the 
inevitable commoditization and standardization of areas, which once used 
to form major streams of revenue for complementors. The tensions between 
chain leader and complementor do not justify decisions to compete. For 
substituted complementors, it is wiser to concentrate on new product gen-
erations, and continue penetrating the installed base of a value chain, in-
stead of potentially fatal competitive struggles or strives for chain leader-
ship. 
Contractors play the archetypical role of Eve Harrington22, beginning as 
trusted partners of other high-tech companies, and later building skills, 
technologies and contacts bases, enabling them to offer own products, 
competing with their past partners. The strategy is potentially the most re-
warding one, requiring only limited financial inputs and reducing risk of 
                                           
22 Eve Harrington was a character from Joseph Mankiewicz's Oscar-crowned movie “All 
About Eve” (1950) – the young aspiring actress gained trust of Broadway star Margo 
Channing, working as her personal aid and learning to imitate her acting skills only to 
betray her and start own acting career at her cost. 
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product development and sales – however, its key precondition is the exis-
tence of close relations with potential clients-partners. 
Even though companies from any chain segment may pursue each of 
these strategies, their options are restricted by financial requirements, pos-
sessed specialist knowledge and contact networks. Strategic analysis helps 
identify own strengths and weaknesses, and the model of value chain can 
subsequently be used to work out specific recommendations. 
The book presented the underlying logic of the high-tech industry, sym-
bolized by the concept of value chain – it is therefore important to examine 
the existence of alternative logics, as other ways of understanding the mar-
ket might lead to different strategic recommendations. The following sec-
tion will overview four possible alternatives – domination, chain virtualiza-
tion, community-driven and government-driven efforts. 
The “do-it-yourself” attitude, described also as strategy of a dominator 
(Iansiti and Levien 2004: 69) is no longer feasible in nowadays markets. 
Literature discussed examples of companies, focused on internal develop-
ment and maintaining no or only few alliances. Gomes-Casseres (1996: 42) 
listed in 1996 IBM, DEC, Intel and Sony as firms, which were avoiding al-
liances, hoping to dominate their value chains – nowadays, all of these 
companies (or they corporate successors) are active value chain players. 
Value chain virtualization is a theoretical concept, emphasizing the short-
lasting, ad hoc nature of linkages among companies: instead of partner-
ships, they would pursue market-based governance mechanisms. “Plug-
and-play” architectures facilitate interchangeability of partners (Veryard 
2002), but real virtualization would only be possible with entirely open 
standards – while even the open source community demonstrates the exis-
tence of path dependence and technological lock-ins. Openness of one 
segment of the value chain – for example operating system software, as in 
the case of Linux – does not change the proprietary character of hardware, 
business solutions or specialist services, used by companies to build semi-
walled gardens and control the market. The current virtualization scenarios 
are restricted to the availability of contractors, but end customer solutions 
are delivered within specific value chains. Internet reduces transaction 
costs within markets – but it does not motivate companies to replace hier-
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archies by markets, as the same Internet technology lowers also coordina-
tion costs within organizations, thus helping increase efficiency in multiple 
ways, through networks of suppliers, partners and own departments (Carr 
2004: 12). 
Community-driven development scenario was thoroughly discussed in 
the chapter concerning the open source software. The initial ideology of 
decentralized and chaotic “bazaars” was gradually supplemented by institu-
tionalized forms of cooperation, establishment of commercial startup com-
panies, and attempts to hijack the community by large high-tech firms. In-
stead of alternative industry logic, open source modified merely project 
management techniques and perspectives on intellectual property manage-
ment. 
Finally, involvement of government could be interpreted as a challenge 
to the proposed framework - national and regional cluster initiatives, as 
well as government-driven technological standardization may potentially 
change the roles of chain leaders, aligning firms around political not busi-
ness objectives. This conclusion is however not justified – cluster initia-
tives are pursued to promote alliance formation among local companies and 
stimulate internal dynamics of the industrial system, ultimately establishing 
high-tech value chains. Government standardization efforts are in turn fo-
cused on commoditizing a specific value chain segment, especially to fa-
cilitate the business of local companies – European governments decided in 
the 1990s to embark on a common mobile telephony standard GSM, Japa-
nese government stimulated in the 1980s the (ultimately failed) TRON op-
erating system to help local companies compete with Microsoft (Takahashi 
and Namiki 2003: 1594-1596), and Chinese ministries took the lead role in 
establishing TD-SCDMA as national 3G mobile standard to limit the de-
pendence on Western technology providers. In each of these cases, the 
commercial success of specific technologies was however dependent on the 
availability of solutions compliant with the promoted standard, delivered 
through complex value chains of local high-tech companies. Even the Chi-
nese TD-SCDMA initiative, initially interpreted by analysts as protectionist 
government project, turned out to be driven by an association of firms led 
by Datang, co-opting local and foreign partners from other value chain 
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segments, including semiconductors, infrastructure, handsets and software. 
Regardless of possible nationalist or anti-liberal motivations for govern-
ment funding, successful initiatives will sooner or later adopt the high-tech 
value chain structure, where leading roles are played by commercial com-
panies. 
The high-tech value chain is the currently prevalent underlying logic of 
the industry, witnessed in different cultural environments and various seg-
ments of the high-tech market. The book proposed an analytical framework 
for corporate strategies, alongside examples of multiple useful techniques, 
such as: partner network mapping, distinction between close and distant 
value chain segments, differentiation of intellectual property ownerships by 
alliance partners, metaphorical dynamic “dance” of complementor and 
chain leader or strategic transformation from partner intimacy towards in-
dependent innovation. The presented examples of firms, following the de-
scribed strategic principles, will certainly offer a useful contribution to the 
strategies of both incumbents and start-ups, helping them learn from mis-
takes and experiences of leading technology companies. 
The author believes that the presented model of high-tech value chain is a 
useful framework for setting corporate strategies, not merely a technical 
description of product and technology portfolios.  It helps decompose part-
nership networks in high-tech markets, identify existing and intended posi-
tions of own company and target potential partners in an effort to offer a 
comprehensive solution for end users. New strategic insights include the 
awareness of technological and strategic interdependencies between tech-
nologically advanced companies and of the partnership imperative. As the 
book demonstrated, most companies do not need to (or even should rather 
not) strive for leadership positions in the value chain, as it involves sub-
stantial investments and business risk. Instead, they should identify and co-
operate with leaders of specific value chains. Aligning own strategies with 
them could help optimize the efforts – but consequently, often requires also 
giving up certain ambitious objectives, and the companies need to under-
stand the underlying logic of the market to know, when their own strategies 
might be endangered by the dominant partner. 
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The findings can be used by startup companies to maximize investments 
and impact of technology strategies, especially by evolving from contrac-
tors to complementors, as it was demonstrated by the case of Indian off-
shore specialists. Established market players might want to reexamine their 
positions and definitions of chain segments, facing the industry conver-
gence – the book demonstrated how NTT DoCoMo and Microsoft crea-
tively reacted to market changes and the growing importance of content 
segment. The three identified strategies of: value chain leader, complemen-
tor and contractor are relevant also for markets based on different advanced 
technological platforms, for example biotechnology. 
The framework is additionally useful in directing government science 
and technology policies, which should be based on a sound understanding 
of domestic sectors' strategic positions in global high-tech value chains. 
Only in this way, governments can set realistic economic and technological 
objectives, deciding whether national industries should strive for self-
sufficiency or rather synergistic co-operation with specific chain leaders. 
The model helps also direct sectoral investments and policies, as well as 
opportunities for foreign direct investment. 
Finally, the book presented new ethical and legal dimensions of the inter-
organizational politics, as many of the discussed techniques, employed par-
ticularly by value chain leaders, seem questionable. For example, the co-
option of partners thanks to technology investments is strikingly similar to 
the payola practice, declared illegal in the multimedia domain, but not 
regulated with reference to the high-tech industry. Numerous litigations 
and court cases involving leading technology companies demonstrated the 
questionability of wide-spread practices, as well as imperfections of exist-
ing legal frameworks. The author did not intend to evaluate the conflicting 
ethical and legal opinions, focusing instead on a detailed description of the 
interorganizational politics and believing that companies have to act within 
the confines of the underlying industry logic, but they should also be aware 
of its deficiencies and have the courage to organize themselves and change 
the rules, if they were challenged for ethical reasons. 
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